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GOODBYE JAPAN

Without doubt there is no other power with which America has locked in a death struggle yet about which she knows so little as Japan.

Goodbye J A P A N

BY JOSEPH NEWMAN



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L. B. FISCHER · NEW YORK

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MANUFACTURED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
BY AMERICAN BOOK-STRATFORD PRESS, INC.

Designed by Stefan Salter

To Mary
for her encouragement and help
and to my teacher of Japan
whose genius unhappily has been proved
by the great disaster

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

To the New York Herald Tribune the author expresses his thanks for permission to use material taken from reports which he sent from Tokyo, and to its managing editor, Mr. George Cornish, his appreciation for securing for him a leave of absence which made it possible for him to write this book by escaping internment in Japan.

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P R E F A C E

THERE is a legend among the Japanese people that those who fail to catch a glimpse of famous Mt. Fuji as they are leaving the picturesque islands will never return. As I sailed from Yokohama shortly before the outbreak of war, dark clouds formed in the sky, hiding the face of the beautiful mountain which Japanese consider a sacred symbol of purity, serenity and peace. I was leaving on one of the last three evacuation ships sent to the United States by the Japanese government to withdraw as many of its nationals as possible before launching an attack against the democracies.

The failure of Mt. Fuji to show her face that day was an augury with deep significance. For on that very afternoon that she remained in hiding, either through shame or sorrow, or both, Prince Fumimaro Konoye was completing arrangements for the resignation of

the last Cabinet to have peace with the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands to make way for a regime which was to lead Japan into a war which will decide the fate of the island empire.

Some of us who left on those last ships may return to Japan, but none will return to a Japan anything like the one we left behind. It was Goodbye Japan not only for us but for the country herself. It also was goodbye for some of the Japanese in submarines, warships and planes which followed almost in our wake for the attack on Honolulu and American ships in hitherto peaceful Pacific waters. Only their souls may now return to Japan to be enshrined with thousands of others in wooden Yasukuni Shrine, the spiritual resting place for dead warriors in Tokyo.

One might think of Mt. Fuji as having continued to hide her face behind the dark clouds which concealed her symmetrical cone on that late fall afternoon, for it was then that those entrusted by the Son of Heaven to lead the destinies of the empire decided to destroy completely the qualities of peace and beauty for which the holy mountain stood as a heavenly guardian. And while Fuji hides her head, thousands of twentieth-century samurai are leaving their revered islands without getting that last treasured look.

When Japanese say goodbye to their country and their people, they use a word into which they pour all their fatalism, sorrow and pride. They say "Sayonara," which means "If it must be so." It is a goodbye of

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fatalistic resignation—the spirit in which Japanese have forsaken the peace which Mt. Fuji symbolizes and engaged in a venture which may mean goodbye to the island empire and the god who was sent from the heavens to rule over it.

But before we hold final rites for the Japanese, we should pay them the courtesy of recognizing some of their virtues and the use to which they have put them. There is a strange notion, which has gained wide currency both in the United States and Great Britain, that the Japanese were forced into the war by the Nazis, whose puppets they had become. Articles have appeared in the press protesting amazement at “Japan’s innocent faith” in Hitler, who intends to destroy not only the Japanese but all colored races. The truth of the matter is that the Japanese understood the Nazis even before we did. They had been thinking along Nazi lines of racial domination and aggression long before Hitler came to power. We tend to forget that the Japanese did not wait for the rise of Hitler to launch their attack against Manchuria and knock the first big hole into the League of Nations structure, thereby winning for themselves the right to claim leadership of the movement to destroy the peace fabric of the post-war period.

The Japanese did not join the war to please the Nazis or to commit harakiri, another popular notion offered to explain actions by an Asiatic country which we find difficult to understand. It is not necessary to look

behind a Japanese "mask" to find the reason for their attack in the Pacific. Japanese officials of Cabinet rank announced their immediate aims several times: to gain control over the western half of the Pacific for establishment of an Asiatic bloc even if it were necessary to attack the United States, Great Britain and the Netherlands Indies. If the attack in the Pacific came as a surprise, it was only because of our refusal to believe what the Japanese had been saying and doing for years. We bluffed ourselves into thinking the Japanese bluffed all the time.

It is true that the Japanese did not present our Secretary of State with an official warning as to the time and place their forces would strike so that we would be prepared to meet the aggressors and send them to a watery grave off Hawaii. But modern warfare is not fought that way any longer and could not be fought that way by an enemy whose time and resources are short. We may insist on calling the attack on Honolulu "treacherous" in our indignant refusal to recognize that there no longer is any morality in international warfare, but that does not explain our failure to understand that an attack by a country like Japan against two of the biggest powers of the world could be nothing but "treacherous."

We unfortunately have suffered long from what appears to be almost a congenital incapacity to take the Japanese seriously. It was this which caused our general failure to evaluate the Japanese properly and be

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prepared for their moves. The disaster at Honolulu was primarily the result of a lack of mental rather than physical preparedness not only in Hawaii but in the United States as a whole.

There lingered in the American mind nostalgic recollections of Japan as a land of cherry trees, samurai and geisha and of strange little Orientals who lived in paper houses and slept on straw mats. We recognized, of course, that an industrial revolution had occurred in Japan, but we did not permit that to worry us very much, as a great deal of what the Japanese learned about the science of the white "barbarians" was imported from our country. We therefore felt that we were keeping tabs on the Japanese. Many American engineers who came to Tokyo to help the Japanese improve their industrial plants took the attitude that Americans did not tell the Japanese everything they knew; that they managed to keep the Japanese behind at a relatively safe distance; and that even if late models of American planes were sold to the "Japs," the inexpert Nipponese would crack them up soon after taking off. Views such as these appeared to be in back of the minds of those Americans in Congress and out who expected shivers to run up and down the spines of Japanese when they hurled threats in the press about blowing Tokyo off the face of the earth and of smashing the Japanese fleet at one blow—as if the Japanese had constructed their fleet by penny pinch-

ing, hunger and political murders only to parade it into the open Pacific to be sunk!

The Japanese navy, like that of any sizeable power, thinks it has the best fleet in the world. It probably is not and could not be because of the general standard of technique in Japan. On the other hand, it may not be the worst navy in the world either. Japanese naval officers were convinced before the outbreak of war that their fleet could defeat the American in a showdown in the Pacific. Army officers felt the same way about their forces. To us such beliefs are incredible because we ourselves cannot conceive them. But what was important regarding decisions made in Tokyo was what the Japanese believed and not what we thought was incredible. As much as it may hurt our pride, the fact is that the Japanese army and navy sincerely believed they could defeat the American forces and acted on that belief.

It would be unfortunate indeed if at a later date we should persuade ourselves that the Japanese were innocent victims of a Nazi plot or of a handful of insane militarists with a passion for harakiri. As will be pointed out later, the Japanese planned long and deliberately for the attack against the democracies. They attacked when they thought it best for them to attack and not when the Nazis wanted them to. Japan is not another Italy playing Hitler's game. Her militarists consider themselves not equal but superior to the Nazis, whom they hope some day to challenge for

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control of the world in order to fulfill the "divine mission" with which they have been entrusted by their gods.

Their immediate aim to conquer Asia and the south sea area is only part of this mission. Failure to grasp its full scope is to invite retribution more devastating than that at Pearl Harbor. The democracies may win the war in the Pacific if they succeed in bringing to bear in time their superior material strength, but they again will lose the peace which follows should they fail to identify and eliminate the forces in Japan which otherwise will forever menace them and disturb the Pacific.

The democracies are as poorly prepared to conclude peace in the Pacific at present as they were to wage war there at the outbreak of the conflict. They now have the simultaneous task of waging war and of securing the knowledge necessary for a peace which will not again make a mockery of their victory. There is no better beginning to such an undertaking than an examination of the developments which led to the outbreak of war in the Pacific after the Japanese army and navy had secured the support of a group of aristocrats, diplomats, politicians and ambitious capitalists whose cowardice and subservience made them as guilty of aggression as the militarists themselves.

New York City
March, 1942

J O S E P H N E W M A N

G O O D B Y E J A P A N

CHAPTER ONE

T H E U N H O L Y T R I N I T Y

WHEN dictatorship came into vogue in Europe during the twentieth century, Japan did not need to import it from abroad with other products. She had one of her own. It was not called a dictatorship, however, but a constitutional monarchy. It is true that Japan has a constitution and a monarchy, but her people derive little benefit from either. Together with the emperor, on whom they are based, both the constitution and the monarchy conceal one of the strangest dictatorships in the world.

Who runs the Japanese Empire? No one ever asked the Board of Information because it would be an embarrassing question. But if Koh Ishii or his successor as spokesman were pressed for an answer, there is no doubt what it would be. He would say the emperor. Any Japanese would say the emperor. But it is not.

A German or an Italian can tell who really runs his country in one word, but a Japanese could not tell with all the words in his vague vocabulary. According to the constitution, "The Empire of Japan shall be reigned over and governed by a line of emperors unbroken for ages eternal." Theoretically, this gives the emperor absolute power, which strangely enough he has almost never been permitted to exercise.

Although Japanese frequently boast of the longest unbroken line of sovereigns in the history of the world, they are reluctant to point out that their emperors seldom if ever ruled. They also hesitate to admit that their sovereigns were little more than prisoners of governing war lords. The revolution of 1867, when the military dictator of the time was overthrown, did not change this deeply embedded practice. It simply changed one set of military dictators for another, which ran the country from a better position behind the throne than that of their predecessors.

Whether the emperor likes this arrangement no one knows because he does not talk about it any more than do the spokesmen of the Japanese government. There have been indications, however, that the emperor would like to have his military friends at more of a distance from his throne. Emperor Hirohito's grandfather, whom the militarists gave a new home in Tokyo following overthrow of the then ruling dictator, hoped for an organization which would make it more difficult for the militarists to seize his preroga-

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tives. He apparently thought that through the constitution which he promulgated it might become possible for his friends in the court and the aristocracy together with the rising business class to muster enough political strength to check the militarists.

But the militarists were not to be taken in by such devices. They protected themselves by making the emperor their direct commander. The Japanese army and navy, therefore, are not responsible to the government or the people. They owe allegiance only to the emperor. That means they are responsible to no one but themselves. The emperor is permitted to do little more than dress himself in the uniforms of commander-in-chief when he is taken out annually from his heavily guarded palace to one of the army fields in the suburbs of Tokyo to have a look at some of his boys in action or occasionally to Yokosuka or Yokohama for a ride on one of his big ships. But that does not mean he has much to say about what the army and navy will do with his boys and his ships, because he is commander-in-chief only in the constitution, and no one took the constitution very seriously except his literal-minded subjects.

A web of mystery has been woven around the revolution which brought to Japan not democracy but a new centralized organization of terror and militarism which spilled over to the Asiatic continent and exploded the entire Pacific area. The Japanese conceal an unshapely body beneath a beautiful kimono. They

also attempted to hide an ugly rebellion beneath the ceremonial robes of their divine emperor. It is not difficult to see what was beneath them.

The rebels who overthrew the military dictator, Yoshinobu Tokugawa, in 1867 belonged to a number of feudal clans who were on the "outs" with their victim and are referred to as the "outside clans." They felt that the family of the shogun, Japanese name for military dictator, had had more than a fair share of the benefits of oppression during its 267 years of successive rule. Like rebels in other countries, they needed money and a good press agent. All Japanese by this time knew where to go when they needed money, and so did these disgruntled war lords, the leading ones being of the Satsuma and Choshu clans. They went to the rising class of merchants, who had learned how to overwhelm sword-swinging samurai with new weapons. These merchants gradually were mortgaging a large part of the country's wealth and losing little time in foreclosing. One of them was Mitsui, head of the family which is the leading capitalist clan in Japan today.

Being dissatisfied with their treatment as social inferiors to samurai paupers and war lords whose lands they were able to take away, these merchants were glad to support a movement which would open a world of new opportunities for business and respectability. They had no special liking for the shogun, who was beginning to eye their expanding money bags with interest.

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The only other thing the rebels needed was a press agent, and the show would be ready to be staged. One of them had a brilliant idea when he thought of the imprisoned emperor. Komei, the emperor at that time, was leading a lonely existence at the palace in Kyoto, which he was not able to leave without the shogun's permission. The emperor was the shogun's most important subject because it was on his behalf that the military dictator was ruling the country. Komei, therefore, was a treasure worth far more than all the money of the Mitsui and their friends. It was only natural that he should be guarded by the shogun's troops to prevent his associating with the "outside" elements. An important principle for successful operation of the Japanese throne might be observed here. It is to keep the emperor in and the outsiders out. Once this principle is ignored, the throne is almost certain to change hands.

The outsiders saw clearly the value in having the emperor handle their publicity and had a strong suspicion that he would be happy to do so. It was true that there were enough court ladies at Kyoto to entertain him and that the food was not too bad, but were men, especially man-gods, meant only for sleeping and eating? Komei hoped for more from life than that, and the outsiders realized it. Their problem, however, was to get in touch with Komei without being caught by the shogun's soldiers. By exchanging notes carried in the long, innocent sleeves of the kimono worn by

court nobles, however, it apparently was not difficult to establish a communication system which evaded censorship much more successfully than that available to foreign correspondents in Tokyo about eighty years later.

Then things began to happen. Hitherto docile Komei, who would never raise his voice except to his court ladies, suddenly became rude to the shogun. He began offering uninvited suggestions about how the government should be run and was so bold as to issue the first big publicity piece in the campaign against the shogun. This was called an "edict," which soundly upbraided the shogun for concluding trade treaties with the United States, England and other foreign countries without asking the emperor anything about them. These treaties, incidentally, marked the reopening of Japan to foreign countries by the shogun and not by the emperor following the revolution, as Japanese sometimes like foreigners to believe.

The shogun was very much upset by this first public announcement to the people of Japan that their emperor was not satisfied with the way things were run at Yedo (old name for Tokyo). And well he might have been because the public began rallying to the relief of their imprisoned emperor. The country was rife with rumor of great things to come. The shogun, therefore, sought to appease Komei by sending one of his agents to Kyoto to tell the emperor he was sorry there had been a misunderstanding and to ask him to

let bygones be bygones. At the same time, the military dictator had his premier round up and imprison all those who helped the emperor get out his clever piece of publicity, fearing that it might very well be followed by a second edition. As his reward for attempting to thwart those seeking a "new order" in Japan, the premier was promptly assassinated at the gate of the shogun's palace in Tokyo, thereby setting an excellent example for subsequent slayings of the emperor's premiers and advisers who were unable to keep up with the rapid pace of the militarists.

When his premier was assassinated the shogun for the first time realized that things were pretty bad. The outsiders were closing in on him in Yedo and dared even strike at his very gate. He realized it would not be long before they broke through the gate itself, and then who could guarantee his head would remain in its proper place? The shogun, therefore, planned a brilliant diplomatic stroke. He asked Komei to join him as an equal partner in the dictatorship of Japan. In other words, he attempted to secure the services of Komei as his own publicity chief and thereby deprive the dissatisfied outside warriors of one of their strongest weapons. But this trick did not work. The outside clans already had moved into Kyoto and taken over custody of the emperor. It was the shogun who was now out and the outsiders who were in. And in to stay.

Having succeeded in getting into Kyoto and taking over the emperor, the final task of the outsiders was

to break into Yedo, the seat of government, and overthrow the military dictator. This they proceeded to do by arousing the public against the shogun. But first they needed a cause. It would not do simply to tell the people that a trinity of militarists, merchants and mikado wanted to oust the shogun so that they could wield his powers. Therefore they accused the shogun (after his family had been ruling for 267 years) of having usurped the powers of the almighty emperor which were given him by the Sun Goddess, the revered female who first conceived the empire of Japan. By robbing Komei of his ancestral rights, the shogun had desecrated the holy empire. In short, it was the shogun who was the rebel and not the rebellious outsiders. Thus ran their line of propaganda which started the movement for "restoration" to the emperor of his ancestors' power, which existed only in fiction and not in fact, because the emperors always were the kept puppets of the military dictators from earliest Japanese history.

To inject some spirit into the movement and help discredit the shogun further, the outsiders launched an anti-foreign campaign and attacked the shogun for reopening Japan to foreign countries after yielding to demands of Commodore Perry, who arrived with his Black Ships in 1853. To prove to the public that foreigners had greedy intentions and bode ill, the outside Choshu clan, by firing on their merchant ships, deliberately provoked the United States, Holland and

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France into attacking the soil of Japan, while the Satsuma clan attacked a British fleet. They knew this would bring retaliation. It did the next year, in 1864, when Shimonoseki was bombarded by the warships of all four powers in the first naval engagement between Japan and the democracies. A severe indemnity of \$3,000,000 was exacted. Less than eighty years later, descendants of these same Choshu and Satsuma clans led the attack on America's Pearl Harbor, England's Singapore and Holland's East Indies after having taken over France's Indo-China.

The Shimonoseki bombardment caused such loss of face to the shogun as to prove fatal. The shogun was held responsible for the attack, as it was he who began dealing with foreigners in the first place. Three years later the trinity was ready for the kill. Emperor Komei died, but the militarists still needed the imperial banner under which to march on Yedo. Therefore his son, the boy emperor Meiji, was given his father's role in the uprising. To make everything look legal, the militarists asked the boy emperor, as sovereign of the land, to command them to open hostilities against the Yedo government. The boy did as he was told on October 14, 1867. The shogun saw that the game was up, that he was outwitted and outnumbered by the rebels. On the day the attack was to be made, according to Japanese history books, the shogun asked the boy emperor for "permission" to surrender the power his family had seized. This was "granted." The rebels,

referred to as "loyalists" in Japan, had won. This was the glorious "Meiji Restoration" of 1867. The boy emperor was brought from Kyoto to Tokyo, where he was given a new home in the palace of the ousted shogun and made to look like a respectable god.

There are several things that might be observed in this little historical drama. The first is that the protagonists were the merchants and the militarists. It was the union of these two groups which provided the money, materials, guns and troops necessary to win wars. This union, forged in the fire of revolution, remained the basis of Japanese economic and military power which, after winning a civil war, was turned loose abroad for conquest of foreign territory. For better or for worse, the money men were wedded to the militarists. They helped the militarists gain power, and the militarists repaid them a thousandfold by building a modern war machine and conquering territories which made it possible for them to earn more money than they had ever dreamed of. On the whole, it was a satisfactory marriage despite frequent outbreaks, which take place in the best of families.

To provide his blessings for the union and for all its future undertakings, the emperor was invoked. The emperor was and has remained to this day a divine ghost in a trinity with the militarists and big business. He is a ghost because the powers which were vested in him when his sovereignty was "restored" vanished even before he had settled down in his new palace. He

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is divine because he is a god and is worshipped by his people, whom he serves as Chief Priest of a pagan national religion called Shinto. He is the living Jehovah of Japan, and his word is law, as far as the masses are concerned. As nominal ruler of the country, the emperor makes it possible for the militarists and big business to operate one of the most oppressive dictatorships in the world. As a living god in possession of the mirror, jewels, and sword, three magic symbols of divine power handed down from heaven by the Sun Goddess, the emperor secures divine blessings and acquiescence by a bewitched public for all of Japan's foreign wars undertaken by the two leading groups. Thus Meiji sanctified two foreign wars in addition to the revolution; his son Taisho, the first world war and numerous invasions of the Asiatic continent; and his grandson, the present ruler Hirohito, did the work for three more wars, the last of which may destroy the unholy trinity. Perhaps that is why, with his divine foresight, he named his reign "Showa," meaning Enlightened Peace.

Of the three divine treasures with which each emperor is vested on mounting the throne, the Japanese are told that the mirror symbolizes truth, the jewels mercy and the sword justice. A more apt designation might be that the mirror, reflecting the light of the sun, symbolizes the emperor, the jewels represent the money men and the sword stands for the militarists.

Hirohito is the most popular but the most lonely

man in Japan. That is because there are about seventy-two million persons who worship him but cannot become his friends. Perhaps such popularity and loneliness nowhere are combined on such a heroic scale as in the case of Hirohito. Although they must revere him, his subjects cannot even call him by his name. They refer to him only as "Heavenly Emperor," and he calls them "subjects." Not much friendship can be stirred up by the use of such tags. But perhaps realizing that familiarity might breed contempt, the militarists, the money men, and the aristocracy which handles Imperial Household affairs prefer to have it that way.

The subjects, however, are permitted to bow. And it is a very important bow that they make to the emperor. It is the National Bow and without equal anywhere in the world; or as the Japanese say, it is "peerless." This bow is the symbol of subservience of the subjects to their divine ruler. When the seventy-two million people in Japan bow to the emperor, and many of them do every day, it means that seventy-two million people in Japan are offering their lives to the emperor to do with as he sees fit. Hitler and Mussolini must regard Hirohito with the greenest of envy. Never have they been able to get anything like the unanimous submission of a people, for all their shouting and their flag-waving, that Hirohito secured without any of it.

To understand how it was possible for one man to

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have the lives of so many people served to him with a back-breaking bow, it is necessary to refer to the role which poverty, ignorance, habit and oppression play in Japan. They have been inherited from feudal and pre-feudal days and have provided the social basis for the amazing development of an obscure, isolated, agricultural country into one of the leading industrial powers of the world, armed with the most modern weapons of war for the conquest of foreign lands and foreign peoples.

If he is not overwhelmed by colorful kimonos and the pretty doll faces which look out over them and if he is fortunate enough to avoid an official goodwill escort, the foreigner who arrives in Japan is struck almost at once by the muddy gray cast to the landscape of the land of the rising sun. It does not take long to discover its origin. I recall my first automobile ride to Tokyo from Yokohama immediately after arriving from the United States. Gasoline was not being used exclusively for war at that time and it was possible to hire a taxi. Mile after mile along the twenty-mile highway linking the port city with the capital were small, drab, dirty, cramped-looking wood and paper structures which would hardly merit a better English word than "shacks." These were the homes in which god-worshippers were born and modern samurai developed. These were the homes where babies were taught to surrender their souls to their divine emperor before they were able to walk.

The scene was something of a personal shock as I had been poorly prepared for it by American school teachers, who taught that the Japanese were so immaculate that they would not wear their shoes into the home and would not blow their noses in handkerchiefs and then stuff them back into their pockets as we did. The dainty Japanese, they explained, blew them into sanitary paper napkins which were dropped into neat receptacles stationed at every street corner. If some of these teachers had gone to Japan they would have seen that the reason the Japanese removed their shoes is that most of them have to eat, sleep and play on the floor of one small room which serves at least five members of the family and very often eight or more. They also would have found long, yellow streams flowing from the noses of Japanese children who were discouraged from wiping them because it was believed unhealthful to do so.

Driving into the center of Tokyo for the first time from Yokohama is, for the foreigner, like coming into a clearing after a trip through swamps. In Tokyo can be found an entirely different civilization than that of the shack lands through which he has passed. Here is a city which might have been lifted bodily from the West and laid down in the midst of a country of wood and paper squalor. There is the eight-story Marunouchi building. Facing it on different sides are the outmoded, but still European, red-brick railway station, the modern central post-office, and the Yusen

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building, home of the N.Y.K. steamship line. The imposing \$9,000,000 white granite Diet building, which was first opened in 1936, when the army was preparing to close it, stands out even more in contrast to the homes of the people who paid for it.

But the heart of Tokyo is not all of Tokyo; neither is it all of Japan. Most of Tokyo is made of wood and paper boxes similar to those I saw along the road from Yokohama. Almost all of Japan is, too. Central Tokyo, which covers a very small area compared with the total area of the city, is the place for big buildings, big business, big government and big foreigners. To most Japanese, which means the people who do not live in the capital, Central Tokyo is "foreign." I cannot forget the look of wonder and amazement in the face of a Japanese peasant on his first visit to Tokyo as he looked around at all the stone, concrete, cement and glass which had been pounded into modern masses. Holding an equally dazed child with one hand, he pointed up with the other and asked me in Japanese, "Is that really the Marubiru?" (contraction for Marunouchi building *). I assured him it was, and he continued walking along the street with his head cocked back to stare at the eight-story structure, which has the same reputation among Japanese for its size that the Empire

* Being unable to pronounce the word "building," which they had to take over from English because they had no equivalent in their language for such structures, Japanese say "birudingu" or simply "biru," which is also their way of pronouncing "beer," another import for which they had no word of their own.

State Building has among Americans, even though this Japanese "skyscraper" would not stir the soul of the smallest country lad in the United States. He was so overcome by wonder that he did not even notice he had spoken to a foreigner.

The difference between Tokyo and most of Japan is the difference between most of the world and Japan. Tokyo is the nerve center for a Western industrial and military machine. In the rest of Japan, with the exception of a few other industrial cities, are the wood and paper homes which supply the manpower to run the Western machines. In the homes, which are almost the same as those of their ancestors, can be found the same habits of mind, the same teachings of blind obedience and filial piety, the same unquestioned veneration for the emperor and the same Shinto deities that existed hundreds of years ago in feudal Japan. Machines have altered the face of Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, Osaka and Nagoya, but they have not changed that of the rest of the country or the feudal minds that come out of it every day to run Japan's modern factories, modern warships and modern machine-guns.

The difference between Japan and the rest of the world and the reason she has succeeded in catching up with Western industries and war machines is that she has been able to exchange her feudal silk and feudal labor for the mechanical brains and industrial genius of the now detested foreigners. Japan imported the industrial revolution, but she closed her ports when it

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came to the thoughts and the standards of living which accompanied that revolution. Instead, the rulers of the country preferred that their people continue living in wood and paper houses, eat their regular diet of rice, fish and pickles in wood and paper surroundings, think wood and paper thoughts, and be brought back from the China battlefields in wood and paper boxes.

The people did not mind, and they were not particularly dissatisfied. Foreigners and not they were conscious of their poverty, ignorance, habits and oppression. Japanese accepted them in the nature of things. They carry on just as did their revered ancestors whom they worship every day. After centuries, feudal standards of life have been ingrained in their souls so that they now are taken for granted together with their emperors, their ancestors, their gods, their floods and their earthquakes. That is why Japanese are not even aware of the fact that they live under a dictatorship. As far as they are concerned, they are ruled by a divine emperor, and as long as they know he is on the throne (which is proved to them through photographs in their four-page newspapers and occasional appearances by the emperor in public), they feel that everything is as it should be and that all is right with the world of their gods and ancestors. They go right on making their National Bows.

The broad, pebbled plaza in front of the palace is the mecca of Japan. Subjects throughout the empire dream of visiting it some day to "pay respects" from

the nearest point possible to the imperial presence. The plaza is simply an extremely wide roadway which slopes upward slightly as one approaches the main gate of the palace, separated from the roadway by a double-arched bridge.

Every day of the year, from early morning to dusk, Japanese of all sizes and ages can be seen shuffling through the pebbles and then stopping suddenly at some vantage point to surrender their souls to their god. They go into a series of profound bows of obeisance and then move to another side of the plaza to repeat the performance. Even then they have not had enough. They gaze at the massive wooden doors with their golden, sixteen-petaled imperial chrysanthemum at the main palace gateway, which is guarded by two haughty looking soldiers of the Imperial Guard, their bayonets unsheathed, just as Hirohito's imperial ancestors must have been guarded at Kyoto. They stare at the three bunches of electric lamps, which are the only Western contribution to the feudal scene. Finally they take a last glance at the sloping massive stone wall on which sits perched a many-gabled, white, medieval guardhouse, originally set up to protect the shogun who lived behind it, and then turn around to walk back down to the foot of the plaza. Even here, before taking leave, they are almost certain to turn around again for an extra series of bows toward the emperor to let him know they were really serious about the whole matter and not just sight-seeing.

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On special occasions, like the emperor's birthday, the biggest holiday of the year, or demonstrations to celebrate the conquest of new territory, huge crowds throng the plaza and fill it to the bursting point. Here can be found a cross-section of the sovereign's subjects: children in uniform with school bags strapped across their backs and rising-sun flags in their hands, material for future wars and industrial machines; soldiers and sailors in pairs or large groups, the conquerors of empire and the murderers of moderate statesmen; members of patriotic societies with bands running diagonally across their chests or carrying pennants to identify them, the nationalist gangs which participate in the murders and assist in fostering "proper thoughts"; the priests with their 'medieval drums and their hungry, fanatical faces, the guardians of the gods who bless the crimes of their soldiers and sailors.

"Three cheers for His Majesty the Heavenly Emperor!" some patriot or soldier cries out, and everyone in unison throws his hands into the air three times in rapid succession and each time roars "banzai!" meaning ten thousand years or long life for the god who made it all possible. If the conquest of the army were big enough and bloody enough, God Hirohito himself might ride out on the bridge astride his white horse to sanctify it in person. Cheering would rise to a wild pitch, setting the green waters in the medieval moat around the palace trembling.

There was no secret about the fact that Hirohito was born in the usual human way. Japanese did not go so far as to claim that their emperors tumbled out of heaven as their ancestors are supposed to have done in the days when the Sun Goddess sent her grandson into a forced landing on a jagged peak in Kyushu, westernmost of the main Japanese islands. It was apparent to everyone that Hirohito shared the common national defect of poor eyes and had to wear glasses which were fitted and frequently adjusted by the same eye doctor who cared for numerous other eyes of his mortal subjects.

It also was known that Hirohito enjoyed sports and hobbies similar to those of subjects who could afford them. He often played tennis with some of his favorite aristocrats, like Count Aisuke Kabayama, American-educated son of the first governor of Formosa, rode his horse around the track of the palace grounds, went for a lonely swim in the foamy waters of the Pacific off the imperial beach at Hayama, where the emperor has his summer villa and where he fussed around with his undersea laboratory with experiments in marine biology, his favorite pastime.

But there was no point in trying to argue with Japanese about the fact that the emperor eats, sleeps, exercises, reproduces and generally functions like other human beings, including his subjects. It did not matter that Hirohito's father, the Emperor Taisho

who died insane, was the illegitimate son of Emperor Meiji and his mistress, Lady Yanagiwara. It was not an unusual practice in Japan to resort to mistresses when a wife was incapable of producing the desired male heir, although some earlier Japanese emperors apparently abused this custom by maintaining a large number of court mistresses in addition to five or even nine wives. Hirohito sanctified Meiji's action when he publicly recognized what was described in the Japanese press as Lady Yanagiwara's "services to the throne" by granting a court award to his natural grandmother.

Nor did it matter whether or not the Japanese imperial line was the longest successive one in the history of the world, stretching back to "time immemorial." Japanese themselves admit that it has taken some strange turns. Although their Sun Goddess is a female and they have had numerous empresses in their history, they recognize that the popularity of women as rulers declined after the scandalous relations of the Empress Koken with a monk whom she invited to live with her in the palace and who later tried unsuccessfully to usurp the throne. Some Japanese derive a secret sense of pleasure in reading about the scandalous doings of the old court. What does matter is that by constantly having dogma drummed into them since childhood, the Japanese grow into soldiers and sailors who are willing to kill and die for a lonely, forty-one-

year-old, moustached and bespectacled man who lives behind massive stone walls enclosing 531 acres in the heart of Tokyo and is called god.

Impoverished peasants, overworked laborers and twentieth-century samurai are not the only persons who bow in Japan. The militarists and money men also bow. The militarists bow to Hachiman, the god of war. The money men, who used to bow to the Diet and the court to save them from the army, now are bowing to the militarists. Because of their faithful worship, Hachiman smiled on the militarists and gave them one big war followed by still bigger wars. The militarists were thankful. They raised Hachiman to the rank of chief god of the country and secured for him even the bows of the emperor. The largest structure in most Japanese towns is the Hachiman shrine. It usually is set back in a quiet grove, where peaceful meditation of war is possible. Pigeons flock around the shrine to emphasize its peaceful nature. To children in country areas, where most of Japan's soldiers are produced, the word Hachiman is taken to mean playground, which also is significant. A Japanese explained this association by pointing out that children spent "many happy hours of thoughtless play" on the shaded ground of a Hachiman shrine. He failed to add, however, that many of these children spent the rest of their hours enshrined in Yasukuni, Tokyo home for the souls of Hachiman's admirers.

The militarists thank Hachiman more than just for

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wars and playgrounds. They thank him also for a long tradition of sword-swinging which has made it possible for them to cut down any opposition to their demands for money and materials to equip the children they collect from the playgrounds to fight the wars for Hachiman and Hirohito. They operated on the sound theory that bigger budgets brought bigger wars and bigger wars brought bigger budgets. Militarists did not object to the constitution, which Emperor Meiji "granted" to the people out of the goodness of his heart and the militarists later took away from them out of respect for the imperial gods, as long as there was no interference with their control of the government and through it control of domestic and foreign policy. They agreed to promulgation of the constitution, which established the Diet, as the price of centralization of the entire military, political and economic strength of the country for participation in a race for power, in which they already were far behind. Instead of hundreds of small armies broken up into feudal clans, they envisaged one huge force combining all local military strength. In the expansion of economic power through intercourse with foreign countries, militarists saw the means of equipping larger forces and constructing a modern naval armada.

There is no evidence of any formal agreement having been concluded by the two dictator groups regarding the division of control following the overthrow of the shogun and the establishment of a central

government. It is clear from what has happened, however, that the militarists understood that they were to run the government in addition to the army and navy, which were to be the new foreign spokesmen of the government, while business groups were to deal with the white "barbarians" and steal their scientific secrets of producing the strange black ships which ran against the winds and tides and carried aboard active volcanoes which could smoke, thunder and destroy like their natural ones. The government, of course, would assist businessmen financially in setting up plants in Japan to produce the mysterious ships and other strange devices invented by the barbarians. At the same time, they could handle the production and export of Japanese goods to pay for the trained men, machines and materials necessary to convert a small part of Japan into an industrial area devoted exclusively to the art of foreign magic. And thus grew the "foreign" parts of Tokyo, Yokohama, Kobe, Osaka and other cities.

But while these were growing, strange ideas also began growing in the minds of the business groups and the people who ran their machines. The people seemed to have quite a different interpretation of the constitution and the government. They somehow got the impression that the constitution was to guarantee them a certain amount of protection from the militarists, a certain amount of human liberty such as could be found in the foreign countries from which came the art and the machines which they were working, and a

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certain amount of control over the government so that such liberty could be protected and their relations with their foreign benefactors regulated satisfactorily. In other words, some of the ideas of democracy and freedom appeared to have sneaked into the feudal-minded country as if they had secretly attached themselves to the machines and the theories of magic imported from abroad. Businessmen also sympathized with these ideas, for they felt that they too should be permitted to have something to say about the government which would decide how the new weapons they were entrusted with producing were to be used.

In detached sympathy with business was the aristocracy, which was well versed in the history of Japan and aware of the danger that both its members and the emperor would once more become prisoners of military dictatorship just as they had been for hundreds of years. The aristocracy, which includes members of the court, hoped to check the militarists through an alliance with business through the Diet. The growing class of career bureaucrats established to administer the routine of government also sought a hand in controlling the government. But the importance of the bureaucracy as well as that of the aristocracy, from the broad political and economic point of view, may have been exaggerated in view of the fact that they were largely controlled by the two dominant military and business groups, which alone had real power.

The militarists realized almost immediately after

the "restoration" that the "dangerous thoughts" seeping through the ports of Yokohama, Kobe and Nagasaki with the imported products from the West had created a difficult and perhaps unexpected problem. It did not take long to see that the constitution which their representative, Prince Ito, had brought back from Prussia might be "misunderstood." Much of modern Japanese history is the story of how the army cleared up this "misunderstanding." Through their representatives who ran the government, such as Prince Ito, of the Choshu clan, which was dominant in the army, and Prince Matsukata, of the Satsuma clan, in control of the navy, the militarists at first ruled directly. They did so by appointing themselves premiers, taking over the political parties by joining them, and finally controlling the results of political elections by corrupt practices of the bureaucracy, which had charge of elections. The bureaucracy, composed mostly of former samurai clansmen, have continued to serve their militarist superiors up to the present day. While controlling the government directly, the militarists raised Japan to a leading power by successfully waging wars against China and Russia.

By this time—that is, 1905—Japan's course was set. From the war with Russia, the army and navy emerged with confidence that they could defeat other Western powers, given the time and the money with which to construct the necessary war machine. Al-

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though the militarists permitted a number of party governments to be organized, they did not hesitate to break them when necessary either by withdrawing war ministers from the Cabinet, thereby causing its downfall; resorting to the direct use of force, as in the case of numerous assassinations; or precipitating wars in China, as in 1931 and 1937. Murder and terror, combined with their control of the bureaucracy and the throne, made it possible for them to destroy the political parties and any of their military colleagues who strayed into the camps of the liberals and money men. Thus they succeeded in clearing up the "misunderstanding" about the constitution by virtually overthrowing it.

Who are the militarists? Much mystery surrounds the men who run the army and navy and through them the government. But even though it is not possible to identify all the war-makers, it is not impossible to name many of them. The militarists, of course, are not the buck privates and their colleagues in the navy. These are usually sturdy, simple-minded peasant youths who have been taught that the greatest aim in life is to die for their god-emperor on the battlefield. The militarists are also sturdy and simple-minded and ready for a glorious death on the battlefield. But they spring from old samurai stock, graduate from schools for army and navy officers, rise through the ranks into key positions and then run the aristocrats, statesmen

and bureaucrats who are supposed to control the throne and the government. As a rule they prefer to exercise power and let others display it.

There has been much speculation, perhaps too much, as to who are the "real" men in the army and navy who run Japan. By this it is implied that there must be some mysterious force in the background which makes the momentous decisions but never comes out into the open. Some of this mystery is only in the minds of those who refuse to look at a Japanese face without thinking it is a mask. The rest is due to a hidden struggle for power which takes place between various factions in the army and navy for positions in the militarist hierarchy. This struggle is the modern counterpart of that which took place between the various feudal clans before centralization of the army and navy following the Meiji revolution. Whereas the old struggle was decided by violence, the new one is determined by internal political maneuvering, intrigue and military achievement either at home or on the battlefield.

Another difference between the old and new struggles arises from the fact that the composition of the modern clans is not the same as before. The feudal clans were controlled by hereditary ruling families. While family ties still are strong among the modern samurai, it no longer is possible to say definitely that the Choshu clan runs the army and the Satsuma clan the navy. New clan lines seem to be drawn to some ex-

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tent on the basis of associations made by officers while in military schools and later in the field. It is well known that one officer often pulls his school chum along with him. Thus when mention is made in the press of the promotion of some army and navy officer, the names of his colleagues in school also are often given. When Lieutenant-General Shojiro Iida was made commander-in-chief of the Japanese forces which brought the new order to Indo-China, it was pointed out that among his classmates at the military academy were Lieutenant-General Kimura, then Vice-Minister of War, and two other influential lieutenant-generals, Yoshimoto and Shimomura. These three classmates may have had much to do with giving Iida the honor of carrying the rising-sun flag deeper into the south. It was Iida who later led the invasion of Thailand and Burma. Asked what determined the changes in military control, a Japanese associated with the army and navy told me they resulted from a "general pressure and surging up from beneath" with every class that is graduated from the army and navy schools.

Unlike the emperor, whose powers they usurped, these militarists do not rule by divine right but by their ability to win wars and maintain support among members of powerful groups. If they fail to do either, they are quickly replaced, and the mortality rate among officers in key positions is high. They have no fixed term of office and no one upon whom they can

depend for favors to maintain their rule. Pressure from below makes them always vulnerable to the designs of the regularly expanding number of men who covet their positions, the highest in the country. They are more important than the emperor or any of his civilian subjects because they make decisions for all. Rewards are high, competition stiff. This fluid, ever-changing nature of the hierarchy of the Japanese army and navy is one of the reasons for its strength. Dead wood is quickly eliminated and the best brains usually rise to the top.

Keen rivalry for power explains why there is no single dictator in Japan, no Caesar or Napoleon, even on a Japanese scale. There is no single dictator, strangely enough, because the militarists would not permit one. The militarists are too avid for power to delegate and leave it all in the hands of one officer. There is keen rivalry not only within each service, but between the services.

The struggle for power within each service and the desire to keep it from falling into the hands of any one officer resulted in a division of control within the army and navy which superficially resembles that found in other countries but actually has more significance. In Japan, there is no commander-in-chief over all the forces such as the heads of democratic governments or the dictators of totalitarian countries. Theoretically, the emperor has this power, but only in the constitution and not in the army and navy. The Japanese

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services are autonomous and work only in cooperation as independent groups. The navy never would submit to army rule and vice-versa. Not only is there no commander-in-chief over both the services, but there is none over any one of them. The Japanese have divided the office of commander-in-chief of each service into three parts: chief of the army or navy general staff, chief of military or naval education, and the war or navy minister. Each is more than the head of the office he holds. Each is one-third of the commander-in-chief of the army or navy. As the Japanese say about their imperial system, so it might be said about the organization of their services: it is "peerless in the universe."

In these two triumvirates within the all-embracing trinity of the mikado, militarists and money men can be found the seat of the Japanese dictatorship. The mikado plays the part of a pagan spiritualist who has charge of depriving his subjects of their senses, while the army-navy triumvirates exercise temporal control in almost all phases except the economic, which was delegated to businessmen. The latter, therefore, play a secondary role in the exercise of temporal power and are often at the mercy of the militarists.

Although details of the inner struggles within the army and navy are not made public, the results are. These give us the names of the men primarily responsible for Japan's actions as a country. And these are the men directly responsible for having thrown

their seventy-two million mesmerized subjects into a death struggle which ignited almost half the world. Their names are known. They are the following chief dictators of Japan: General Hideki Tojo, War Minister; General Hajime (Gen) Sugiyama, chief of the army general staff; General Otozo Yamada, chief of military education and concurrently commander of home defense; Admiral Osami Nagano, chief of the navy general staff; Admiral Shigetaro Shimada, Navy Minister. Bald, myopic, moustached Tojo also took over secondary agencies of control by holding concurrently the posts of premier and home minister in addition to that of war minister.

If we must know the militarists directly responsible for the holocaust in the Pacific, we need not embark on a futile search for someone behind a Japanese mask. The forementioned experts in the art of violence and oppression are not puppets posing for someone else. They are the leaders of the hierarchy and the cream of the militarists who have gained their positions by outstanding achievements in military and naval intrigue and mass murder. They will share equally in the future glory or disgrace of their undertaking.

Their henchmen and equally devout followers of Hachiman who will become the future chief dictators of all Asia unless they are crushed also are known by name. One of them is General Juichi Terauchi, who is chief of the army forces carrying Hirohito's banner into the southwest Pacific. He is a member of the

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same Choshu clan which first fired on American ships in 1863, when the United States could have blown the top-knots off every dictator-aspiring samurai in that feudal country had she so desired. His father, Field Marshal Masatake Terauchi, also lived up to the traditions of his war-worshipping ancestors by helping engineer the conquest of Korea after her Queen had been murdered by Japanese and Korean gangsters under direction of a Japanese general. The younger Terauchi continued his father's work as commander of Japanese forces in North China. An ardent admirer of Nazi military efficiency, he went to Germany for his early training, and returned there in 1939, intending to attend the Nuremberg rally but becoming Hitler's guest at the war front instead shortly after Poland was invaded. His equally ambitious counterpart in the navy is Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto, commander-in-chief of the combined Japanese fleet. Other militarists who form the backbone of the army-navy hierarchy can be found in command of naval bases at Yokosuka, Kure, Sasebo and Formosa and of the armies in Korea, Manchuria, occupied China, and other occupied territories.

Though the best brains usually rise to the top to take control of the Japanese militarists, the same cannot be said for the economic dictators. They are not replaced so easily and their mortality rate is negligible despite the fact that some of their associates have been cut down by militarists. Their rewards, like those

of the army, are great but their competition, on the other hand, is ridiculously small. Their term of office at one time appeared indefinite but they came uncomfortably close to making it definite when they fell into disfavor with the army over an interpretation of a five-page document, the constitution.

There never had been any mystery about the identity of the economic rulers of Japan. Their nameplates appear over their offices and factories throughout the Japanese Empire. The four leading ones are Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and Yasuda. There are a number of lesser ones, such as Okura, Kuhara and Asano. But the "big four" are dominant and between them control at least half of the nation's economic life. Their names (with the exception of Mitsubishi, which is a firm name used by Iwasaki) do not represent individuals but family clans. The feudal clan system which continued to prevail in the army and navy also provided the basis for Japan's economic structure. But while the original clan lines of the militarists were weakened, those of the economic groups were strengthened. The reason can be found in the fact that military power depends on brains, which decline with age, while economic power depends on capital, which increases with time at compounded rates. That is not to say that brains were not necessary in the exercise of economic power. But it was always possible for the economic clans to hire brains whereas this was not possible for the army. Management and control could

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be separated in industry but not in the army and navy. The money clans could hire an outsider like Seihin Ikeda, former Finance Minister, to run the family business, but Japanese militarists (with few exceptions) were not for hire. Japanese officers fought their way to the top so that they could rule, not manage for someone else. And the top was open to the man who was good enough to get there and strong enough to force someone else out. This was not so true in the case of the money clans.

Although they hired and trained the most capable men they could find to manage their affairs, these clans never lost family control over them. Outsiders often were adopted and absorbed into the family but the family never was absorbed by outsiders. These money clans, whose control extends throughout industry, finance and trade, constitute perhaps the strongest and smallest economic oligarchy in the world, making the economic situation in Japan very different from that of any other country.

Much attention has been given to the friction between the business groups and the militarists but too little to the role which the former have played in making possible Japanese aggression in Asia. It is a fact that the Mitsui, Mitsubishi and the other members of the economic oligarchy have been keen supporters of the militarists' policies of aggression in Asia. And they profited immensely by it. Their agents were not very far behind the flag carried by the militarists into the

Asiatic continent. Often they were ahead of it and provided the army with an excuse for interference in China. After the Manchurian "incident," the big business groups turned to heavy industry with increasing zeal. They pretended not to realize that this eventually would provide the basis for the adventure now being undertaken by the army and navy. Japanese heavy industry was deliberately developed, with army and navy encouragement and subsidies, to make possible the establishment of a giant war machine to challenge major powers of the West. If Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda and the others hoped that the war monster they were developing would not be turned against those countries who made it possible for them to be Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda and the others, they nevertheless must have known that it was an empty hope.

They, better than anyone else, knew that their militarists were intent on the conquest of Asia. And they were not altogether averse to the idea of Japan's ruling "Greater East Asia." They only feared that it might lead to disaster and therefore sought to steer a "moderate" course. It was extremely ironical to hear members of the Mitsui and Iwasaki families speak privately of their hopes for a "moderate" course in foreign policy when they were the principal ones who had constructed an "immoderate" war machine, entirely out of proportion to what was necessary for defense of Japan's own territory. Although they were

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aware of it, they refused to admit that their "immoderate" war machine actually had made a "moderate" policy for Japan almost impossible. In exchange for the silk which they sold to the democracies, they took raw materials and the art of molding them into a military monster to be turned against their benefactors. It was one of the most criminal exchanges ever made in history.

Although the militarists and business groups engaged in bitter feuds, these always were submerged in the interest of their common goal: conquest of foreign territory blessed by the third member of the unholy alliance, the lonely man who plays the part of god behind his feudal prison in the heart of Tokyo.

CHAPTER TWO

E I G H T C O R N E R S O F T H E W O R L D

THE Japanese government frequently announced its intentions of establishing a "Greater East Asia." It never was understood just how "great." The reason is that no limits have been set for "Greater East Asia," which has no limits except those of materials and men required to carry the flag of Japan's god-emperor to every corner of the world. This sounds fantastic, but it is no more so than other announcements by the Japanese government. If the Japanese refrained from fixing any limits to their area of immediate conquest they did not fail to make clear to the world what their ultimate aims were.

In official publications and official pronouncements from the highest militarist down to the lowliest bureaucrat the Japanese have informed the world that their aim is "Hakko Ichiu," which they translated as mean-

ing "eight corners of the world under one roof." This is and has been the basis of Japan's foreign policy for years. If the democracies insisted that it was fantastic because the world was round and had no corners, they did so at their own peril. It is no more fantastic than was the attack on Pearl Harbor.

The Tanaka Memorial, which is alleged to be a document submitted by the then Premier General Tanaka to the emperor in 1927, outlining a program for the conquest of Manchuria and China, was branded by Japanese as a forgery. If Japanese were incensed over the document, which was first published in Shanghai, it was not because it had misrepresented their aims but because it had disclosed them too concretely. And if there is anything suspicious about the document, it is that the author revealed an understanding of the Japanese which was better than their understanding of themselves. But it is not necessary to rely on the Tanaka Memorial for a declaration of Japanese aims. They can be found in their own bible, which was published for the first time in the summer of 1941, only a few months before the attack on Pearl Harbor. In the middle of 1941, this bible would have been considered fantastic in America. At the end, its message was being spread by bombs throughout the Pacific.

The Japanese never had a bible for their national Shinto religion, which was handed down from the dark ages by word of mouth without being committed to writing. As there was no text for Shintoism, different

Japanese had different ideas about it and none had any clear ones until 1941. At that time the Japanese government, realizing the need for something which would help bewildered Japanese as Hitler's *Mein Kampf* had helped the Nazis, issued a pamphlet called *The Way of the Subjects*, and described as "The Bible of the Japanese People." It was written by the Education Ministry on instructions from the Konoye Cabinet. The first edition, consisting of thirty thousand copies, was distributed through all Japanese schools, where it was needed most urgently so that Japanese youths who were about to be graduated would have a better idea of what they were being sent to die for.

The Way of the Subjects supplied the answer in three easy chapters, requiring only a few minutes' reading a day for very few days to discover the key to the life and death of a loyal subject of the throne. And that was not all. It also gave the reader an extra-quick understanding of world history in the first third of the first chapter, making unnecessary the hitherto heavy task of wading through obscure tomes. Only a sharp word or two about the greedy Americans, another for the treacherous British, and the Japanese student had a full graduate course on the evil mind of the democratic plutocracies.

The bible opens with a preamble which informs the subjects that their chief job is "to guard and maintain the Imperial Throne co-existent with Heaven and Earth." Those infected by the germ of Western skepti-

cism are warned that this is not a silly abstraction but "a way of daily practice based on history." The bible itself would not have been necessary, just as their ancestors had no need of one, had it not been for the fact that individualism, liberalism, utilitarianism and materialism stole into the country and began to interfere with "the virtuous customs bequeathed by our ancestors," the preamble continues. After the invasion of Manchuria and China, the true national spirit of the Japanese did begin to rise, the bible admits, but some of the ideas which sneaked into the country together with machines and raw materials imported from America remained to plague many Japanese. Therefore, it was considered necessary to issue a national bible because, "If this situation is left unremedied, it will be difficult to eradicate the evils of European and American thought that are deeply penetrating various strata of the national life of Japan."

Having made it clear that ideas of democracy were undermining the feudal myth of divine rule and thereby hampering the militarists' policy of aggression, the bible takes the loyal subject into chapter one, which explains the nature of the new world order planned by the militarists and supplies him with a ready orientation of world history. After mentioning the terrible misdeeds of the European countries in building rich empires by the conquest of colonies, some of the richest being very near Japan and therefore within reach, the bible quickly overtakes the first world war, which

it explains intensified the "monopolistic world sway of Britain, France and the United States"—just as might have been expected. No mention is made of Japan's plunderings in China while these greedy powers were engaged in defeating Germany, and no mention is made of the fact that Japan participated in the war with them against Germany. Such facts had no place in a modern bible of a country allied with Germany.

The countries which triumphed in the first world war (except Japan, because she was not mentioned as having participated in it) "regard the strong preying on the weak as reasonable, unstintedly promote epicurean desires, seek a highly expanded material life and stimulate the competition for acquiring colonies and securing trade, thereby leading the world to a veritable hell of fighting and bloodshed through complicated causes and effects." So complicated, in fact, that the authors of the Japanese bible had no desire to go into details about the rape of Nanking and numerous other cities of China, let alone bloodshed and veritable hell.

The net result of such thoughts, as any loyal subject of the throne might have guessed, was the decay of the three evil democracies which insisted on maintaining the status quo. To replace them, says the bible, Japan launched a movement for construction of "a new world order based on moral principles." It began with the Manchurian "affair," which is explained as "a violent outburst of Japanese national life long sup-

pressed." There is no mention here of the fact that it ended with the suppression of more than thirty million Chinese in the new state of Manchukuo. The bible does mention, however, that the Manchurian affair was an unavoidable development in the course of Japan's "world mission." And here we come to "Hakko Ichiu," the kernel of the entire bible.

When Emperor Jimmu, the first and probably mythical ruler of Japan, selected a site for his capital and mounted the throne 2,602 years ago, he is quoted as having issued the following proclamation :

"Therefore let the capital be extended so as to embrace the six cardinal points and let the eight corners of the world be covered so as to form a roof. Will this not be good?"

Whether or not it was good for the Chinese and other victims of Japanese aggression, it was good enough as a holy message which the militarists could use to justify the use of murder and violence by their subject peoples and goad them on a path of world conquest. The "eight corners of the world under one roof" has been the basic principle of Japanese militarism since it first struck against China in 1894, seized Formosa as a base for future operations against the greedy Western powers and then proceeded to defeat one of them in 1905, when President Theodore Roosevelt, with questionable wisdom, interceded in favor of Japan and made it possible for her to secure her first hold on the Asiatic continent. It was also a move in carrying

out Japan's "divine mission," which is conquest of the world.

The eight corners of the world are not in one corner, as recent history shows. The corners are wherever the Japanese succeed in driving a wedge on foreign soil and nail down a shrine as proof to the gods that their children are not slumbering down below and are not falling victims to the passive materialism of the democracies. The roof of the capital which Jimmu asked to be extended may today only cover the heads of about one billion people in Asia and ten million in Oceania, but tomorrow or the next day its divine protection will be offered to the peoples of Africa, Europe or the Western Hemisphere. The nice thing about the eight Japanese corners is that they are not stationary. They move as the size of the Japanese world increases. They may be in Tokyo, Taiwan, Hongkong, Singapore, Manila, Bangkok and Peking at one time, or Tokyo, Vladivostok, Batavia, Melbourne, Honolulu, Nome and Seattle at another, depending on the skill of the offspring of the Sun Goddess in carrying out the divine command of Emperor Jimmu.

Residents of these places which have not yet been occupied might find comfort in the fact that their cities were not mentioned in the bible by name. But residents of other areas cannot find such comfort for they *have* been mentioned. This bible, published in the summer of 1941, it will be recalled, pointed to "India, Turkey, Arabia, Thailand, Annam and others," in-

cluding China, as victims of Japanese aggression. At the time of writing, the Japanese already have overrun Thailand, Annam, and "others," including China. The bible, of course, did not refer to these countries as having been marked for conquest. That would not be according to "bushido," or the medieval code of slicing a victim with a samurai sword. The bible only says that these countries hope to be "free of the shackles and bondage of Europe and America," and no expert in Japanese history is required to point out who is to do the freeing. The bible makes that unnecessary. After explaining that Japan's victory over Russia kindled hopes for freedom in the countries mentioned and stimulated a new racial movement among the Chinese, the bible continues, "Amid this swelling atmosphere of Asia's reawakening, Japan has come to be keenly conscious of the fact that the stabilization of East Asia is its mission and that the emancipation of East Asiatic nations rests solely on its efforts." That makes it perfectly clear.

As if not to offend others who may not be so fortunate as to live in East Asia, the bible hastens to explain that the Japanese aims of domination are not limited to East Asia because "The ideals of Japan are to make manifest to the entire world the spirit of the founding of the empire represented by the extension of the capital so as to embrace the six cardinal points and the eight corners of the world under one roof."

If this also sounds like nonsense then it might help

to sober some by quoting, as the Japanese bible does, part of the Imperial Rescript issued by Hirohito on the occasion of the conclusion of the tripartite alliance among Japan, Germany, and Italy in September, 1940, keeping in mind the fact that an Imperial Rescript in Japan today has greater force than law:

"It has been the great instruction bequeathed by Our Imperial Foundress (the Sun Goddess) and other Imperial Ancestors that our grand moral obligation should be extended to all directions and the world be unified under one roof. This is the point we are trying to obey day in and day out."

Hirohito, apparently, did not think Jimmu's instructions were simply a joke. He took them seriously enough to offer them as an explanation to his seventy-two million subjects why he, a divine god and direct descendant of the Sun Goddess, sanctioned the decision of the Konoye government to conclude the most serious and possibly disastrous alliance in the history of the Japanese Empire. He made it clear that the alliance was in full accord with Japan's national policy of extending the imperial rule until there exists nothing between it and control of the entire world. No one could have asked for a fairer declaration of Japan's aims. Yet it was ignored abroad.

If Secretary of State Cordell Hull had difficulty in understanding the final reply of the Japanese government to the American proposals for an understanding immediately before the outbreak of war, and if he con-

sidered it "a document that was more crowded with infamous falsehoods and distortions on a scale so huge that I never imagined until today that any government on this planet was capable of uttering them," it was because he did not understand "Hakko Ichiu." That, it is regrettable to record, was why our foreign policy toward Japan was so unhappy. Without an understanding of "Hakko Ichiu" it was impossible to deal correctly with a Japanese government either in 1941 or in 1905. Not being able to fathom this fundamental principle of Japanese policy, Secretary Hull and President Roosevelt may have had difficulty in recognizing other "infamous falsehoods" in previous documents submitted to the American government.

Many of us in Tokyo were convinced for some time that a government such as Japan's, which in all solemn seriousness subscribed to such a conception as "Hakko Ichiu," was incapable of uttering anything but what would be regarded by Americans as infamous falsehoods. We were deluged with them almost every day in our work in Tokyo. It was impossible for a correspondent to handle his job with any measure of credit unless he was capable of recognizing these "falsehoods." They turned up everywhere: in statements by official spokesmen, interviews by State Ministers in the press, private talks with Japanese officials, reports by Domei, the official Japanese news agency. The job of the Tokyo correspondent was to convert and interpret them in such a way that they would be recognized as

such when they were read in the American press. This was an extremely embarrassing assignment for resident "guests" of Japan, but a number of us attempted to do it as best we could although it did not contribute to our popularity with officials of the Japanese government.

For example, in the course of the border warfare between Thailand and Indo-China, Japan announced early in 1941 that she would "mediate." But even before her "mediation" began, most correspondents were convinced that Japan was incapable of any "mediation" in the foreign sense of the word. It was simply a device by which Japan weakened both parties to the dispute and thereby made them more vulnerable to conquest by the "mediator." If the mediation announcement was a falsehood, then the declaration by the Konoye government of its intentions to establish a "new order" of "co-prosperity" in Greater East Asia was equally false.

The word "co-prosperity" means one thing to a Japanese and something else to a foreigner. Although they may use the same words, they usually are speaking different languages. That is because their minds exist in two different worlds, and that is the reason why Secretary Hull was unable to comprehend the last message he received from Tokyo. Washington and Tokyo are capitals which do not exist on the same planet. It was no shortcoming on the part of Secretary Hull, for he may very well be the most capable official

ever to have directed the State Department. Neither he, nor President Roosevelt nor any other American was capable of fully understanding "Hakko Ichiu." To the Western mind it is incomprehensible, just as worship of dead ancestors is incomprehensible. It is the product of the Japanese mind and perhaps no one but a Japanese could ever seriously accept it as an honest principle because it involves worship of a human, mortal, yet divine ruler as well as ancestors and pagan deities who are invoked to avert disaster, bring good luck or cure disease. Documents by the Japanese government are products of feudal minds which live in the twentieth century but which we buried, if we ever had them among us, somewhere in the dark days of the medieval age.

Yet it must be said, in all fairness to the Japanese, that statements which they made and which appear to be "falsehoods" to the American mind are not necessarily so to the Japanese mind; and vice-versa, statements which we make and believe to be true the Japanese consider false. Just as there is no real meeting of minds between an individual Japanese and an individual American, so there could be none between the Japanese and American governments. It is fairly safe to say that the statements which Secretary Hull branded as "infamous falsehoods" were nothing of the sort to the Japanese, who may have made them with the highest sense of honesty and sincerity of which they are capable. In fact, there seems to be no reason

why the Japanese government should have bothered at all in drawing up and delivering to the American government a long document reviewing the course of the negotiations and offering reasons for their failure, when they had already dispatched their warships for the attack on December 7. It is probably more correct to believe that the only reason the Japanese delivered the final document was because of their sense of "bushido," that curious medieval code of the samurai which strangely enough, of all places, turned up in Washington! To the Japanese way of thinking, it may not have been considered correct to strike at an enemy until he had been given a full explanation of his misdeeds and the honorable intentions of the samurai. They submitted a reply because they considered it necessary to justify themselves in the eyes of the enemy before attacking him so that they could report to the Sun Goddess that everything had been done in accordance with time-honored traditions, 2,602 years old!

The Japanese may seriously have believed what they wrote in the note which Secretary Hull found so incredible. The third paragraph seems to have been lifted almost bodily from the last part of the Imperial Rescript mentioned earlier and says, "It is the immutable policy of the Japanese government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and thereby to enable *all nations to find each its proper place* in the world." Compare this with the latter part of the rescript which follows the declaration of "eight

corners of the world under one roof": "We believe that to let *all nations seek their proper places* and the myriad peoples to enjoy the piping times of peace are enterprises of unexampled magnitude . . ." Both these statements are equally unexampled for being incomprehensible to Americans, yet to the Japanese they seem perfectly reasonable.

Other American correspondents and I have argued by the hour with Japanese about statements of this kind. We would ask them how they could speak of "stability of East Asia" when they knew very well that their troops were running hog wild over the Asiatic Continent destroying whatever stability there ever was in East Asia. Their answer was as simple as it was sincere. They said the old kind of stability was not "permanent" or not "sound." In short, it was not in accord with "Hakko Ichiu," which means that the Japanese must carry the banner farther and farther across the face of the earth until they come up with it from the other side and report to the Sun Goddess at the Grand Ise Shrine that the Imperial order to spread the rising-sun roof over the heads of everyone in the world and put all nations each in its "proper place" has finally been achieved. To the feudal Japanese mind there can be no stability sanctioned by their Imperial gods and their fanatical Shinto priests unless it is a "Japanese stability," a "Hakko Ichiu" stability.

The democracies had not the slightest idea of what they were letting themselves in for when Commodore

Perry knocked a hole in the eastern end of Japan and thereby made it possible for a violent and vicious feudal doctrine such as "Hakko Ichiu" to escape to plague them and the rest of the world. We may not be able to conceive how "any government on this planet" could be capable of conceiving such a doctrine, but the democracies might just as well begin to realize, as late as it is, that the Japanese government *has been* capable of conceiving it and, what is more, executing it with the cool-headed and almost brilliant deliberation of a highly trained Western mind. The capacity of the Japanese mind for absorbing Western technical genius without suffering any serious damage to the feudal structure of their mental chambers is another one of the "incredibles" about Japan.

"Eight corners of the world under one roof" may sound like the talk of a madman, but he nevertheless is armed with weapons which Western teachers taught him to make. The democracies unwittingly armed a man who would be committing a crime against Jimmu and his ancestors if he did not subsequently turn against them and disarm or kill them, for he is committed by centuries of superstition and feudal belief to worship an emperor who is and always has been a victim of militarists who in turn are convinced that they have a divine mission, which is to conquer the world and spread Jimmu's blanket over it. As they refused to listen to his doctrine, even though it was made public in his bible and in his actions for many years, the de-

mocracies are not entirely justified in recoiling in injured surprise on the ground that the Japanese gave no warning. They gave more than sufficient warning, as far as their fundamental aims were concerned, even if they failed to make a public announcement before attacking Pearl Harbor. Unfortunately, very few believed the warning because very few on this planet who are not Japanese are capable of fully understanding it.

The democracies do not believe they have a divine mission to conquer the world and therefore have proved themselves so shortsighted as to be unable to see how anyone else might have. And they showed themselves so narrow-minded that they were unable to understand how it was possible for Japan officially to accuse the United States and Britain of attempting "to obstruct the establishment of a general peace between Japan and China." What they failed to understand, of course, is that by "peace" Japan means a Sun Goddess peace, short of which there can be nothing but war. They failed also to understand that by assisting China to resist Japanese aggression they were really violating the will of the Sun Goddess as well as the commandment of Emperor Jimmu. That was nothing short of *lèse-majesté*. For this crime against the imperial fountain-head the Japanese exact nothing short of death, which they delivered at Pearl Harbor.

But just as the democracies have been unable to understand the Japanese, so have the latter been unable

to make any sense out of statements by Americans and British. Being unable to conceive of anyone's mind operating differently from their own, the Japanese suspected that "democracy" was a fake doctrine modeled after their "Hakko Ichiu" and designed to enable the United States and Britain to rule the world. But it was obvious that there could not be two "Hakko Ichius," as the Japanese consider their civilization the oldest in the world and their people the only chosen ones in the world because the Sun Goddess dropped her grandson off in Kyushu, and not the District of Columbia, to organize an army for the conquest of the world.

The "Hakko Ichiu" democracy of the District of Columbia, therefore, was quickly branded in the eyes of the Japanese as an insult to their gods and was officially exposed in the bible distributed to Japanese students. The very first chapter of the bible informs the student that the march of the Western countries into all parts of the world, including the Far East, gave them world domination and led them "to believe that they alone were justified in their outrageous behaviour." The authors of the bible probably do not intend the reader to infer that Japanese also are justified in engaging in "outrageous behaviour," but they undoubtedly do mean to point out that this expansion of Western powers was in violation of the spirit of Hakko Ichiu, which for the Japanese makes murder moral

and resistance against it a crime against the Sun Goddess.

To correct this crime against their gods, the Japanese bible goes on later to explain: "the China Affair is a *step* toward construction of *a world of moral principles by Japan*. The building up of a new order for securing *lasting peace of the world* will be attained by the disposal of the China Affair as *a stepping stone*. In this regard, *the China Affair would not and should not end with the mere downfall of the Chiang Kai-shek regime*. Until the elimination of evils of European and American influences in East Asia that have led China astray is realized, until Japan's cooperation with new China as one of the links in the chain of the Great East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere yields satisfactory results, and until *East Asia and the rest of the world are united as one on the basis of moral principles*, Japan's indefatigable efforts are sorely needed."

These passages in italics point out in as clear language as can be expected from an official document the aims of Japanese militarists. They make perfectly clear for anyone who cares to read that the Japanese government (speaking for the militarists, of course) considered the endless warfare in China only a "step" toward a world full of Japanese gods and Shinto shrines, which are the only "moral principles" the Japanese have. And they said in so many words that they had no intention of sheathing their sword after removing

Chiang Kai-shek because they are committed by a vow taken at the holiest shrine of the empire at Ise that they will not stop until "East Asia and the rest of the world are united as one."

To some of us in Tokyo these passages were breathtaking. To others the bible was simply a joke, and they went on talking and writing about the fact that Hirohito named his reign "Enlightened Peace" and therefore the Japanese militarists would not dare go too far in clouding it. But those correspondents who were convinced that the militarists controlled the throne and through the throne both the government and the business groups, which were resigned to making the best of things by going in with them for conquest for what it was worth, came to the conclusion that the Japanese bible was tantamount to a declaration of war against the rest of the world and that there could be no peace either in the Pacific or anywhere else as long as that bible were permitted to be circulated among young Japanese, thereby perverting them with a barbaric creed. None of us pretended to know exactly when and where the Japanese attack would come against the United States, Britain and the Netherlands Indies, and some thought the chances were fairly good that the Japanese would hold back at least until the spring of 1942, but still we were convinced that sooner or later Japan had to attack one and all, preferably singly, but if necessary all at the same time. Only one thing could prevent it. That was destruction of the Japanese mili-

tarists' bible and everything it stood for. It could only have been destroyed by a revolution against the militarists, and there was no organized group outside of the army capable of conducting it. The general outlook in Tokyo, therefore, was war, and a number of us weighted our news reports to the United States accordingly.

As a group, the Nazis in Tokyo probably had a better insight into the significance and implications of "Hakko Ichiu" than any other foreigners. They were fully aware of the fact that the Japanese bible was in sharp contradiction to the teachings of *Mein Kampf* and therefore was a challenge to Hitler's program of conquest. But they did not worry about the Japanese very much, being quite confident that the Nazi military machine was more than a match for the Japanese if and when the time came for a showdown between the two Axis partners, who first of all had to "clear the stage" of the "decadent democracies" before they could put on the main bout in a struggle for world control.

I remember one Nazi correspondent telling me very bluntly in the Imperial Hotel one afternoon that we Americans were rather naïve in our attitude toward the Japanese. I admitted that Americans understood the Nazi aims first and best of all and the Japanese second. He laughed at that but said it was a very far second. For example, he explained, many Americans believe that Admiral Oikawa (Navy Minister in

the Konoye Cabinet just before the outbreak of war) is a moderate and therefore belongs on their side, but they are all wrong about Oikawa. This Nazi was a friend of Oikawa, whom he had known long before the Admiral became Navy Minister. Some of us were inclined to agree with him, but other Americans, including embassy officials, were convinced that it could not be so. But the fact of the matter, as we learned later, is that Oikawa had more than a little to do with planning the war in the south.

It was only natural that the Nazis should have understood the Japanese bible better than did the Americans. The Nazis were capable of taking seriously a doctrine of world conquest because they had one of their own, while the Bible available to Americans was of an entirely different kind. Most Americans could not believe that any mind, especially the Japanese, was capable of really entertaining ideas of world conquest. The general attitude of Americans in Tokyo was that the Japanese bible was just more propaganda for muddled Japanese minds, which may very well have been true. But what the Nazis realized and we were incapable of perceiving was the fact that from just such muddled minds were world warriors born.

Still another advantage the Nazis had over Americans was that they could look at wars and movements on a grand scale whereas we Americans, despite the fact that we came from a broad and flowing country and might have been expected to be capable of broader

vision, actually were more provincial and narrow in our outlook than the Japanese. Most Americans in Tokyo, and apparently in the United States as well, had rooted in their minds the assumption that the Japanese would not dare undertake a war against any first-class power, let alone two of them simultaneously. We believed that the Japanese would keep moving along lines of least resistance in any direction but would stop short of a major conflict. We thought they took Indo-China only because it was there for the asking and no one was prepared to stop them.

The Nazis, we now can see, looked at the Japanese moves in a much more realistic light. In every move south they saw that the Japanese were becoming inevitably committed to a policy of continuing to move south. And in every move they saw the Japanese jockeying for a better position in preparation for a kill. In other words, the Nazis interpreted the Japanese occupation of Indo-China as being similar to the German seizure of Czechoslovakia, while the general American attitude probably was similar to that of the British at Munich.

Here were two opposing interpretations of Japanese aims, and news correspondents could take their choice. Everyone, including officials of the American Embassy, was aware of both interpretations. I came to the conclusion that the whole problem was a matter of belief and judgment. Either we believed that the Japanese were serious about what they said or we did not.

If he believed they were serious about "Hakko Ichiu" and Greater East Asia and that it was really a matter of "life and death," as they so frequently insisted, then the correspondent or the diplomat would send one kind of a report to the United States. If, however, he did not believe the Japanese were capable of such fantastic ideas and simply were bluffing, then he sent another kind of report. The result was that we had two kinds of interpretations in the United States, and our own prejudices, perhaps, led many to accept the wrong one.

The tremendous importance of belief and judgment in international affairs came home to me very strongly in January, 1941. At that time the late Admiral Baron Mineo Osumi, senior naval member of the supreme war council and former Navy Minister, gave a long interview which was printed in the Tokyo newspaper *Asahi*. He urged the nation to prepare to expand to the south sea area. "Japan must expand in some direction," he said. "There must be expansion in the direction of every corner of the globe. It happens that there is much talk of expansion to the south. It is the nature of things that nations, like individuals, should seek regions favored by nature. . . . It is as natural for a growing nation to expand to the south as for a tree to bud in spring. . . . It is a mistake to think that it was only yesterday that Japan took it into her head to advance southward. The Japanese race has been eager to expand to the south for 1,000 years. The China affair,

the necessity of obtaining supplies and materials, and the spread of the European conflict combine to give impetus to the southward movement of the Japanese." Osumi concluded on the following note: "I know for certain that the future will see an aggravation of the situation."

That was the gist of the interview. Correspondents could handle it in different ways. If they believed that Osumi simply was "sounding off," that his was just "another interview," then they came to the conclusion that there was no "story" in it because it was ridiculous, and they would ignore it. If they thought that Osumi not only was speaking his own mind but that of the dominant militarist group which ran the country, then they would send the story abroad in great detail. There was still another group of correspondents in Tokyo that always liked to play safe. These were the men who sat on the fence. They would not ignore the story but they would not send very much of it either—just enough for "protection." The judgment of all correspondents depended on belief in whether or not the Japanese were serious. Some of us felt they were and wired as much as a thousand words of the interview. But it did little good, because newspaper editors in the United States could not believe it. Only about three paragraphs of the interview were published in America, and most newspapers ignored it entirely. Had newspaper editors been aware of the real danger that less than one year later the Japanese

would attack throughout the Pacific area, they might have made the story the biggest one of the day. The three paragraphs were an example of how seriously we took the Japanese and their bible, and they help to explain why the shock was such a severe one when it did come.

Shortly after his interview was published, Osumi left on a secret mission to China. Then came the announcement that the plane in which he was flying on an inspection trip of the Japanese navy in South China had crashed and that Osumi had been killed. Chinese guerillas reached the plane before a Japanese rescue party was able to get to it. According to a Chungking report, they found in Osumi's plane secret papers disclosing Japanese preparations for an attack in the south. These papers were shown to American and British officials in Chungking, and their contents were transmitted to London and Washington. That was the beginning of the first big Pacific war scare at the start of 1941, and later in Tokyo it was possible to secure confirmation of the fact that the Japanese attack originally was planned for that spring. Osumi died in the service of his gods and his emperor and while on an important assignment connected with Japan's "divine mission" of expanding to "every corner of the globe." He was not talking out of an admiral's cocked hat, as we now know, when he predicted war in the south sea area.

But even Japanese determined to expand were di-

vided as to direction. There was a long historical split between advocates who favored the north and those who were for the south. This division fundamentally was caused by a difference of interests between the army and the navy. The army, following the line of least resistance, gained a foothold on the Asiatic continent in Korea and was determined to expand northward through Manchuria and North China. The navy, on the other hand, after securing Formosa and then defeating the Russian fleet in the Russo-Japanese war, had an excellent base of operations in the south and nothing left to do in the north. It was natural, also, that the navy should look to the south because in this theater it would play a dominant role while on the Asiatic mainland there was nothing for it to do except stand by and watch the army run off with all the glory. Their differences were intensified by the fact that usual professional rivalry between armies and navies is greater in Japan than in other countries. The Japanese compete for the glory of god and a prominent place at Yasukuni Shrine, while soldiers and seamen of Western countries regard their rivalry pretty much as a sport.

While the Japanese press was engaged in heated discussion as to whether their warriors should strike in the north against Russia or in the south against Britain and the Netherlands Indies, all three appearing ripe for plucking, one of Tokyo's prominent writers pointed out that it was an extremely foolish argument. Japan's

mission, said he, is to expand in both directions! He provided some sound historical facts which not only support his view but show how the Japanese had been applying the principles of their national bible even before it was written.

Both the southward and northward expansion programs were advocated as far back as the early years of Emperor Meiji, who reigned from 1867 to 1912, Teiichi Muto, author of the article, explained. During this period, Takamori Saigo, elder of two brothers and associated with the army, was the leading advocate of sending forces into Korea, while Judo Saigo, his younger brother who sided with the navy, preferred the conquest of Formosa. Both agreed, however, on a war against China, and decided to win their war first and argue about spoils later.

When peace terms were discussed after conclusion of the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, the navy's Judo Saigo and the army's Field Marshal Aritomo Yamagata disagreed on what part of China should be sliced off for Japan. Yamagata insisted on a foothold on the continent at the Liaotung Peninsula, which was conveniently located as a base for future operations against Manchuria. The navy was all against this. Saigo said Japan was not "destined" to expand northward but southward, pointing out at the same time that the territories in the south were rich in natural resources. He held out for Formosa as a foothold in the south. Prince Ito, that famous constitutionalist whom we already

have encountered, was premier at the time. He was unable to decide on the merits of the case and submitted the problem to Emperor Meiji for arbitration! Desiring not to offend either of his loyal supporters, Meiji said he would not object to their taking both the Liaotung Peninsula and Formosa, which is just what happened.

Meiji was forced to disgorge the peninsula, however, when foreign powers intervened. On that occasion, one of the few times in history that Japan was publicly disgraced, Meiji issued a rescript which is a masterpiece of hypocrisy and double talk. First he explained why Japan launched the first of a series of unprovoked and ruthless attacks against China: "*Devoted as We unalterably are, and ever have been, to the principles of peace, We were constrained to take up arms against China for no other reason than Our desire to secure for the Orient an enduring peace.*" Being a great lover of peace, Meiji then pointed out that he had received a "friendly recommendation" from other lovers of peace. These were Russia, Germany and France, who submitted a joint warning that if the Japanese did not beat a hasty retreat and evacuate Liaotung, the Mikado might find it "detrimental to the lasting peace of the Orient." In view of the general situation, Meiji explained to his disappointed subjects, it was no disgrace to "yield to the dictates of magnanimity." Less than ten years later, the militarists struck at Russia for disgracing Emperor Meiji before his own

subjects; after that they had the pleasure of sharing the allied victory against Germany; and by throwing France out of the Far East in 1941, Japan repaid that country for her share in the move to check Japanese aggression.

The "Meiji policy" of expanding in both directions either simultaneously or alternately was nothing more than an admission of the fact that the emperor could not control either the army or the navy, which moved whenever and wherever they thought best. Footholds which the army and navy secured in Korea and Formosa were intended to become strangleholds for the Asiatic continent and the south sea area. Korea and Formosa set the immediate course of Japanese history and from that time on both Japanese and foreign students with insight into the military-Shinto mind of the Japanese began speculating on wars which Japan would launch against China, Russia, Great Britain and finally the United States.

The story of the Japanese army's policies of terror, exploitation and oppression in Korea, Manchukuo and China is fairly well known abroad, but the use of the very same instruments by the navy in Formosa has not been generally recognized. The reason for this is that relatively few foreigners have visited Formosa and those who have were not permitted to see very much. The beautiful tropical island which lies off the South China coast was converted by the Japanese into a major naval base for the conquest of the Netherlands East

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Indies as well as other foreign possessions in the south sea area. When the Japanese decided to strike in the Pacific, Formosa became the nerve center for the widespread operations of the Japanese navy in the south. Being the most important point in these operations, Formosa is at the same time Japan's Achilles heel. It is Japan's principal outpost both for offensive and defensive operations in the southwestern Pacific and has the same relationship to the mainland of Japan as the Hawaiian Islands to the United States. Just as the loss of Hawaii would expose the west coast of the United States to direct attack, so the fall of Formosa would make the western and southern shores of Japan vulnerable to bombardment and invasion.

One of the serious internal problems with which the Japanese navy has to deal is that of the Chinese population. The traditional Japanese colonial policy of exploitation has kept most Chinese, who constitute ninety-five per cent of Formosa's population of five millions, down to the level of slaves. Their hostility to the Japanese is intense not only because of oppression but also because of sympathy with their brother Chinese in the war against Japan. The serious concern and suspicion with which the Japanese regard the Formosan Chinese was disclosed by George Kerr, an American teacher, who arrived in Tokyo after witnessing the bombing of Taihoku, capital of the island, by Chinese planes early in 1938. At that time, he reported, the Japanese hurriedly piled sandbags around principal government

buildings and set up machine guns, directed not against attacking planes but against the native population, which the Japanese feared would revolt.

Americans who lived in Formosa for several years became aware of an underground insurrectionist movement, the extent of which could not be learned because of the extreme secrecy essential for its operation. But it was known that the Japanese were attempting to check the considerable amount of gun running between the mainland and the island. It is illegal to possess firearms on the island and Formosans found with them were disposed of swiftly. The insurrectionist movement, however, was said to have been strengthened rather than weakened by Japanese oppression. The Japanese army and navy not only forced Formosan workers to join coolie gangs in occupied areas of China but occasionally conscripted wealthy Formosans as coolies, either to confiscate their property or to remove them from the island because of suspicious activities.

To prevent Koreans from associating with Formosans, thereby increasing the potential threat to Japanese domination of both races, the Japanese did not permit Korean men on the island. Only Korean prostitutes were admitted, and there was no reason to believe that the prostitutes were especially grateful to the Japanese for their generosity.

In their attempt to undermine Chinese nationalism and convert the population to Japanese nationalism, a

general colonial policy of the mikado's men, they interfered with native religious worship. Japanese were reported to have torn down many Formosan places of worship and to have attempted to force the Japanese Shinto religion upon the natives. This policy proved unsuccessful. Japanese police, who frequently entered Formosan homes to learn whether the Shinto shelf was being maintained, were conducted into a room where such a shrine had been set up. Hidden from sight in another room, however, the Formosan had his native shrine, at which he continued to worship secretly.

The educational system was designed to limit the knowledge of Formosans and thereby curb the rise of Formosan leaders. Surveillance of literature admitted to the island was more severe than in Japan. The attempt to convert Formosans to Japanese nationalism, as in the case of Koreans, began in primary school, where children were taught only the Japanese language and were discouraged from speaking their native tongue. Formosans were not eligible for government positions, reserved for Japanese, and were permitted to follow only one profession, medicine, probably owing to the shortage of Japanese doctors.

But if Formosa is hell for the natives, it is by the same token a paradise for the remaining five per cent of the population, the twentieth-century Japanese lords. Together with their battleships, they moved in with other symbols of divine conquest, the Shinto priests and shrines to purify the new home for Japanese gods

and ancestral spirits and to announce to Emperor Jimmu that a new corner had been built for his roof. Other symbols of Japanese conquest were the nameplates of the Mitsui and Mitsubishi, who together with other business groups were not far behind the fleet in going to work on the natives and the natural resources of the island.

Americans who lived in Formosa were struck with admiration for the amazing capacity for organization which the Japanese showed in their development of Formosa. They converted the island from a wild territory, with which the Chinese did nothing because of the head-hunters, into a veritable gold mine which produced tremendous profits. Manchukuo and China have been an economic loss to Japan, but Formosa proved to be the pearl of all Japan's colonial undertakings. The intensity with which the Japanese developed the coal, sugar, tea and other resources of the islands convinced some Americans that they were the equal of the Romans as organizers and exploiters.

It was in the rich tropical island of Formosa that Japan's dream of a Greater East Asia was born. The success of Formosa both as a naval and economic undertaking stood out in contrast to the general failure of the army's aimless and costly peregrinations in China, especially after more than four years of fruitless fighting. Japanese began to look more and more to Formosa as the magic key which would open the warm doors of the south and provide a way out for the mi-

kado's militarists who had bogged down in China. That is one of the great advantages of "Hakko Ichiu." It offers more than one way out as it provides for expansion in any or all directions.

The navy was prepared to answer the divine call. It had already developed in Formosa not only one of the best naval bases in the Far East but also a large number of technical and naval experts who were intimately acquainted with details of the south sea islands. The two big government schools in Taihoku made Formosa the training ground for eventual attack against the islands in the south. The Higher Commercial College, where Kerr taught English, turned out a corps of boys who undoubtedly provided the Japanese navy with the kind of information it needed before launching its attack. The Imperial University, built in 1929, turned out the technicians required for the undertaking. Students in both schools were taught one or more of seven languages used in the south sea islands, including Dutch, Spanish and Javanese. At the Imperial University there were more professors than students, the entire staff spending most of its time working on projects for development of the southern regions. Directors of the university hold higher rank than Japanese ministers to foreign countries, which indicates the honor and significance attached to the men who prepared for the drive southward. Japanese in Formosa left no doubt as to where they were going. Kerr was given a photograph in 1937 of some of his students at-

tending a masquerade party in Taihoku to celebrate the awaited independence of the Philippines in 1946.

As the time for the drive to the south drew nearer, the anti-foreign policy of the Japanese officials in Formosa was intensified, and a concerted effort was made to force the handful of American and British businessmen to leave the island. Because of the importance of Formosa as Japan's chief base in the south, the Japanese took fanatical precautions against disclosure of its secrets. The island was honeycombed by police and intelligence officers, who watched every move by foreign residents and visitors. Although most foreigners in Japan proper were considered spies, all in Formosa were suspected of being foreign agents. Japanese suspicions were not limited to Americans and British. When Italian and German ships took refuge in Formosan harbors after the outbreak of the European war, their crews were not permitted to land—a tribute to the confidence which Japanese have in their Axis allies.

Feeling against Americans in Formosa led to two ugly incidents. The wife of an American tea exporter who was riding her bicycle along a narrow road which was being repaired was ordered to stop and dismount. Being slightly deaf, she did not hear the cry of the Japanese foreman and continued pedaling. Incensed because he thought a white American woman was deliberately ignoring the command of a son of heaven, the Japanese rushed up and with one great shove sent

her flying from her wheel. Enraged and injured but still in possession of good aim, she picked up the largest stone that was handy and bounced it off the head of the Japanese official. The American Consulate lodged a protest with officials of the government and demanded an apology. The Japanese dutifully apologized, said they were sorry, and then promoted the foreman to a better job for his patriotic deed.

The second incident did not turn out so well. Matsuo, a loyal, popular Japanese who had worked for the American Consulate in Formosa for eighteen years, failed to show up at his office one day. Inquiries by American officials disclosed that he had been arrested, but Japanese officials refused to explain the reason. By that time, Americans had learned that retaliation was the only weapon the Japanese understood in international dealings. They wired Manila and asked that clearance papers for Japanese ships there be held up until an explanation was given for Matsuo's arrest. After their ships had been held up for some time, the Japanese came through with the explanation. Matsuo was arrested, they said, because he was suspected of being a spy for the American Consulate. It was a delicate matter, the Japanese did not want to injure the feelings of American officials, and that was the reason they were reluctant to explain the arrest, the consul was told. What made the Japanese think he was a spy for the United States government? Very good reasons, replied the Japanese. Matsuo had asked them how

many automobiles they expected to import from the United States the following year. But he had been doing that for the entire eighteen years of his service, so that an estimate could be made of future American exports to Formosa, the American officials protested in amazement. That did not matter, was the next answer. Matsuo was a spy because this year was different from other years.

And so it was. The Japanese navy was making final preparations for the big push, and they preferred to have Matsuo in a cell rather than in the services of the American government, which he might in some way help by disclosing the feverish activities of the navy, such as construction of new hospitals springing up all over the island, even covering baseball fields once used to keep seamen fit for future action.

The record of the Japanese navy in Formosa should have blasted long ago the popular misconception that the navy was "moderate" in contrast with the army, which was described as "extremist." If the Japanese navy has been "moderate" for so long it was because it had little opportunity to be much else, not because it did not realize its heavenly mission as keenly as the other service with which it combined to control the government and the Japanese people. It carried out its share in the murderous bombings of Chungking and other cities. If it refused to launch the attack against the democracies sooner, it was because the Japanese navy realized it needed more time before it was ready

and before the American navy was sufficiently dispersed in the Atlantic to give the Japanese the superiority they desired in the Far East.

If some intellectually sterile members of the foreign community in Tokyo found comfort in the belief that the navy men were "moderate" because they had spent more time in Washington and London than did their army colleagues and therefore were more amenable to democratic ways and thoughts, no Japanese would be so dull as to deprive them of it. If their belief was strengthened by the fact that such men as Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, former Navy Vice-Minister and Foreign Minister, was once the most popular member of the official colony in London and related by marriage to the equally "moderate" Mitsui family, they now can have the unenviable satisfaction of knowing that he played no small part in preparations for the assault on the democracies and that the Mitsui, Mitsubishi and other capitalist clans are only waiting to take over the oil fields of American and British companies in the south seas.

It is true that the admirals and rear-admirals and the minor corps of admirals dressed better, spoke English better, and behaved in public better than their colleagues in the army. But beneath the Western braid and cocked hats were the same samurai spirit, the same perverted beliefs in Shinto gods and the same fanatical zeal to fulfill a divine mission of conquering the south sea area and organizing it into a Greater

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East Asia, whose population of more than a billion and whose resources of incalculable value might be exploited as intensely as Formosa, and then, with a bigger and better armada than ever before, to step up and challenge anyone who dared interfere with their god-given command to bring the eight corners of the world under one roof.

CHAPTER THREE

S C H O O L F O R P U P P E T S

EVERYONE who has visited the Bunraku Theater in Osaka, the only one of its kind, has been entranced by the performance of beautifully dressed puppets which strut across the stage and behave in such a way as to appear almost human. The dolls are very large, at least two-thirds life size, and they can be made to go through all the movements of a professional actor, often with even greater effect. The art of bringing these puppets to life is no mean one, and years of study and practice are necessary at the school in Osaka before the dolls can be made to perform properly. Each puppet requires one chief operator and two or three assistants. They appear on the stage with the puppets but stay pretty much in the background and try to conceal themselves from the audience by wearing black hoods and robes. Most puppets in other countries

are attached to strings, which sometimes get tangled and even break. There is no such danger in Japan, where the operators have a firm hold on their dolls. The chief operator slides his hand under the doll's dress and up along its spine until his fingers reach the head, which is manipulated almost as if they were playing on its brain.

Japanese are skillful not only in making puppets behave like human beings. They also have had much success in making human beings behave like puppets. And in this art, in which they have a rightful claim to originality, the Japanese have a larger collection of international dolls than any other people in the world. They have dolls from China, Mongolia, Russia, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, India, the Philippines, and other areas in which Japan is directly interested at the present time. Many of these are of the Bunraku type and are held very securely by the head so that if they should misbehave they can be crushed very easily. They usually do not misbehave.

Puppets originally were introduced into Japan from China. After inverting the art, Japan, in return, introduced it into China. With some understanding of human nature and the importance which Orientals attach to "face," the Japanese saw the value of giving conquered peoples the illusion of self-rule and independence. This was done by recruiting from among them puppets which the Japanese could manipulate to their advantage without themselves appearing too

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much in the public eye. The operators in the new art of handling human puppets were the Japanese militarists, who developed it originally with great success in their own country.

Perhaps it was first used on the Asiatic continent in Korea, where the Japanese succeeded in organizing Korean gangs to assist them in the murder of the Korean Queen in 1895. After the country was thoroughly undermined by the use of terror and corruption, Japan annexed Korea but did not destroy the royal family, which was used by the militarists in an attempt to placate the outraged nationalism of the Koreans. The Royal House of Korea became the first appendage to the Imperial House of Japan. To draw the Korean family closer to the Japanese, the head of the Korean house, Prince Gin Ri, was given a Japanese wife so that the future royal family would be half Korean and half Japanese. If this process is continued, as the Japanese undoubtedly plan, all that will be left of the Korean family will be the name. The blood will be almost all Japanese, which is the material the militarists prefer for their puppets. To make Ri feel even more like one of the family, they gave him a home not far from Hirohito's palace and a commission in the army so that he could learn to strut and bow like other chosen subjects of the god-emperor.

From Korea the practice of puppetry spread with the Japanese like a plague in China. All types and kinds of agents were hired by the Japanese in Man-

churia, where finally Henry Pu Yi, former emperor of China who was being kept in stock for just such an occasion, was made chief of all puppets and crowned Emperor Kangte. The Japanese militarists also tried to sell Henry the idea of taking a Japanese wife, but the common rumor in Tokyo was that he resisted vigorously, holding out for his most attractive Chinese sweetheart, Yueh Hua, daughter of a Manchurian businessman. Although she was a commoner, they were married in 1934.

But that appears to have been the only serious difference between the Manchurian puppet and the militarists. When he was asked to visit Tokyo in 1940 to pay respects to his superior puppet, Hirohito, on the mythical twenty-sixth centennial anniversary of the founding of the empire, Henry agreed. His imperial stature of about six feet created a rather embarrassing scene at the Tokyo railway station, where Hirohito was taken to meet him. It is bad manners in Japan to look down upon the god-emperor, and most Japanese do not even dare look up at him when he passes in the street. It was understood that buildings more than eight stories high were not permitted in Tokyo so as to make it impossible to look down upon the palace grounds, an offensive act. Airplanes fly around but not over the palace.

But when Henry met Hirohito at the Tokyo station he either had to look down at him, because the

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superior puppet was of inferior height, or look over him. Nervous smiles on all faces present concealed Henry's bad manners as he smiled down at Hirohito from his lofty position. It may have been one of Henry's brief moments of pleasure in Tokyo. Few Japanese failed to observe the difference in height between the senior and junior gods when photographs of the meeting at the station appeared in evening newspapers.

Henry, nevertheless, was given the same reverence by the god-loving Japanese as Hirohito receives from his subjects and was treated as one of the members of the divine family. Whenever the chief emperor passes on the streets, residents of apartment houses along the imperial route are ordered by police to pull down their blinds so as not to look down. The same consideration was shown Henry. Residents of the Bunka Apartment, where a number of foreigners lived, found the following typewritten note in English under their doors shortly after Henry's arrival in Tokyo :

NOTICE

His Majesty, the Emperor of Manchukuo, who is now visiting Japan, is expected to pass through the front of the Bunka on Sunday, the 30th. You are requested to pull down all blinds of your windows facing down, east, west and south during the following hours :

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2:00 P.M.—2:50 P.M.

3:30 P.M.—4:10 P.M.

You are also requested not to look down the party from your rooms.

The Management

The first period was to take care of Henry's trip from the palace to some function to which he was being taken, while the second period was to cover his return to the palace. About an hour before his car was scheduled to pass the apartment, policemen knocked on my door and asked to be admitted. They are the civilian rulers of Japan and exercise more direct control than the emperor. They need no warrants to break into a room, so that when they ask for admission it never is denied. Two of them had called to see whether the foreigner had complied with the instructions of the management's notice. The window shades had been drawn full length. The police, however, were not quite satisfied. They asked why the windows had not been shut, apparently suspecting that a wayward breeze might touch off the spring so that the blind would recoil just at the strategic moment when Henry was passing beneath. The windows therefore were closed and the blinds drawn again. The officers grunted approval and moved on to inspect another room. To the disappointment of foreign residents, Henry did not pass through the front of the apartment, as the notice promised, but only by it.

When Henry returned to Manchukuo, the army had a surprise for him: a brand new imperial sanctuary just like the one he had just seen in Hirohito's garden. Enshrined in the sanctuary was the spirit of the Japanese Sun Goddess. It was understood that Henry was not as pleased with the gift as he might have been, but he already had been taught to bow low in front of Shinto shrines just as Hirohito did, so that he was expected to overcome his prejudices against the Japanese gods more easily than those against Japanese girls. This shrine was to be for Manchukuo what the Ise Grand Shrine was for Japan, and Henry was to play Hirohito's role as the living deity in charge of the dead gods.

In making Manchukuo over in the image of Japan, the militarists also established a military shrine near the capital at Hsinking, where five thousand souls of those who were killed in the Manchurian "incident" were enshrined. This was Manchukuo's equivalent of Tokyo's Yasukuni Shrine, where the souls of Japanese warriors are preserved. With a temple for the Sun Goddess and another for the souls of the militarists, it was said that Manchukuo's future was assured. Commenting on ten years of rule by Japanese militarists in Manchukuo, the government-controlled English-language daily *Japan Times and Advertiser* announced: "Favorable Development Is Attributed to Divine Protection of Sun Goddess." Included in this divine protection were fifty special (meaning Japanese) compa-

nies, which the paper said had been established in accordance with the principle of "open door and equal opportunity." These companies control most of the wealth of the new state, "established as an independent country at the will of the entire people," who are waiting only for an opportunity to destroy their benefactors.

A third leading puppet manipulated by the Japanese on the Asiatic stage is Wang Ching-wei, slick, sleeky, revolutionary renegade who deserted Chiang Kai-shek for the pleasure of a prison at Nanking. Chester Holcombe, a young newspaperman from Rochester, New York, who worked for a short time in Tokyo and then drifted on to Shanghai, wheedled a permit from the Japanese army to go up to Nanking to interview Wang, who is closely guarded by his rulers. In the course of the interview, Wang was said to have told Holcombe that he was not very happy with his job as "president" of the Japanese-controlled government and that he was virtually a prisoner. Holcombe wrote the story of his interview, which was published by that singularly courageous American-owned weekly in Shanghai, *The China Weekly Review*, under the caption, "The Prisoner of Nanking." The story incensed the militarists in Shanghai, and Holcombe was promptly put down on their blacklist together with other Americans who were bold enough to speak up under the bayonets of the Japanese.

It is not unlikely that Wang deliberately "planted"

the story on Holcombe in the hope that it would cause some loss of face for the Japanese militarists and result in relaxation of their hold on him and his gang. The general dissatisfaction of Wang and his clique and their fear that they might be sold out by the Japanese in a deal with Chungking led to an effort by the Japanese to placate them the following year, in the summer of 1941, when the leading Nanking puppets were taken to Tokyo for reconditioning. An elaborate reception was given Wang, who was personally entertained at the palace by Hirohito himself. The admission of Wang to the holy precincts of the palace marked a new low in the visitors which the militarists selected for Hirohito, but it also served to fix the seal of sanctity upon Wang and to guarantee him that he would not be sold short in a possible peace with Chiang Kai-shek.

But Wang and his group were not satisfied simply with entertainment and assurances. They had lost face in China with their own people and made it clear to the chief militarists in Tokyo that they had to be given more control in the occupied areas to regain some of it. They carried their appeal directly to the Japanese people in an attempt to force the issue. Chou Fo-hai, vice-president and finance minister of the puppet regime, wrote an article for the Tokyo newspaper *Asahi* saying that Japan had not succeeded in making the livelihood of Chinese in occupied areas superior to that under Chungking control. His statement directly con-

tradicted one made only a short time before by the Japanese ambassador to Nanking, Kumataro Honda, who had come to Tokyo to mediate between the disgruntled puppets and their Japanese warlords. To a public saturated with army propaganda claiming that everything was going smoothly and that the Chinese were cooperating full-heartedly with the Japanese in the "new order" program, Chou disclosed several blunt facts. Taking a public slap at his lords, Chou denied that peace and order had been established in the occupied areas, where he said bandits and guerilla troops constantly threatened the lives of Chinese who had expected full protection by the Japanese.

Chou did not stop at that. He went on to point out that the militarists had promised to turn over administrative control of the occupied areas to the new government but in fact had limited it to a few provinces. He indicated that the puppets were willing to abandon North China to their masters but pleaded that "At least central and south China should be placed under the complete rule of the national government." Wang's right-hand man then protested against the use of the same type of monopolistic companies which the Japanese used to deprive Manchukuo of her economic wealth. The Chinese people found difficulty in understanding the "purpose" of such Japanese companies, he added ironically, despite the fact that the Nanking regime tried to explain that they were organized on the basis of "equality and mutual assistance."

To make it clear that Chou was not the only puppet dissatisfied with his role, another member of the Nanking troupe, Chen Kung-po, president of the legislative yuan and mayor of the occupied part of Shanghai, wrote an article for the Tokyo magazine *Kaizo* in which he said that Japan was expected to prove her words by deeds instead of by more words—a warning similar to one given by the American ambassador, Joseph Clark Grew, during a farewell luncheon for Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura before the latter left for Washington as the new Japanese ambassador there. It was clear from what Chen said that the Japanese were breaking their treaties not only with the democracies but also with their own puppets. Chen pointed to the chaos which had been caused to Chinese industry as a result of the war and made it clear that the Chinese would not help to restore it on the basis of a policy which sought to monopolize all his country's wealth for the Japanese. China is a nation which desires national progress just as much as Japan, he cried.

This joint appeal for relaxation of the Japanese grip on the Nanking puppets had little effect. The premier at the time, Prince Konoye, saw that something had to be done to calm the rebellious marionettes. The war minister, who was then General Tojo, also saw the need for a more genuine display of good intentions by the Japanese. The result was a bigger and better document than ever before filled with the same meaningless assurances against which the Chinese had protested

so vigorously. The press had been trying to build up the story for several days prior to the announcement of renewed pledges of support for the puppets when Germany suddenly invaded the Soviet Union and spoiled the entire show. It was not the only show the Nazis spoiled for the Japanese. Yosuke Matsuoka, then foreign minister, and other government officials were entertaining the puppets at a theater party when word of the new war was flashed to Tokyo. Matsuoka had to excuse himself and leave the puppets to enjoy themselves as best they could while he rushed to the Foreign Office to study the new mess his friend Hitler had made of his diplomatic policies.

Before Wang left Tokyo, foreign correspondents were invited to "interview" him. The Board of Information announced, however, that those who planned to attend would have to submit in writing their names and the questions they wished to ask four days before the interview, which was scheduled for Saturday, the day before the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. It was a good opportunity to see a free puppet show, and we all decided to attend, although the Americans had no desire to participate in the drama by submitting questions. The interview was held at the Chinese Embassy, which was taken over from the Chiang Kai-shek government and given to the Chinese puppets. Glaring at it almost directly across the street was the stern, cold-looking Soviet Embassy, which had little use either for its puppet neighbors or their masters and

therefore sensibly fortified itself behind large, forbidding, iron gates.

When a group of us drew up to the Chinese Embassy in a dilapidated, charcoal-burning Ford taxicab, just about making the crest of the hill on which the building stands, we were met by military policemen, who wanted to see our silk identification ribbons which the Board of Information had distributed. After producing them, we were admitted into the building, which is a much better structure than that of Japanese army headquarters which controlled the puppets. The building had been built by the Chinese government before the outbreak of war; hence it would be wrong to conclude that the Japanese militarists deprived themselves of anything for the comfort of their victims. At the entrance to the room where the press conference was to be held, there were more policemen, who stood alongside officials of the Board of Information stationed there to identify all who entered, so that no ill-meaning visitors might get within range of the army's protégé.

The room was filled with a large battery of Japanese news photographers, who can blaze away at one subject for hours on end without getting tired or bored, and sometimes without getting any good shots. After we had been seated at two long parallel tables, which ran from one end of the room to the other, and after Chu Min-yi, the puppet ambassador in Tokyo, had made himself comfortable in a rocking chair on a

verandah just outside the room, Wang's press assistant made his appearance. He was a small, ratty-looking person with beady, shifting eyes and jerky mannerisms.

He mounted a small platform that had been set up at one end of the room and announced that he was very happy to see us. He then made a point of saying that President Wang was very much pleased to have received the written questions of correspondents which the Board of Information asked for *at his (Wang's) request*. Apparently President Wang was very sensitive about the fact that correspondents had been asked to submit their questions four days before the conference so that Japanese officials could study them and "suggest" the proper answers, thereby making it impossible for him to speak directly to foreign correspondents.

With this prelude concluded, the chief actor, Wang himself, made his appearance on the stage. There was no applause as he strode in from the dressing room in the rear, but everyone sat up to have a look at the man who has had one of the strangest careers in the history of modern China. We were all interested in seeing the face of a Chinese who once had been an ardent revolutionary associated with the leftist government at Hankow, had fled for his life from his bitter enemy, Chiang Kai-shek, then joined the generalissimo in a joint front against Japan, and finally abandoned Chiang in a secret flight from Chungking to join the Japanese at a time when China was in desperate need of unity

against the common aggressor. We were anxious to see whether any face, including that of an unexpressive Chinese, could conceal the humiliation which we felt must have been his in betraying his people.

He briskly mounted the platform and took his stand slightly to the left of his assistant. Dressed in formal clothes, his dark hair plastered straight back from his forehead with either water or pomade, Wang looked much younger than his years, chiefly because of his boyish expression. He was very well built and had not lost the attractive yet strong features of a face well-known and once respected in China. The puppet of Nanking held himself erect and faced his audience boldly as if to say he was ready to meet anyone who cared to challenge or question his desertion to the enemy. He undoubtedly was aware of the opinion American and British correspondents had of him as well as the fact that they were only there out of curiosity to see rather than hear him. Fortified behind a well-prepared front and an equally well-prepared set of answers written on a sheaf of papers he held in his hand, he played his part perfectly, like a well-trained performer. His high-strung assistant reeled off a question in his screechy English and Wang read the answer in what sounded like polished Chinese, the English translation of which was then recited by his master of ceremonies. This routine was repeated until all the questions and answers were exhausted, Wang maintaining his serious expression while waiting until the

translation of his answer was completed, so that he could go on to the next one.

His answers were what everyone expected. Asked about foreign interests in China, Wang said he would respect the "legitimate" rights only of "friendly powers," which obviously did not include Great Britain and the United States. They did include, however, the Axis powers, with whom Wang said Nanking would move "side by side" for realization of a "new world order." Having already received assurances that he and not Chiang Kai-shek was the apple of the Japanese government's eye, Wang said he hoped Chungking would join his regime at Nanking and abandon its resistance to Japan. Some interest was aroused by a question regarding his attitude toward the Soviet Union, but Wang had the proper official Japanese answer for that. The anti-Communist policy which his regime was following in union with Japan was one thing, Chinese-Russian relations quite another. Gone were his revolutionary ideas of the days of Hankow and Borodin, the Communist agent sent to China to help launch the revolution there. Gone also were his independence and his freedom as he stepped down from the platform and returned to the room where the Japanese militarists were waiting for him to finish reciting his piece.

As we left to cable a few lines of the answers which Wang had just parroted for the Japanese and which the Japanese government spokesmen might just as well

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have read to us, were it not that both the Japanese and their Chinese puppets had to save the inevitable face, we noticed again the military guard which had been thrown around the building to protect the puppets. Just outside the gate we saw an American-made police car equipped with a wireless set, which is not seen very often on the streets of Tokyo and is used only on special occasions. It was apparent that Wang was not considered safe even in his adopted country. He was carefully protected wherever he went and was given a military escort when driven through the streets, which were cleared long before his car was scheduled to pass.

His party of assistants in the unwholesome drama also was carefully protected by police, who maintained a twenty-four-hour vigil at the Imperial Hotel, where they were quartered. I remember the close scrutiny given me by a policeman when I entered the hotel late one night while the Chinese were still there. Residents were relieved when the siege was lifted after Wang and his troupe left, which they did a few days after the interview. They were almost completely ignored by the Japanese, who had plunged into the new and serious problems arising from the German-Soviet war, which left them no spare time for playing with puppets.

The few correspondents who had formed any definite opinions about Wang Ching-wei were divided in their interpretation of his role in the Sino-Japanese

war. Some were inclined to believe that Wang really was not a puppet but had left Chungking at the end of 1938 with the understanding of Chiang Kai-shek himself to serve as a contact between Chungking and the Japanese and to make life as easy as possible for Chinese in occupied areas by taking over the administration of the controlled territory and wheedling whatever concessions he could. The possible result of such a policy would be the eventual merging of the puppet Nanking regime with the Chungking government after the Chinese had secured the best terms they could get from the Japanese.

Although something could be said for this point of view, which was shared by a number of Americans both in Tokyo and Shanghai and was supported by the fact that such double-dealing was not without precedent in Sino-Japanese relations, it did not fit very well with a number of other considerations. If Wang had left with the understanding of Chiang Kai-shek, there would have been no reason for the attempt by Chungking agents to assassinate him at his hideout in Hanoi, French Indo-China, where Wang narrowly escaped death, his secretary, who had been mistaken for him, being killed instead. There was also the fact that Wang was known to be ambitious, playing with one side in an attempt to reach the top and then with the other. Otherwise he would not have betrayed so many causes so many times. He already had shown himself a

man of weak convictions, the type of material of which puppets usually are made.

Although there might have been some diplomatic value in Chungking's having Wang dicker with the Japanese, thereby creating uneasiness in Washington regarding a possible Sino-Japanese settlement unfavorable to the United States and making America more amenable to China's pleas for aid, the disadvantages outweighed such advantages. The damage to national unity by the defection of such an important official as Wang Ching-wei, who was second only to Chiang Kai-shek in the government, could hardly serve China's interests from either the political or the military point of view and had the effect of encouraging the Japanese in the prosecution of the war by leading them to believe that the split at Chungking would cause speedy disintegration of the anti-Japanese faction.

It seemed more plausible to believe that Wang, after failing to gain control of the Kuomintang on a platform of peace with Japan which he hoped would cause Chiang's downfall, came to the conclusion that the United States would continue its equivocal policy toward the China war, which would drag on for some time with Chungking growing steadily weaker. Together with Wu Pei-fu, the old warlord from whom Wang had little to fear because of his advanced age, the Chungking renegade apparently thought he could swing the Chinese masses onto the bandwagon of peace

with Japan. Wang seems to have counted too much on the inner political struggle in Chungking and too little on the international situation, which underwent a revolutionary change with the outbreak of the second world war. America's foreign policy slowly and painfully crystallized, Chungking's back was stiffened, and Japan faced the alternative of surrendering or fighting her war of destiny, the outcome deciding her rise or fall as a great power, with puppet Wang tied up directly with it.

But what Wang's fate will be is not difficult to guess. He either will become a bigger and better puppet than his colleague, Henry Pu Yi, and thereby gain the complete disdain of his people, if he does not have that already, or he will be discarded by the defeated Japanese together with other marionettes like a broken, worn-out doll, which might not even be accepted again for repair by the country which produced it.

The year before Wang Ching-wei came to Tokyo, I had a chance to see some of the puppets and their operators in action on the stage in China. Jim Tew, blond, strapping and still fresh from Harvard, who had worked with me on the American-owned *Japan Advertiser*, wanted to see China before leaving the Orient to enroll in the Royal Air Force. I decided to join him in a quick excursion. Before we could sail from Kobe to Tientsin, however, the Japanese told us we would have to secure visas from the "Chinese National Government." As Tientsin and Peking are in

North China, which was nominally under control of the puppet Nanking regime, anyone who wanted to go there had to get permission from Nanking rather than Tokyo, which thereby sought to establish the fiction of the new government's independence.

We did not particularly like the idea of having our passports soiled by the stamp of a puppet regime which our government did not recognize, but we did want to see North China. It was not possible to get a visa at the Chinese Embassy or any other place in Tokyo. For some strange reason, Nanking visas were issued only in Yokohama, where an office had just been opened in a small wooden building formerly used by a trading firm, probably put out of business by wartime economic restrictions made necessary by the army's determination to establish a puppet government in China. It was a good example of the vicious circle which the Japanese militarists had set into motion in their own country when they invaded China.

A young Chinese clerk said he could give us visas to visit the territory of the Republic of the National Government of China, but they would cost six yen each. We whistled in surprise. Neither visa nor payment had been necessary before. It helps meet the cost of running the office, the clerk explained. It was easy to see how the visa business could be made much more profitable than the trading business it succeeded. It required only an investment of a large number of rubber stamps bearing Chinese characters, several ink pads,

and a supply of typewritten forms in English for foreigners who wanted visas. We had no time to argue technicalities, such as the fact that there had been no arrangement between the new Nanking regime and the government of the United States for such transactions or the fact that there was no charge to Americans for visas to Japanese territory because of a mutual agreement for Japanese who visited the United States. We put our money down on the counter and told the clerk we would buy two of his visas. We were handed forms strongly reminiscent of those we had filled out on our arrival in Japan, and it was not difficult to guess who the authors of the new ones were. We finally received our visas, which said they were good for any number of visits to China for a period of two years. As we walked out, I asked Tew what he thought of the chances of our visas' lasting longer than the government which issued them.

Arriving at the port near Tientsin, we ran into another strange business. At the pier we had to surrender our Japanese money for the notes of the new Chinese government, the currencies being exchanged at par, one Chinese yuan for one Japanese yen. This amounted to exchanging American quarters for nickels because our yen was worth about twenty-five cents in Tokyo while the new Chinese money, which was being turned out by the army as fast as it could work the printing presses, was worth only five cents. But we were "guests" of a "new order" China, where the ordinary

rules of arithmetic and logic did not prevail; so we took the new crisp nickel notes for our worn twenty-five-cent yen and congratulated ourselves on not having carried more Japanese currency. We learned later that the Japanese army's purpose in depriving us of our yen was to prevent its depreciation through a flight of currency from Japan to the continent.

Peking, which we reached the next day, was as beautiful as ever, despite its occupation by the Japanese. The only damage to its majestic temples was that caused by the vandalism of the beauty-loving Japanese civilians, who were anxious to carry some small memento back home with them—according to the story of an anti-Japanese guide, who himself offered to engage in the same kind of vandalism by securing for me an enamelled tile from one of the structures near the Temple of Heaven. Strangely enough, it was in Peking, a city occupied by the Japanese army, that I was able for the first time in three years to shake off the feeling of oppression always present in Tokyo, which in a sense is occupied more pervasively by the militarists than Peking. Here it was possible to find an Oriental people who belonged to the same world that we did, who knew what freedom and oppression meant, who refused to surrender their souls to a stupid and barbaric myth about gods and ghosts and whose every thought and feeling sprang from a conviction that they would be free from the arrogant group which ruled them from its garrison on the outskirts of the

city. We could not escape the conclusion that Peking was a city of free people even though occupied by foreign troops, while Tokyo was a city of lost souls although apparently unoccupied.

For Tew and myself, then, Peking was like a breath of fresh air which shook loose the cobwebs that had collected in our heads during our long stay in Tokyo and made us aware of the fact that not everyone in the world was half dead. It was even possible for us to forget there was ever a Japanese army. Mrs. Chien, a kindly old American woman married to a Chinese who was somewhere in China working for the Chungking government, drove us out to the various temples, which are laid out on such a heroic scale that human beings shrink in size and look like Lilliputians. Even the swaggering Japanese soldiers were swallowed up by the size of Peking's temples. It was possible to wander around the temple grounds and lose sight and thought of everyone else, including the militarists who ruled the city. Peking provided a brief interlude of civilization with which we were reluctant to part.

We found that the Japanese army also was reluctant to part and was enjoying its stay in Peking equally well. Before leaving, Tew and I visited the Japanese garrison headquarters to see Captain Takata, the army spokesman. There we encountered the customary haughty-looking guards with their bristling bayonets. They softened a bit after being addressed in Japanese

and let us pass into the building where Takata had his office.

The first thing we noticed was that he had an ample supply of Japanese cigarets and matches, neither of which we had been able to get without difficulty in Tokyo at the time we left. There were plenty of cigarets, matches and other Japanese goods in China, Takata said. It was easy to see here one of the reasons why we were so short in Tokyo. It also was easy to see that the Japanese army was quite satisfied with its life in the new empire it had just carved out for itself in North China. Everything is peaceful here and everyone is quite happy, Takata said. He boasted about the fact that many diplomats were moving their offices to Peking from various other parts of China because, he said, Peking was safer and pleasanter. Takata thought that was a fine compliment to the Japanese army. It was really a compliment to a Chinese city which could not be spoiled entirely by the presence of Japanese or any other troops.

The Japanese army in North China was aware of the fact that it was in possession of something good and had no intention of giving it back to the Chinese. We asked Takata whether the Wang Ching-wei regime would take over the administration of North China. He did not evade the question but made it perfectly clear that the army in North China was not sympathetic with Wang or his new regime. Every-

thing was running smoothly under control of the army, Takata said, and there was no reason to believe that Wang or his assistants could do as well.

The army in North China obviously wanted to select its own puppets and not have them chosen for it. To select or even recommend a puppet to the North China army was almost the same as impinging on its sovereignty. Like the army in Manchukuo, it wanted to be free from interference by Tokyo or by the armies in Central and South China, who had empires of their own. The North China army favored a policy of dividing up China into at least three separate empires, ruled by three separate Japanese armies, which would "cooperate" with each other for the common good.

The empire of the North China army extended south to the Yellow River, where the empire of the Central China army began. Passing from one into the other was like going from one state to another. At the "border" separating North and Central China, Tew and I were awakened about five o'clock in the morning and told to leave the train on which we were traveling from Peking to Nanking to change our North China money for Central China money, which was a military currency. The two Japanese empires even had different money! We were entering Central China, the land of Wang Ching-wei, who probably could not even visit Peking without a special permit granted by the new lords of North China. Wang Ching-wei, it was clear from what Takata said, was the puppet only

of the Central China army, not to be confused with the North China army.

Tew and I had left Peking early the previous morning. We discovered that the train was loaded with puppets of both the North China and the Central China empires. Two of them entertained us almost all the way to Nanking. One of them was the vice-president of the puppet Chinese railway company which ran the line on which we were traveling. The other was a friend of his, a huge Chinese doctor with a heavy black moustache and a big stomach which heaved as he roared with laughter. The cause of all his laughter was the railway vice-president himself, who was on a tour of "inspection" of the line. At every station, an army sentry would open the door of our compartment, and the vice-president would hurry out to the platform, where a delegation of young Japanese employed at the station would be assembled in their khaki uniforms for a demonstration. They would all bow to him in unison, and the little round Chinese vice-president would bow back the best Japanese bow he was capable of performing. There would be an exchange of about three or four bows before the conductor would rescue him by signaling the engineer to start off again, when the vice-president would jump back on the train as the Japanese railway corps gave him a rousing send-off with a series of "banzai," which the official recognized with more bows as the train drew away from the station.

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After he had returned to our compartment and the door had been closed again by the sentry, the doctor would break out in a roar of laughter that set Tew and me off just watching him. He had restrained himself all during the time we had been watching the performance on the platform, but after the train had started again and the sentry had gone away, he could hold himself no longer. He would pound the floor of the car with his cane as an extra vent to release the flood of laughter that poured out of him for minutes at a time. When he had finally cooled off a bit, he would then re-enact the scene which we had witnessed and which had touched his sense of humor to its very depth. The doctor spoke Japanese perfectly, having been graduated from Keio University in Tokyo. He would first take the part of the Japanese station master who had charge of the railway corps and mimic in Japanese the words of greetings to the vice-president. Then he would take the part of the puppet official by standing up and bending over in a few clumsy embarrassed bows with which the vice-president recognized the demonstrators. Finally he would throw both hands above his head and shout "banzai" just as did the Japanese. By that time the doctor had worked himself into another state of explosive laughter, which would gush forth again in a steady stream.

The little globular vice-president would blush with embarrassment all during this puppet take-off on his own original puppet demonstration at the platform,

but he tried to work it off by joining the three of us in the general laughter. Between all the joking and fun-making, we managed to learn a few things about the vice-president, one of which was that he did not like his job any more than the ridicule it brought him. The doctor told us that the Chinese official had been the vice-president of the railway line before the Japanese seized it following the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war. They asked him to retain his position. To have refused would have meant confiscation of all his wealth in Peking as well as possible harm to his family. Furthermore, there was no other work he could turn to that the Japanese did not control. He decided to accept the offer. But he did not hide from us the fact that he hated and despised his rulers. And we were soon to see why.

As we drew near another station, military police entered our compartment and asked to see identification and permits for traveling. The vice-president produced a special card which had been given him by Japanese officials in Peking. One of the Japanese soldiers then asked him in extremely coarse language, which even I could recognize, whether he had a vaccination certificate. The vice-president unfortunately had none. The soldier then took him by the arm and raised him out of his seat to the doorway of our compartment, where he called for another soldier who was standing nearby with a scalpel and vaccine ready to perform the operation. The official protested that he

was vice-president of the line and had already been vaccinated. One of the civilian Japanese officials on the train also interceded on behalf of the troubled vice-president, but the Japanese soldier silenced both by shouting something which I could not understand. Up went the sleeve of the hapless vice-president and down came the instrument of the attending soldier. Whether he had ever had any medical experience we could not tell. He wore only the ordinary military uniform of the Japanese regular soldier. When they had finished with him, he was shoved back into the compartment and the door was closed. For some strange reason the rest of us were not even asked to produce any certificates.

The number two executive of the line was burning with anger and embarrassment as he returned to his seat. We were all soon laughing again, however, when our doctor friend broke the tension with his mimicry of the scene which had just taken place and the suggestion that the official had just been poisoned. The vice-president had hardly composed himself when the train stopped, the sentry opened the door and the official was given his cue for another performance on the platform. By this time we had begun to sympathize with him for his unenviable job, and the doctor apparently had tired of repeating his take-off on the platform scene.

Shortly before he left us, we asked the official whether there were many derailings as a result of

guerilla activity. Not very many, he answered. Only one or two every week, he said proudly. We were not sure whether he was proud of the guerillas for what we thought was a fairly good record or pleased that the rate of accidents was not greater. After the official got off the train, the doctor left our compartment for another, where he had abandoned a young Japanese girl, who obviously was his mistress. While he was with us, he had mentioned a wife and children in Peking and said he was going to Shanghai on "business." We never learned exactly what his connection was with the Japanese. He seemed to be well known at the Japanese hotel in Nanking, where we had to spend the night and wait for the train to Shanghai, which ran only during the day because of the danger of guerillas at night. When we arrived in Shanghai, he seemed to know how to bow and play the part of a puppet even better than the railway official he had ridiculed when it came to passing military inspection at the railway station. In the hotel at Nanking he pretended not to know us, apparently feeling he would be suspected by the Japanese if seen talking with foreigners.

This was even more obvious in the case of another official Tew and I had met on the train from Peking. This Chinese was an engineer traveling with the Nanking minister of "reconstruction," as smug, greedy and corruptible-looking a bureaucrat as I have ever seen. He told us that his brother also was an engineer

but worked for Chungking, where he too wanted to go. However, he said he had been asked to stay in the occupied area to care for the family and its property. He wasted no words in expressing his attitude toward the Japanese and telling some of their outstanding deeds. Tew and I had made an appointment to have dinner with him in Nanking. After we had had a look at Wang Ching-wei's prison and returned to the hotel to meet our Chinese friend for dinner, he asked us to excuse him as his boss, the minister, had given him something else to do. We understood.

It would not be just to leave the Japanese in China without mentioning their work with native puppets in Inner Mongolia and White Russian victims in Manchuria. Puppets like Prince Ri, Henry Pu Yi, and Wang Ching-wei are used principally for internal purposes, but in Inner Mongolia and northern Manchuria, bases for future operations against the Soviet Union, the Japanese militarists developed marionettes intended for foreign service. Shortly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war, the invaders set up Prince Teh as head of the so-called Federated Autonomous Government of Inner Mongolia. His position was somewhat similar to that of Wang Ching-wei, and he occasionally was brought to Tokyo with his Mongolian troupe for instructions on proper collaboration with the "new order." But perhaps more important than Prince Teh is the army of fifth-columnists and agents which are being turned out by Lieutenant-

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General Kanji Tsuneoka, president of the Central Academy at Kalgan, capital of Inner Mongolia. After graduation from this military school, where they are trained by Japanese officers, they are "distributed to various regions in Inner Mongolia as leaders," according to a Japanese announcement. What they lead, of course, are groups of future saboteurs and agents to be used against the Soviet Union and its outposts in Outer Mongolia. "Inner Mongolia forms an anti-Communist corridor and is very significant politically, militarily and racially," the *Japan Times and Advertiser* said.

More impressive and even more open in declaring their intentions are the White Russian Fascists organized by the Japanese in Manchuria. Known as the Duce of the White Russian Fascist Party is Constantin Vladimirovich Rodzaevsky, thirty-five-year-old visionary and adventurer who has grown a full beard and moustache to emphasize his resemblance to the last Tsar of Russia, whom he hopes to succeed on a new throne in Moscow supplied by the Japanese. Headquarters of the party are located in Harbin, former "Moscow of the Orient," where thirty thousand White Russians discovered that they jumped out of the Bolshevik frying pan only to land in the Japanese fire. Russians are divided into two political groups, the Fascists and Monarchists, who are led by General Kis-litsin, a veteran of the first world war. Both are victims of the Japanese and compete against each other

for Japanese favor. Kislitsin claims eighteen thousand supporters and Rodzaevsky twelve thousand.

The Russian Duce, however, has caught the eye of Japanese militarists because of his dashing manner and his fantastic ideas. The Duce has his "elite corps" which surrounds him at his headquarters, where two life-size oil paintings of the last Tsar and Tsarina provide the proper background. Like the Italian Fascists, members of his gang are provided by the Japanese with black shirts and cross-belts. Not to discriminate against the third member of the Axis alliance, the Nazi swastika is used as the symbol for the organization. Rodzaevsky claimed that his office is the headquarters of an international organization of White Russian Fascists numbering thirty-two thousand in twenty-six different countries. The second most important office of the Fascists, Rodzaevsky said, was located in New York City, where the party published its own newspaper and received instructions from Harbin.

Included in its membership are said to be Tartars, Cossacks, Georgians and Armenians. The Russian Duce claimed he had members who were of one hundred and fifteen different races in the Soviet Union. Russians of both sexes, not of Jewish blood, are eligible for membership if over five years of age, when they are supposed to be old enough to understand the reactionary Fascist creed. On the two thousand six hundredth anniversary of the founding of the Japanese Empire, the Russian Fascists paraded their loyalty to

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the Son of Heaven by joining Japanese demonstrations.

But the greatest pleasure the Japanese derive from their Fascist puppets is at their branch in Manchuli, where a huge, neon swastika perched on the roof of a tall building is illuminated every night to blaze a threat at the Soviets, standing at their border less than two miles away. Duce Rodzaevsky is waiting for the day he can carry his swastika across the border. Also waiting is General Kislitsin, who expects to lead the army of White Russian soldiers who have been trained in Manchuria for action with the Japanese against the Soviet Union. Both have great hopes as Japanese Quislings.

Soon after I returned to Japan from China, plans of the militarists to establish their "Greater East Asia" began to crystallize. Included in these plans was a new set of puppets who were in the process of manufacture for a number of years. They were intended for Indo-China, Thailand, the Philippines, Burma, Malaya and India.

Most of them were enlisted in their own countries. It was generally known that Japanese agents were active in Indo-China, Burma and Malaya in an attempt to arouse natives to revolt against their foreign rulers, while in Thailand they engaged in intrigue and bribery to establish a government favorable to Japan and hostile to the democracies. The announcement shortly after the outbreak of the Pacific war that the British had seized U Saw, Prime Minister of

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Burma, because he was suspected of dealing with the Japanese, was an indication of how deeply the Japanese had penetrated long before the war began. Another could be seen in the readiness with which the Japanese established a puppet government in the Philippines under Emilio Aguinaldo, the rebel general.

As early as August, 1941, four months before outbreak of war, a report was circulated in Tokyo that the Sultan of Johore, strategic state at the southern tip of the Malayan peninsula opposite Singapore, had sold out to the Japanese. At that time the government-controlled *Japan Times and Advertiser* published a story under the caption: "Sultan of Johore Hates British Yoke." It mentioned that the Sultan was of "bold and upright character" because he disliked the British and went tiger hunting to forget them. The paper also recalled that the Sultan was very friendly toward Japan, which he visited in 1934, when the emperor decorated him with the Grand Cordon of the Rising Sun and sent him back to his country loaded with gifts and a warm feeling for the Japanese.

Participation of Thai troops in the war against the democracies almost immediately after the Japanese invasion of that country indicated how quickly the Japanese were able to press into service puppets which they had trained over a period of years. Once in control of Bangkok, the Japanese had no difficulty in eliminating the so-called pro-British and pro-American faction and substituting for it one of their own making. Dur-

ing the visit of Thai officials who were sent to Tokyo to take part in the negotiations to settle the border dispute between Indo-China and Thailand early in 1941, the Japanese made vigorous efforts to win them over to the "Greater East Asia" doctrine. They wined and dined the officials night after night to make the "new order" more palatable to their guests. But the Japanese did not recruit their puppets so much from these officials as from nationalists and army and navy extremists in Thailand herself, where attempts to bribe and corrupt Thai officials were no secret. Japan was rumored to have established an efficient fifth column not only in the Thai army and navy but in the government as well even before the outbreak of the border conflict with Indo-China. Shipments of Japanese planes and war materials for the fighting against Indo-China strengthened the bonds between Japanese and Thai officers in Bangkok.

Japanese ambitions extend beyond Thailand, and her preparations to fulfill them did also. From India Japan gathered perhaps the largest single group in Tokyo for training in fifth-column work and puppetry. This group operates under the name of Indian Independence League. Its president is Rash Behari Bose, whom the Japanese have groomed as the possible head of a puppet government in India. In Bose they see the future Wang Ching-wei of India. The importance attached to Bose can be seen in the fact that he is a protégé of Mitsuru Toyama, head of the gangster

Black Dragon Society, which has turned out more than one effective puppet for Japan as well as China. Shortly before I left Japan, Toyama arranged to have Bose stage a demonstration of "loyal" Indians at the Zojoji Temple in Tokyo to honor Japanese soldiers who died in Manchuria and China and to express "appreciation of the great task Japan has undertaken." Japan's number two Indian puppet is A. M. Sahay, who has organized Indians of Kobe and Osaka for support of the "new order" against Britain in India.

As instruments of conquest and control of occupied territories, Japan undoubtedly has made greater use of puppets than any other country in the world. As in the case of her doctrine of "Hakko Ichiu," the art of producing and manipulating puppets was developed by the genius of her own militarists, who had become experts in it long before Hitler or Mussolini came upon the world stage. For the success or failure of their puppetry the Japanese militarists will have to take a bow.

CHAPTER FOUR

S A M U R A I S E R E N A D E

I N T H E spring of 1941, when the democracies began to suspect the intentions of Japan in the Pacific, cynical Nobufumi Ito, as head of the Board of Information, invited foreign residents, especially correspondents and diplomats, to a concert in their honor at the theater in which the board had its offices. An attractive program was offered to a community which had been starved for entertainment because of wartime restrictions. A large crowd therefore responded to the offer and filled the balcony which had been reserved for it almost to capacity. The British Ambassador, Sir Robert Craigie, and his wife were shown to special seats in the middle of the first row, where they were flanked on both sides by Japanese dignitaries.

The concert consisted mostly of classical Japanese music so dear to the samurai of feudal days and then

to the nationalists of succeeding days. The finest classical musician in the Japanese Empire, blind but masterful Michio Miyagi, played on the koto, thirteen-stringed Japanese harp. Another expert filled the theater with the strange, unhappy sounds of the samisen, three-stringed Japanese banjo. The program was concluded with the most beautiful piece of modern Japanese music I ever heard, a cantata sung magnificently by a mixed choir of about a hundred children. The cantata was dedicated to the Eastward Expedition of Emperor Jimmu, first mythical ruler of Japan.

Before the concert was begun, our host, Dr. Ito, mounted the platform and explained the reason for our being there. First he spoke in his perfect French, which must have been appreciated by the French mission, from whom Japan had only a few days before extracted pieces of Indo-China for the benefit of Thailand after taking most of the colony for herself. Later he spoke in English, which must have been appreciated by Sir Robert Craigie, whose territories in the Far East were next on the Japanese calendar. What he said in both languages was that the Japanese, in the midst of a world submerged in war and chaos, were doing their work so quietly and calmly that they were able to stage a concert for the benefit of foreigners from everywhere.

To some of the diplomats and most of the audience the speech was as comforting as the cantata. To many of the newspapermen it sounded as cynical as the sami-

sen seemed sour. While Ito was holding his concert, another official, Foreign Minister Matsuoka, was speeding quietly to Berlin to plot with Hitler the death of the British Empire, represented at the concert by Craigie. And while Matsuoka was away, the Japanese navy in Tokyo continued studying its strategy of possible war against the United States, which would mean the continuation of the eastern expedition of Emperor Jimmu under his direct divine descendant, Hirohito.

The concert was not the only official entertainment offered by Japan as proof of her peaceful intentions while her militarists quietly continued their work of planning destruction of some of her guests. For several years the Japanese had been trying to put the world to sleep with their samurai songs, which were broadcast by short wave twenty-four hours a day to all the eight corners. "More Power to You" said an advertisement in a publication circulated abroad announcing expansion of Radio Tokyo's facilities to provide foreign listeners with "easier reception, better programs, longer hours."

The expansion was effective the first of 1941, when the program of the militarists also began expanding. For the south sea area, scene of future military operations, Radio Tokyo announced it would broadcast daily in the various languages understood there: English, Dutch, French, Chinese (three different dialects), Malay, Thai and Japanese. For Southwestern Asia and the Near East, scene of possible future operations,

Radio Tokyo offered daily programs in Burmese, Hindustani, Arabic, English, French and Japanese. To Hawaii, known for its base at Honolulu, daily programs also were beamed in English and Japanese. Other daily programs, in an appropriate assortment of languages, were beamed specially to Europe, Central and South America, the eastern districts of North America, the western districts of North America, South America, Australia and New Zealand, and finally China. Radio Tokyo covered the world, offered music to everyone, discriminated against no one, charged nothing.

The world was invited to listen but not to reply with programs of its own for Japan—because no one could hear them. Short-wave radio receivers were prohibited to the subjects who paid for Radio Tokyo's operations. The "Voice of Japan," as Radio Tokyo calls itself, could be heard abroad but it was illegal for any voice from abroad to be heard in Japan. There were several reasons, the most important being that Radio Tokyo could take care of domestic listeners as well as foreign. The militarists had no desire to permit any ideas from the "decadent democracies" or the subversive Soviets to invade the minds of myth-ridden subjects by way of the ether while they were making every effort to crush whatever free thought had stolen into the country through their ports.

A large staff was trained to turn out the programs for Japan's world-wide radio undertaking. Through

the new modern building of the Broadcasting Corporation of Japan, government organization which operates Radio Tokyo, passed nationals of all different countries of the globe to speak to their people in a language which they could understand. The subject and content of their speeches, however, were selected and censored by Japanese officials, so that foreign listeners would not gather any wrong impressions. Sleeping quarters were provided in the building, so that messages conveying proper impressions could be broadcast from Tokyo during the night for the other half of the world to receive during the day.

Radio Tokyo, which in addition to its own programs broadcasted news provided by Domei, the official news agency, sang the songs foreign countries liked most to hear. To the democracies were beamed stories of peace; to Japan's Axis partners, stories hinting closer collaboration in war; to the south sea area, assurances that they had not been overlooked in the Greater East Asia program. When the day drew near for Pearl Harbor, Radio Tokyo assured Hawaii that all was well and that the islands could go on enjoying their warm sands and surf bathing. The very day the last Pacific peace cabinet resigned, newspapers in the United States and Hawaii published the following Domei report: "The Cabinet of Premier Fuminaro Konoye resigned in a body today, with diplomatic observers expressing the belief that it foreshadows a Japanese move against Russia in support of Germany."

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War against Russia, yes; against the democracies, ridiculous! Honolulu had Domei's word for it. And if it did not believe Domei, it could have the word of the new Japanese Foreign Minister, Shigenori Togo, who also was quoted throughout the United States as saying that Japan's aim was the promotion and maintenance of world peace. Thus Radio Tokyo, with its songs of peace, often succeeded in misleading future victims of Japanese bombs and frequently in undoing the work of foreign correspondents in Tokyo who attempted to sound a warning of danger.

Japan did not depend entirely on the radio to convey her messages abroad. She relied also on foreigners. She established not only schools for puppets but also schools for propagandists and goodwill merchants. The Foreign Office spent thousands of dollars to bring to Japan thousands of teachers who were taken by the hand like children through the genuinely beautiful wonderland of Japan. From the colorful temples of Nikko through the grand old capital of Kyoto they were led enchanted and bewitched by the sights of a world they had never seen before. Still enchanted and still bewitched, they were led back to Yokohama for a comfortable ride on a modern Japanese liner to return to their desks in the large and small schools of the United States to tell their pupils of the wonders of Japan.

Japanese always complained that they were poor propagandists. In best propaganda style, they com-

plained so persistently that they convinced many foreigners it was true. Japanese liked nothing better than to be told they were poor propagandists. It assured them that their propaganda was working. And in working on foreign school teachers they showed a fine sense of discrimination. Through school teachers they realized they could secure a much wider audience than through the parents whose children they taught. Each teacher over a period of years might reach hundreds of impressionable minds. Teachers of grade schools made the best conveyors of appreciation for the delicate manners and delightful ways of the Japanese, because they could plant thoughts in the minds of children which they would remember long after they had forgotten they were ever children.

The Foreign Office also had a warm place in its heart for students interested in Japanese culture and language. Special schools were established to provide instruction for foreign students, while courses in the secrets of flower arrangement and tea ceremony were available to any who cared to stimulate their sensibilities and dull their senses. Suitable Japanese teachers and texts were provided to those who wanted private instruction.

To develop an appreciation abroad for the good things in Japanese life the Foreign Office encouraged international student conferences. For a number of years conferences between Japanese and American students were held alternately in Japan and the United

States. The Society for International Cultural Relations and its branch, the Japan Institute at Rockefeller Center, New York, were particularly helpful in providing suitable impressions for foreign consumption. In 1940 it sponsored a world-wide essay contest on the subject of Japanese culture. It was open to the nationals of every country in the world and offered to winners of the contest one first prize of a first-class round trip to Japan and three thousand yen for a three months' visit; two second prizes of a first-class round trip to Japan and one thousand yen for a month's stay; and several third prizes of five hundred yen in books published in Japan. The society announced that it expected "to obtain the best results in the North American zone, particularly in the United States. . . ."

Such generosity was not reserved only for students. The Japanese knew the value of making friends among foreign newspaper publishers and writers. Whether they received only free first-class passage on one of the new N.Y.K. luxury liners, which also were built for conversion into naval auxiliaries, or whether all expenses involved in their trip were paid by the Foreign Office, visiting newspapermen were assured a pleasant and entertaining interlude as guests of the Imperial Japanese Government. The monthly magazine issued by the N.Y.K. Line was filled with photographs of such guests. Here is a typical legend which appeared beneath the photograph of one happy American couple who were invited to see for themselves that Japan was

not nearly as bad as hostile propagandists represented her abroad, their names being better left undisclosed: "Mr. and Mrs. S. crossed the Pacific aboard the Asama Maru from Yokohama to Los Angeles. Mrs. S. is well-known lady reporter in New York City. They were invited to inspect Japan, Manchukuo and China under sponsorship of Foreign Office." Below this photograph was one of another couple, the male member being described as a well-known publisher of New York City. Sharing the page with them was a photograph of Hiroshi Oshima, the Japanese Ambassador at Berlin, who helped conclude the alliance which helped lead to the attack on the country of the guests of the Japanese Foreign Office.

Such photographs appeared year after year, and those who posed for them were imported into Yokohama from the Western Hemisphere in a steady stream. While the Japanese were willing to gamble on a venture, they were shrewd enough to avoid repeating mistakes. The regularly increasing expenditures by the Japanese Government for free or semi-free trips for foreigners was an indication that it considered the money well spent and the returns in goodwill which helped blunt the hostility of the democracies more than enough to justify its investment.

Their love of adventure and strange places made Americans particularly vulnerable to the romantic attraction of the Orient. It was as difficult for an American to resist an offer to visit Japan at little or no ex-

pense as it later was impossible for him to deny the fact that Japan is a beautiful country and that her people are not all militarists. The Japanese exploited this weakness just as they exploited their good qualities to conceal their bad ones. Their invitation to foreigners to visit Japan and judge the country for themselves instead of submitting to second-hand prejudiced accounts sounded reasonable enough. But it was in such reasonableness that misfortune lay.

During his few weeks' officially guided whirlwind tour of Japan, Manchuria and China, the average visitor saw little that had much bearing on international problems but a great deal that impressed him with the beautiful and the exotic. The Japanese technique in entertaining a foreigner was to put him through a sight-seeing schedule which began early in the morning, ended late in the day or night, and left him exhausted and swimming in a maze of confused but exciting impressions and no time to think about anything else. The Japanese preferred to let their impressive temples, their colorful kimono, and their kind-hearted subjects speak for themselves. There was no need for written propaganda. The best propaganda of the Japanese lay in their people with their quaint customs, polite manners, raw fish, paper houses, wooden shoes, bifurcated socks, and Shinto shrines, all creating in the foreigner delightful sensations with which he was drugged into senselessness before he was ready for the second day's excursion.

The Japanese knew better than to add to this delightful confusion by going into political and economic issues, although they were always prepared to explain their peaceful intentions in China and how they were trying to raise the oppressed Chinese to the level of the Japanese. But usually there was not enough time to go into such prosaic matters or the equally prosaic details of the rapidly declining living and health standards of the nation, the shortages of food, clothing, and fuel, rising prices, longer working hours, loss of sons and husbands in the China war, military dictatorship in government, clan dictatorship in business, spiritual dictatorship in religion.

While catching his breath between trips, the foreigner could see there was plenty of food in the Imperial Hotel, where all Japanese do not eat; supplies of cotton shirts, which were available only to foreign tourists and diplomats, whom the Japanese were chiefly concerned with making comfortable; a large selection of brocades, antiques, curios and jewelry, which Japanese no longer were permitted to purchase, as they were considered "luxury goods" and out of keeping with the "emergency situation"; there was no apparent unemployment, no indication of dissatisfaction, and no particular signs of war despite the fact that the Sino-Japanese conflict had been going on for several years.

If anything at all remained in his head by the time he reached home in America it was that the Japanese

people were extremely kind and courteous, lived in a lovely land and were nothing at all like the brutes he had first imagined as a result of pro-Chinese "propaganda." That was the impression the Japanese wanted him to have, and it was about the only impression he could have taken back with him under the circumstances. It was quite correct but treacherously abused. What happened when the tourist returned to his country was that his confused but delightful exotic impressions together with a sense of appreciation to his hosts for his exciting experiences unconsciously created in him an inclination to defend the Japanese in international affairs, with which his trip had practically nothing to do. What were honest impressions about the Japanese were used dishonestly in their behalf. That was the purpose of the large budget in the Foreign Office for entertaining foreign visitors, and apparently only the Japanese realized how effective it proved in contributing to their aims.

When anti-Japanese feeling in the United States continued to mount as a result of Japan's aggressive policies, the Japanese did not hesitate to intervene directly with the American people. Japanese officials and businessmen known to certain classes in the United States offered goodwill speeches—without charge. Said Noboru Ohtani, president of the N. Y. K. Line, which carried so many goodwill salesmen to and from Japan, in a special short-wave broadcast to the United States from Tokyo, "Our people appeal therefore to

their American friends to understand that they were forced into the Sino-Japanese conflict against their will." Here was the voice of Mitsubishi, which controls the N. Y. K. Line, justifying the unprovoked aggression of the militarists. But Mitsubishi's N. Y. K. president did more than simply justify Japanese aggression. He also appealed to American businessmen on two grounds: first was that Japan's war against China was really a war against Bolshevism, an obvious attempt to play on American prejudices; the second was a promise of greater trade in the Far East through application of the open-door principle. The Mitsubishi mouthpiece failed to mention, however, that a Japanese soldier was to guard the door and, as someone suggested, permit it to be opened only for the democracies to leave.

Another interventionist was Yakichiro Suma, former counselor of the Japanese Embassy in Washington and later Foreign Office spokesman. Shortly after the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese conflict he took the liberty of touring the United States on a propaganda mission for the Japanese government, which would have been shocked if any American had attempted to do the same thing in Japan on behalf of his government. Tokyo operated its propagandists on the same theory as its short-wave broadcasts. It was a one-way affair with the Japanese sending their agents abroad but refusing to permit even foreign residents in Japan to speak freely with the people there. Sharp-tongued,

witty Suma waged his war against American understanding of what was taking place in the Orient for almost two full years, from 1937 to 1939, when he returned from Washington to wage war against American correspondents in Tokyo. He traveled from one end of the country to another, lecturing to thousands of innocent Americans at universities, clubs and associations.

Said Suma-san to the learned members of the Foreign Policy Association of Cleveland, Ohio: "China is not really a state; it is rather a 'tradition' or a 'history.' . . . For 4,500 years China has been a despotism—the only form of government that the masses understand." It was also the only form of government the Japanese wanted them to understand, because when it became clear that the Chinese had learned enough to know that the Japanese were interested primarily in replacing their warlords, the sons of the samurai struck with all their force before it was too late.

"What the Chinese people need is law and order," spokesman Suma went on to tell his Cleveland listeners. "The case against Japan has been largely trumped up. . . . We are not, for example, going to attempt to conquer the world." The American public had not yet learned of "Hakko Ichiu" and it had not yet heard of Pearl Harbor. They applauded after Suma sat down following his smooth serenades, which were composed of "infamous falsehoods" of a quality even superior to

those delivered to Secretary of State Hull immediately after the Japanese attack.

Yet the United States was a free country and propagandist Suma was free to tour with his propaganda songs. In a one-night performance at Bucknell University, Lewisburg, Pennsylvania, Suma sang: "The present [war] problem should be settled between Japan and China in a heart-to-heart talk. That is the reason why our Government has been unwilling to heed further remonstrances from the West. Surely, China, with a population of over 400,000,000 people and a territory as large as that of Europe, should be able to take care of herself. If she is not, whose fault is it?" Surely Hawaii with her population of thousands, the south sea area with its millions, India with still more millions should be able to take care of themselves, and if they are not. . . .

Perhaps Suma's greatest success was scored in a performance before the Economic Club of Detroit. Here he received a warm welcome by its chairman, who pointed out in introducing speaker Suma that Americans also have resorted to armed aggression to add to their national boundaries (an argument repeatedly used by Japanese in their propaganda to justify aggression in pursuit of their policy of "Hakko Ichiu"). The chairman then is quoted as having said: "Whatever the means Japan may use to reach her objective, you can be sure that Japan is motivated by an idealism

which is possibly beyond our understanding, which permeates her life, her religion and her being." After Suma had finished delivering his usual line of propaganda, supplied and paid for by the Imperial Japanese Government, the chairman is again quoted as having said: "We Detroiters today have heard probably the first *authentic* discussion of one of the difficulties of our *ally* in the west and, if you have listened attentively, you will have learned that many of the problems which faced us in the last century are facing Japan in this century and must be solved probably in the same way in which we solved ours—by force when we were right, by diplomacy when there may have been a question about it."

When I read these statements in a book of his American lectures distributed to Tokyo correspondents by Suma himself after he had become spokesman of the Foreign Office, I could hardly believe that they were made by an American. After the Japanese had been ruthlessly attacking Chinese civilians as well as soldiers, it was incredible that any American or anyone trained in the Occident could seriously be sure and urge others to be sure at a public gathering that the Japanese were motivated by an idealism which he could not even understand. And to refer to Americans as the allies of a dictatorial and militaristic country engaged in a program of conquest to which there was no limit was an insult of which no Japanese would ever be so crude as to be guilty. Yet it proved that Suma's

songs were not going unheard and that the money of the Imperial Japanese Government was not being wasted. I knew spokesman Suma quite well in Tokyo and admired him for his talent in deceiving foreign people in a language which was not his own.

Perhaps even more successful than Suma in peddling Japanese propaganda were a number of Caucasian Americans, who accepted Japanese money to do a job which I could not consider to be anything but betrayal of their country. Most of them are known to officials of the American Government and some of them were seized following the outbreak of war in the Pacific. Their arrest, however, could not undo the harm they already had done by helping the Japanese drug the American mind into a sense of innocent friendship or indifference, which made it possible for the Japanese to secure ten years of undisturbed aggression in the Far East. These Americans contributed to magazines, lectured throughout the country with or without films supplied by the Society for International Cultural Relations of Tokyo, and operated agencies for the distribution of Japanese propaganda in the form of cultural literature.

In 1941, when the Roosevelt Administration finally began to bring pressure to bear against Japan, and the American people awoke as from a sleep, the goodwill on which the Japanese government had spent so much money gradually was overpowered. Tokyo abandoned

its policy of entertaining American visitors and transferred its affection to Latin America, from which she hoped to extract supplies of raw materials which it became increasingly difficult to secure in the United States.

In an attempt to strengthen her position in Latin America, economic missions from the various countries, such as Mexico and Argentina, were invited to make free tours of Japan. The Japanese, as usual, were extremely generous in their hospitality, and yen flowed freely to give the visitors a proper impression of Japan's new order. In return, Dr. Carlos Torriani, chief of the trade section of the Argentine Foreign Office and head of the visiting mission, was generous in his praise of the Japanese and their empire. "With our fresh knowledge about the places we visited we shall direct our efforts to educating the people of Argentina about the things we saw and to promoting trade and good relations," he was quoted in the press as having said following his return from a trip to Manchukuo, occupied China and Korea.

But much more open in admiration and praise of the Japanese were two Mexican journalists who were brought to Japan on a goodwill mission at the end of August, 1941. They were José Pages Llergo, one of the owners and editors of *Hoy*, leading Mexican weekly magazine, and Isaac Diaz Araiza, a member of the staff of *Hoy*. Publisher Llergo did not wait until he completed his scheduled three months' tour of

Japan, Manchukuo, and China before disclosing his affection for Japan. Immediately after his arrival he was quoted by the *Japan Times and Advertiser* as having expressed full understanding and sympathy with Japan's efforts in East Asia. The United States, Llergo said, is oppressing Mexico with its "financial yoke," which he thought was "the cause for the common hatred of the Mexicans toward America. . . ." Latin America was definitely pro-Axis, said the visiting publisher. His interview was published under the caption: "Mexican Amity for Japan, Public Dislike for American Yoke, Revealed by Visitor." Statements such as these were music to the ears of Japanese and stirred fresh hope for a friendly Mexico. Almost immediately after the Japanese attack in the Pacific, however, *Hoy* published a cartoon which was not quite as cordial to the Japanese as they might have expected following publisher Llergo's remarks.

But if the loyalty of the Western Hemisphere to Japanese principles was questionable, that of various Asiatic countries appeared more assuring. In Tokyo are many students and teachers who have been gathered from Thailand, Java, Indo-China, India and even Afghanistan. One of the Japanese-cultivated minds from India spoke like a loyal subject of the Son of Heaven when he issued an appeal to his countrymen urging them to free themselves from the "Western hold" by combining with Malaya, Burma, Thailand and China in a joint front with Japan.

GOODBYE JAPAN

The serenade, having served its purpose in the Western Hemisphere by helping to rock the democracies into a false sense of security in the Pacific, now is being used to numb the resistance of the Asiatic countries to the advance of samisen-loving samurai.

CHAPTER FIVE

T H E P R E S S G E T S S C O O P E D

THE bombs which broke the early morning silence of the Pacific on December 7 awoke the American people to the fact that they were at war with Japan. Little did they realize that Japan had been at war with them for some time. Japan began waging war against the democracies before she began dropping bombs on them. The surprise effect of the attack which stunned America was not accomplished in one day.

Even before extending bombing operations which she had been conducting in China for more than ten years, Japan had engaged in shrewd dealings with the United States. It may have been a subtle form of shrewdness but it was none the less effective. In trade, as has been observed, she exchanged soft silk for hard metals, which were converted into weapons and returned with vengeance. In public relations, she offered

the product of her corrupt and persecuted press in exchange for that of a relatively fair and free one. Whatever she took from the United States in trade and information she used to promote her plans of conquest and domination. Whatever she gave in return she hoped would soften and confuse a future enemy. .

Japan is an ardent supporter of freedom of the press—for others but not for herself. While her industrious correspondents drained every drop of important information from the generous newspapers of New York, Washington and London, Tokyo papers provided the foreign press with a maze of confusion but little worthwhile news. There were different stories to suit everyone's tastes. Japan had no desire to boast about her strength or to disclose her weakness. She left that to the American and British press. Tokyo correspondents, starved for facts, seldom were troubled with statistical information of what was going on in the plants of her booming industrial cities. If the world thought Japan should be exhausted after four years of fighting China, so much the better. Let it go on thinking so. Did it not reflect what foreign countries felt would happen to themselves after four years of war? Then what better praise could Japan ask for her own fortitude? That was the general attitude of the smiling, silent, serious Japanese when reading repeated reports in the foreign press of imminent collapse of their country.

American and British writers who had been in the

Far East would return home to assure the world of what it always suspected : that Japan's feet were made of clay and her body of paper and wood. A sharp snap of Uncle Sam's fingers or a sonorous swish of the British lion's tail and the whole thing would collapse! The American and British public was delighted. Sales of these books mounted. Readers knew it all the time, but they wanted to be reassured, so that they could return to a sound sleep after several shocks caused by "accidental" bombings of American and British property in China or impudent insults to the British at Tientsin.

The Japanese also were delighted. American and British writers had their blessings. Did they not confirm the repeated Japanese assertions that Japan would not resort to force against the democracies by proving that Japan could not? Tokyo had no better propagandists in the United States and Great Britain than well-meaning anti-Japanese writers who returned home to disclose "the real truth about Japan." They were far more effective in quieting foreign suspicion than the flood of Japanese propaganda about Tokyo's peaceful policies. One book by a British writer exploding the Japanese "myth" was withheld from the Japanese public but was available to foreigners in Tokyo who visited the library of the Society for International Cultural Relations, a government-subsidized propaganda agency which maintained a similar library in New York.

This unwitting teamwork between propagandists for

and against Japan had its effect. It helped create a sense of false security to which the democracies were so vulnerable. When the bill to fortify Guam was proposed in Congress, the Japanese-controlled press was loud in expressing indignation. Fortification of Guam was a dagger aimed at the heart of Japan, the press cried. Official spokesmen announced their "grave concern." Japan might have to consider "counter-measures," they warned darkly. The bluff worked. Congress, reluctant to offend the feelings of a sensitive country, shelved the measure. It could return to reading articles in the press about the drain on Japan's resources by the "exhausting" war in China. There would be no war in the Pacific, and there was no point in provoking a weak country by fortifying Guam! The Japanese spokesmen expressed pleasure. The Japanese army and especially the navy expressed pleasure. Everyone expressed pleasure while the militarists went on fortifying the Mandated Islands and other Pacific outposts. Of course there would be no war in the Pacific. All America had to do was to go on retreating!

The Japanese government had no desire to arouse the suspicions of the democracies or disturb them from their absorption in the European war by permitting unnecessary leakages about what Tokyo was up to. It decided to narrow the sources of information available to foreign correspondents. The War, Navy and Foreign Ministries, in which foreign correspondents were most interested, had maintained their own informa-

tion bureaus, to which newsmen had access. But as the work of these ministries grew in importance, the ever-suspicious Japanese thought it would be wise to keep prying foreigners away from these offices. Furthermore, it was considered time that Japan "centralize" her information, as stories coming from the different bureaus did not always agree. Matters were simplified. Instead of troubling reporters to visit the dreary wooden barracks of the Foreign and War Offices or the more sturdy brick building of the Navy Office, all they had to do was to reach one central source, that distinguished vacuum known as the Cabinet Board of Information. While correspondents occasionally learned something from the separate information bureaus of the government, they were certain to learn nothing from the central agency, which appropriately was housed in a former theater to stage its meaningless drama.

Modeled after the Nazi Propaganda Ministry, the Board of Information had charge of all propaganda, both domestic and foreign. Chief of the board was small, cynical Dr. Nobufumi Ito. A mild-mannered, almost bald little gentleman, Ito was one of those career diplomats who had absorbed much of European and especially French culture during his long service in Paris and Geneva. He spoke French perfectly, much better than English. With the rise of extreme nationalism in Japan, diplomats who had been too closely associated with the League of Nations fell from favor be-

cause they were considered to have been tainted there by the "old order." Ito was among those who were left in obscurity for some time. But when the Board of Information was created, it was thought that Ito, with his long training on the European Continent, would be the right man to be put in charge. He was taken down from the shelf and dusted off to present a fine front of respectability for the militarists. But Ito had little to do directly with foreign correspondents. This job was delegated to a shy and honest bureaucrat of the Foreign Office, Koh Ishii.

Ishii was a smiling, extremely good-hearted spokesman who formerly had been consul in New York, where he has many friends. At about ten o'clock in the morning, when conferences were held twice weekly for foreign correspondents, he would come strutting into the crowded press room and take his place at the center of a long table facing the newsmen. On either side of him was arrayed a battery of assistants, numbering at least a dozen. After a breezy "Good morning, gentlemen," Ishii would drop two lumps of sugar into a cup of black tea, gaze into his cup thoughtfully as he stirred and wait for someone to say something. "No questions today, gentlemen?" he would ask with a broad grin after looking up from his cup. There were plenty questions, but when Ishii grinned it was a sign that he would not or could not answer them. The Japanese-American talks preceding the outbreak of hostilities had been under way for some time. But

Ishii could answer no questions about them. Newsmen finished drinking their tea and then trooped out of the musty theater. "Foreign Correspondents Still Draw Blank" was the description of the conference by the *Japan Times and Advertiser*, English-language daily controlled by the Foreign Office.

It was an apt description not only for that particular conference but for almost all of them. The aim of the government in establishing the central information agency was to have correspondents draw nothing more than a "blank." And it must be admitted that it succeeded with more than a moderate degree of success. Members of the information board were kept almost as much in the dark about the intentions of the Japanese leaders as were representatives of the press. Ishii would hustle to the Foreign Office several times a week, in an attempt to gather information for the press. But he was placed almost in the same category with Japanese newsmen who badgered high government officials. He was considered something of a nuisance and sent back from the little hill on which the rambling firetraps of the Foreign Office were situated to the theatrical center of the information board with little more knowledge of what was going on than he had before.

This created a very embarrassing situation for Ishii. Extremely sensitive and shy to the point of girlishness, as it can be found only in Japan, Ishii became conscious of the fact that foreign correspondents were

aware of how little information was entrusted to him by the government. The army and navy would provide him with no news at all. It was against their clannish principles to permit a man like Ishii, who came from the Foreign Office, to say anything or know anything about the Imperial Army and Navy, which were responsible only to the emperor and not to the government. They did agree, however, to permit an army and a navy officer to sit in on the press conferences to deal with any matters which came up about the defense services. Their placid-faced representatives contributed nothing to the press conferences, and they were as often absent from the meetings as not.

Spokesman Ishii therefore tried hard to glean a few bits of news here and there so as not to suffer too much loss of "face" with the foreign press. But even then he often was not able to release them because his corps of assistants would silence him before he had a chance to complete anything that sounded like a slip. At every press conference Ishii was flanked on both sides by his assistants, whose solemn faces showed how seriously they took their job of "assisting." Stationed there to see that Ishii did not permit his honest nature to upset any plans of state, these super-guardians of silence were held equally responsible with the spokesman for anything that went amiss. It was only natural that they should keep their ears pricked at attention when Ishii spoke because a serious slip might mean a sharp fall in salary and rank for all of them.

Occasionally, however, when a correspondent would pin him down, Ishii would surrender an admission after consulting his aides. This was the case when he was questioned at one press conference about the freedom of waters of the Tsugaru and Soya Straits. It was through one of these two straits, which separate the main island of Japan from the Hokkaido and the Hokkaido from Sakhalin that ships carrying war materials from the United States to Vladivostok were about to pass. The attitude of Japan was of great international interest at the time as it was feared that she might attempt to halt shipments to the Soviet Union by closing these straits. During a press conference, therefore, I read verbatim an article from the Portsmouth Treaty, concluded by Japan and Russia following their war of 1904-05 and then reaffirmed after the Soviet revolution. The article stipulated that Japan would regard the Tsugaru and Soya Straits as international waters and open to the commerce of third powers.

It was a ticklish question. The Portsmouth Treaty was still in effect, and Japan had indicated that she was neutral in the war between the Soviet Union and Germany. Ishii therefore could not denounce a treaty with an ostensibly friendly country. At the same time he already had repeated at several previous press conferences that Japan was very much "concerned" about shipments of war materials from America to Vladivostok on the ground that these materials provided a "threat" to Japan. Then the usual comedy was enacted

when the spokesman was troubled for an answer. All his advisers gathered around him and they went into a huddle. One of them apparently had had some legal training and he slipped a Latin phrase to Ishii. And then out it came in the answer. "Observance of international agreements by Japan is based on the principle of *rebus sic stantibus*," he said.

That was news. It meant that the Japanese government would respect its commitments only so long as the international situation remained the same as at the time these commitments were concluded. The statement amounted to a denunciation of international law, although Ishii and his advisers did not see it in that light at the time. If Japan concluded an agreement for ten years, according to his statement, she nevertheless was free to break it any time she decided that the situation had changed. Ishii's statement was of particular significance at the time it was made, because it amounted to an official announcement that Japan considered herself free to ignore the terms of the Portsmouth Treaty and to break an agreement with a supposedly friendly country. It had even wider significance. If applied to the newly concluded ten-year tripartite pact with Germany and Italy, it meant that Japan felt free to abandon the Axis any time the international situation changed. And the international situation was changing almost every day. The statement was an exact description of Japan's real attitude toward international agreements and was made only be-

cause of Ishii's honesty and frankness in speaking the government's mind when he did say anything.

After the conference, American correspondents walked to their offices at a much quicker pace than usual in order to make the morning newspapers in New York. (It had already become virtually impossible to find taxis on the streets.) But during the five-minute walk from the Board of Information to the Domei Building, where most American correspondents had their offices, Ishii and his battery woke up to the significance of the admission they had made. Publication of the statement would have made all foreign capitals smart, Axis as well as anti-Axis. It had to be stopped and stopped quickly.

An efficient control system had already been perfected. All that was necessary was to telephone headquarters so that communications from Tokyo to the outside world could be stopped. It was only a matter of minutes after we reached the Domei Building that our stories were ready for transmission. I called the telephone censor to read my story to him over the wire as was customary before being permitted to speak to the *Herald Tribune* in New York. After I finished the first reading, the censor told me to wait, which also was customary. He had to consult a board of advisers probably as numerous as Ishii's before he could approve a story.

After a few minutes he called back and asked to have the first paragraph repeated. It read something

like this: "Japan announced a new interpretation of international law today when Koh Ishii, government spokesman, told foreign correspondents that her observance of international agreements depends on whether the international situation remains the same as at the time they were concluded." It was almost word for word what Ishii said in explaining his meaning of the phrase *rebus sic stantibus*. "Did Mr. Ishii say that?" the censor asked in his sluggish English. I replied that he did. "It is no good. Please cut it out from your story," was the immediate rejoinder.

It was clear what had taken place. The same thing had happened several times before. Becoming nervous about the statement, the Board of Information decided to prevent its being sent abroad. The telephone and wireless censors therefore were asked to stop the story. One of the few advantages in using the international telephone was that it gave us an idea of what the censors were deleting in wireless copy. As most correspondents used wireless instead of telephone, they had no contact with the censors and therefore no way of knowing what was being cut.

But the disadvantages of using the telephone soon outweighed the advantages. Authorities adopted a policy of putting obstacles in the way of correspondents to discourage their use of the telephone in transmitting news stories, fearing that they might somehow succeed in circumventing the strict censorship. They preferred to have correspondents use only wireless, for

then the censors could read the stories on paper after receiving them from the telegraph offices where they were filed. The Japanese can read the English language much better than they can hear it spoken, because their training in school is confined mostly to reading. Whatever English they do hear usually carries the poor accent of a Japanese instructor so that when the language is spoken by an Englishman or an American most Japanese still have difficulty in understanding it. Censors therefore often failed to catch phrases and sentences read to them over the telephone which they would certainly have struck out had they been submitted in writing.

They used two methods in forcing American correspondents to abandon the telephone: the first was to delay approval of news stories until it was too late to make editions of the New York newspapers, and the second was to make the cost prohibitive. Up to about the end of 1940, telephone service was not too bad. There were delays sometimes of one and two hours, but connections were made. The censor who received the call on the other side of the wire at first was an American-born Japanese who understood English perfectly and often acted on his own responsibility in passing news stories. But following the general tightening of all sources of news with the inauguration of the Board of Information, there was evidently a complete reshuffle of the censorship system at the telephone office. At this point Mr. Maruyama, the new censor,

came into my life. We had almost as full a year of such wrangling and frustration over the telephone as the most unhappily married couple ever engaged in. I finally was compelled to resort to divorce and return to the use of wireless.

I never saw Mr. Maruyama and am not even certain that was his correct name. But through regular use of the telephone in reporting to the *Herald Tribune*, I spoke to Mr. Maruyama several times a week and even daily when important news developments were under way. We finally got to know each other fairly well and developed a hearty dislike for each other's means of earning a living. First of all his English was poor. Perhaps that was the reason he qualified to replace the American-born Japanese, whose easy understanding of the language made censorship rapid. It was necessary to repeat sentences and words time and again before he recognized their meaning. I thought it might be possible to save time if I were to give Mr. Maruyama a few free lessons in English. With this in mind I suggested that we meet for lunch some day. There was a laugh in his voice as he thanked me and then apologized over the phone. It was against the rules for me to meet him or any other censor, he explained. We were destined to know only each other's voices. We may have passed each other many times on the streets of Tokyo without knowing it.

His English improved as a result of our frequent conversations, and the severity of censorship increased

accordingly. I often complained vigorously about it, pointing out that Japanese correspondents in New York were permitted to speak freely over the telephone with Tokyo. But he had a good answer for that. You are now in Tokyo and not in New York, he would laugh. Technically Japan was violating her international communications agreements by censoring news either over the telephone or wireless, and not until almost the very end did she admit officially that she exercised censorship. But as the American government failed to retaliate, the Japanese considered it an excellent arrangement whereby all messages received from America were uncensored and all messages going to America were censored. During the summer of 1941, censorship became so severe that it was almost impossible to make editions with full reports of important developments. The time required for censoring a story of less than one thousand words was three or four hours. On several occasions the censor was not ready with his decision until late in the afternoon, when the daily telephone period between New York and Tokyo came to an end. When the second Konoye Cabinet fell in July, I submitted a long story about the expulsion from the Cabinet of Yosuke Matsuoka, then Foreign Minister. After three hours, the censor announced that none of it could be sent to New York except a few sentences giving the official explanation for the Cabinet's downfall.

Relations with the censor seemed to deteriorate in

direct proportion with those between the American and Japanese governments. Protests were to no avail. I submitted a request that the censor at least expedite his examination of news stories so that editions could be made. Mr. Maruyama explained apologetically that the delays were not his fault but that of his superiors. From all that could be learned and guessed, it appeared that the board of censors had been expanded. With more heads responsible for what was being transmitted abroad, more time was required before they could reach an agreement on what was permissible. Their mounting nationalism also increased their hostility in examining news stories. Further delays were caused by a system of recording all messages submitted for censorship before permission was granted to speak to New York, transcribing them and then censoring.

The entire censorship issue came to a climax at the end of July. At that time both the telephone and wireless censors refused to permit transmission to the United States of stories about the protests lodged by outraged American Ambassador Joseph C. Grew against the bombing of the American gunboat *Tutuila* at Chungking, and no mention could be made of an expression of regrets by Japanese Foreign Minister Admiral Teijiro Toyoda. For the first time American correspondents combined in a joint complaint against excessive censorship. They approached Ambassador Grew, and embassy officials, acting on his behalf, protested three times within six hours to the Foreign Ministry. The

officials, speaking as diplomatically as possible under the circumstances, indicated the foolishness of withholding from the American public reports about Tokyo's expression of regrets. They pointed out that over-zealous censors, stupidly believing that they were suppressing reports of the bombing, which already had been announced to the world by Chungking, were simply permitting bitterness in America to mount by withholding disclosure of Japanese regrets.

The Japanese finally saw the light, but only after two false starts and after Max Hill, of the Associated Press, and Robert Bellaire, of the United Press, had filed a series of urgent messages at double rates which got no farther than the telegraph office. It was too late to telephone. The circuit already had been closed to New York, but a special arrangement was made to switch the radio-telephone beam from Europe to the United States for those correspondents who wanted to use it that night.

Nothing cuts Nipponese pride more than an admission of guilt. Together with a belief in pagan deities, the Japanese appear to have inherited a conviction that they never can be wrong. This belief in Japanese infallibility lies behind many of their reactions. If the *Tutuila* was almost blown up, it must have been the *Tutuila's* fault, not that of the Japanese bombers. The gunboat had no business being there! When a Japanese convicted of murder recants, he seldom does so from a sense of guilt but rather from one of expediency.

This could be seen in the case of repeated near-bombings of the *Tutuila*. (The fact that the gunboat was not hit is a tribute to Japanese skill rather than a lack of it.) The Foreign Ministers who expressed regret to the American Ambassador for the incidents did so not with a feeling of guilt but with an understanding of the retaliatory price involved in failure to reach a settlement. They did not apologize for the incidents. An apology implies recognition of guilt, and the Japanese could not admit they were to blame. They could only express regrets, say they were sorry for what had happened, and offer to pay damages. They would pay almost any price to repair damages rather than admit they were guilty of causing them. After the bombing of the *Panay*, thousands of Japanese expressed sorrow for the victims and would go to almost any length to comfort survivors, but it is doubtful that many felt any sense of guilt about the attack.

This psychology lay behind some of the censorship in Japan. The story about the *Tutuila* incident and the official expression of regret was banned from publication in Japan, although it was permitted to be sent abroad after vigorous official action. The rulers of the country would take no chance in having their people draw the mistaken conclusion that an expression of regret to the United States implied that Japanese fliers, envoys of the emperor on their missions of death, were wrong in having caused the incident. The em-

peror never can be wrong. He is infallible. So are his winged killers.

The day following the exchange of protests and regrets, Spokesman Ishii walked into his press conference with a face nicely made up with wreaths of smiles, which helped conceal his nervousness and break up the prominent flush of his cheeks and eyelids. When Japanese are upset either through grief or fear their natural reaction in public is to smile and even laugh. Ishii worked hard at his smiles all through this press conference. He had just come from the Foreign Office, where he was told how seriously the American government took the *Tutuila* incident. He heard how Ambassador Grew served the Foreign Minister with a warning which was the nearest thing to an ultimatum the United States ever delivered to Japan. The Ambassador said, in effect, that if another incident like the *Tutuila* should occur he doubted that relations between the United States and Japan would survive the shock. His meaning was quite clear. It meant that the United States might sever diplomatic relations with Japan if nothing more. In the summer of 1941, when this warning was served, Japan had not yet completed her preparations for war against the United States. The challenge implied in Ambassador Grew's warning therefore came as a severe shock, and Spokesman Ishii was told to commit no blunders at his press conference. At the same time, he was told not to show any weak-

ness, for it was about this time that Premier Konoye was preparing to open final negotiations with President Roosevelt for an understanding. Ishii therefore followed his basic policy, which was to say practically nothing at all and to dismiss the conference as soon as possible.

When asked to comment on the *Tutuila* incident, Ishii laughed it off, saying that it was a very small affair, not very important, not very much damage; a settlement had been made, the incident was closed and the best thing to do was to forget all about it. It was a typical performance in concealing and refusing to admit guilt, and it showed up the Foreign Office and the Board of Information for what it really was: an agency for whitewashing the dirty work of the Imperial Army and Navy. If it was such a minor or such an inoffensive affair, someone asked, why did the censors hold up the story for at least five hours and why was it banned from publication in Japan? Ishii expressed surprise. He was not fully informed of what had happened. There must have been some misunderstanding, he explained. The censors probably misinterpreted the ban on domestic publication of the story to include foreign publication as well, he suggested. It was too bad. As for the domestic ban, well, relations between the United States and Japan were delicate and the government had no desire to arouse the sensitive feelings of the Japanese people. It was ironical to hear the spokesman use almost the very same argument to keep from the

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Japanese public a story about the recklessness of its militarists as was used in Congress to defeat the bill to fortify Guam. Both the spokesman of Japan and the Congress of the United States were unwittingly playing into the hands of the Japanese militarists.

But the American correspondents were in no mood to drop the issue there and in no mood for Congressional logic and tactics. They asked for an appointment that same afternoon with Spokesman Ishii to discuss numerous complaints they desired to make against both the professional and personal treatment they were receiving in Japan. At the appointed hour we marched over from the nearby American Club to the Board of Information: Max Hill of A.P., Bob Bellaire of U.P., Dick Tenelly of N.B.C., Otto Tolischus of the *New York Times*, and I. We were led backstage of the theater and up a rickety flight of stairs to the office of the spokesman, whose assistants greeted us rather nervously. This was probably the first time that there had been a joint demarche by a group of correspondents in Japan, and the Japanese dislike nothing more than to face cooperative action either by individuals or nations.

We were seated around a long table covered with green flannel such as is seen on billiard tables. Spokesman Ishii came in with his usual good-natured grin to listen to the grievances. They were presented to him in writing and signed by all the correspondents. The note requested that the censorship system be improved

by informing correspondents of bans against news reports and of deletions in their wireless messages. It also asked that correspondents be permitted to confer with the chief censor about them. It pointed out that both the working and living conditions of Japanese newsmen in the United States were far superior to those of American correspondents in Japan and therefore requested that the Japanese government at least permit Americans to import necessary food, clothing and tobacco and allow them to purchase rationed amounts of gasoline for operating automobiles. Because of economic restrictions, it had become impossible to import daily necessities to which foreigners were accustomed and which no longer were available in Japan. The government had discriminated against Americans by refusing them gasoline, which was given to Axis correspondents, who also were free to telephone to their countries without censorship. The note finally requested that Americans be permitted to own and operate short-wave radio sets as Japanese in America were permitted to do.

In brief, a demand was made for reciprocal treatment for American correspondents. It proved extremely embarrassing for the Board of Information. First of all, the Japanese were reluctant to admit officially that there was any difference between the treatment of foreigners in Japan and those in the United States. The demands made by the American newsmen only brought to light a fundamental difference between living con-

ditions of all non-official foreigners in Japan and other countries. The Japanese therefore were reluctant to recognize differences for any special group. Secondly, before the Board of Information could grant any requests, it had to secure permits from different ministries of the government. Special permits were necessary from the Finance Ministry before anything could be imported, while requests for gasoline, short-wave radio sets and information about censorship had to be taken up with the Home and Communications Ministries.

The bureaucracy of the Japanese is so clannish and self-centered that requests from one office to another are seldom considered very seriously. It would have required either a miracle or a revolution for the Board of Information to have secured permission for more than one or two of the demands. It was almost a certainty that we would not get permits for short-wave sets. Although the Japanese flooded the rest of the world with short-wave propaganda, anyone without diplomatic immunity who attempted to operate a short-wave radio in Japan invited a diet of rice and water in a dingy, rat-infested prison. The official explanation was that the Japanese government feared its people might be misled by Soviet propaganda. It was all right for officials to deal with the Soviets and even conclude a peace treaty with them, but it was dangerous for the Japanese layman to have anything to do with them. Though only a partial explanation, there was some

truth in it. The Japanese rulers genuinely fear a Communist movement which might overthrow them.

Ishii, for all the faults which he inherited through race and training, was much more reasonable than most Japanese. He understood the fairness of the requests and felt genuinely sorry that conditions in Japan had degenerated to the point which made them necessary. He had lived in the United States for many years and had learned to understand the American people and their ways. He promised to do what he could, but none of us were so optimistic as to think that anything would happen. The note we submitted had the support of officials of the American Embassy, who expressed the hope that the Japanese government could see its way clear to granting the requests, thereby contributing something to improving relations between Japanese and Americans. But even that had little effect.

Shortages, censorship and sterile press conferences were not the only companions of correspondents. There were closer and more dangerous ones. The Japanese, with their usual ingenuity for adapting imported ideas to their own purposes, organized a group of confidence men and turned them against foreign newsmen. Coming from a country where this would be considered fantastic and fit only for a Hollywood film, most American correspondents at first were extremely skeptical at the suggestion that it could be true in Japan and were inclined to dismiss it with a knowing laugh. But after a period of time, the actions of certain men

who circulated in the foreign colony began to look suspicious. A number of slips were made, leading to one conclusion: that foreign newsmen, especially American, were the object of close scrutiny. Although fantastic stories of spies and blackmail in the United States were confined for the most part to the screen, Japanese studied American films seriously and put into practice with fatal effect more than one uncanny idea which originated in the head of some Hollywood script writer.

Two of these confidence men employed by the Japanese were white. Ironically enough, one was American and is still in Japan. Hoary and tall but bent with age, he has lived there for more than thirty years without returning to the United States once. During his long residence in Tokyo, his weak mind and character gradually were broken down through dependence on Japanese money and the exotic wine and women of the country. Having been thoroughly perverted mentally and morally, he began to think and act like a Japanese.

By retaining his American nationality and working for several British newspapers, he was able to circulate among foreigners, thereby proving of greater use to the Japanese. When the head of a large chain of American newspapers visited Japan several years ago, this Japanese agent was delegated to take him in tow and see that he left with the proper "impression" of Japan. In 1941, when another American arrived in Japan to relieve a correspondent, he again was given the job of

baptism. His knowledge of the language and the people made him an extremely helpful guide to the newcomer in Japan, and not all time spent with him was wasted.

He would attend press conferences for foreign correspondents as an ostensible newsman himself. Here he proved helpful in seeing the spokesman over pitfalls and out of tight corners. On more than one occasion when we had worried Ishii with a number of questions and were about to pin him down to a statement, our hoary friend, his eyes dancing beneath shaggy brows and his big right foot stamping nervously, would sabotage all our work by booming forth with an innocuous question which would change the subject entirely and relieve the spokesman of answering our questions. On other occasions, after Ishii had made some admission, he would rephrase it so that it meant very little and then ask the spokesman if that was not what he "really" meant to say. Ishii invariably would agree. This American tool also served as prompter at press conferences. When the spokesman occasionally wanted to take a "dig" at a foreign country, usually the United States or Great Britain, but preferred to have it made naturally in the course of the press conference, he would always count on this agent to plant a question at the proper time.

The second agent was a more dangerous character, a short, stocky man, with a sharp wit and an endless store of obscene jokes. He was born in Hungary, where

he met a number of Japanese army officers who were participating in the demarcation of his country's borders following the first world war. He became pretty much of an outcast in Hungary after his work for the commission, and through the friends he made among the Japanese officers he came to Japan. There he worked for some time as a news correspondent for European papers and gradually slipped into the secret services of the Japanese army.

This Hungarian stool pigeon was a much greater menace to Tokyo correspondents than the American. The latter was employed by the Japanese Foreign Office to assist at press conferences, to win correspondents over to Japan's favor and then report the progress he was making with them. The Hungarian, however, was employed by the army as an espionage agent to dig up material for criminal action against foreigners, especially newsmen. During the last few years, with Japanese nationalism mounting to the point of fanaticism, almost anything in the possession of a foreign correspondent could be construed as evidence of his guilt as a spy. The Hungarian was given the job of fraternizing with them and providing the army with information with which to condemn them.

He spent much time circulating in the Tokyo and American clubs, where many foreigners were always present. He would often climb on a stool at the bar of the American Club at lunch time, lean his square head on his hand, and then prick up his ears in an attempt

to pick out one conversation from the general buzz that would prevail at that hour. His interests were not confined to newsmen. In the dining room he usually would sit in a corner of the room where a number of officials of the American Embassy were accustomed to eat. Sometimes, without realizing it himself, he would visibly strain his eyes and ears in an attempt to catch what was being said, and when he had heard something interesting, his eyes would roll furtively around the room to see whether anyone had observed him snatching the morsel. But he was recognized for what he was by almost everyone. All in all, he was a very lonely man despite his wide circulation, and I sometimes thought he was gay to excess only to conceal a sickening unhappiness within.

The Japanese employed a number of other secret agents against correspondents. One was an Eurasian engineer who apparently was connected with the navy. Although his work was originally directed against American engineers, he branched out into the field of possible news victims. His tactics were similar to those of the Hungarian and were carried out with the same purpose.

The army and the civilian police did not rely entirely on foreign agents to keep in touch with the newspaper colony. They had their regular staff of publicly recognized and secret officials. The former visited our offices almost daily. No sooner would the smiling, easygoing civil policeman leave the room than a jolly

gendarme would roll in. Both loved to drink and talk. Those two were regularly assigned to the seventh floor of the Domei Building, where most correspondents had their offices. They wore the conventional, drab clothes of the civilian Japanese, but did not hide their identity. We got to know each other quite well, and in the exchange of questions and answers, we learned much about what they thought. They said frankly that they suspected German and Italian newsmen much more than American. They understood that the Axis correspondents had been sent to Japan not only to report to their newspapers and agencies but to gather whatever secret information they could for the German Embassy. They also felt more at home with Americans, who they thought were frank and open in nature while the Germans were shifty and secretive. We therefore got along quite well with these officers, particularly when we had some liquid refreshment for them.

The regular secret police, however, were annoying. They would search our desks at night when we were not in our offices or our homes during the day when we were out. Our telephones were tapped all the time at both places. Returning home one day, I saw that the floor of the kitchen had been torn up and the boards crudely replaced.

Sleepy-looking secret police, dispersed in hotel lobbies, bars and other public places, operated on the theory that every foreigner was a spy, otherwise he would

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not be in Japan. Anyone coming from the Soviet Union was dangerous from the moment he set foot at Tsuruga, the Japanese port across from Vladivostok. Anyone coming from the Soviet Union as a resident newspaperman there was a marked man. When Walter Duranty therefore arrived in Japan during the spring of 1941 on his way to the United States from the Soviet Union he was watched much more closely than he suspected. And it was not until long after he had left Japan that I learned how he had "incriminated" many of us who sat with him, in full view of the public and the police, in the lobby of the Imperial Hotel, drinking beer and listening to his interesting chatter. A Japanese newspaper friend told me he was informed by the police that I had been seen several times with Spy Duranty. They wanted to know whether he agreed with their suspicion that I was involved with Duranty in acting for either the Soviet Union, Great Britain or the United States or all three countries.

When police were not looking for spies they were hunting violators of so-called "state secrets." This was an extremely difficult assignment because they were never told what the state secrets were. Therefore they had to spend most of their time trying to run down secrets before they could turn to their business of running down foreign violators. A strange case occurred during the summer of 1941, when a policeman approached an American newspaperman in an attempt to learn whether a story I had sent had disclosed a state

secret. Some time before Japan opened the last series of negotiations which preceded the outbreak of war with the United States, I filed a story saying the Japanese had begun to make preliminary overtures for an agreement with the United States covering the entire Far East and south sea area. Some Japanese at that time were thinking of possible American mediation in the Sino-Japanese war in exchange for American recognition of a dominant position for Japan in China. They also wanted to increase their stocks of raw materials while marking time to see the course of the European war and therefore were preparing paper promises to observe the status quo in the south in exchange for restoration of trade with the United States.

The story was wired back to Tokyo by Japanese newspaper correspondents in New York, London, Berlin and Moscow but was banned from publication in Japan. Its publication in Japan from foreign sources would bring only another outcry against the oppressive policy of the government in withholding information from the public. Furthermore, the Japanese army was extremely displeased by the suggestion that Japan might ask the United States to mediate the China war. The army was not ready for that kind of thing although the Foreign Office and other branches of the government were.

While some police sought the source of the story others were given the job of deciding whether a crime had been committed against the state by disclosing a

secret. After almost everyone had forgotten about the story, W. R. Wills, the courageous American publisher of *Japan News-Week*, walked into the lounge of the American Club and came over to tell me that he had just had a visit from a policeman. If the story I had sent was true, the officer told Wills, I had committed a crime and the police would act, but if it was not true, then no secret had been violated and I was safe. All the policemen wanted to know from Wills was whether the story was true or not! Up to the time I left Japan the police evidently had not yet been able to decide.

Although nothing came of this particular incident, it nevertheless served as a warning against taking too many liberties in reporting news from Tokyo. A law had been passed by the servile Diet (Japanese Parliament) making it a crime for a correspondent not only to disclose "secrets" but to send stories abroad which caused an unfavorable reaction against Japan. Strict enforcement of this law would have meant imprisonment of several years for every American correspondent, for almost every action by the Japanese government during the year preceding the outbreak of war in the Pacific was such as to meet with disfavor in the United States. Reports of the very law which attempted to gag foreign newspapermen could have been greeted with nothing but hostility abroad. But simply because the law itself was extreme to the point of senselessness it did not mean that newsmen were free to report what they had learned. On the contrary, although applica-

tion of the law was vague, police made it clear that they had an instrument which they could use to silence for many years anyone who incurred official wrath by attempting to report what was taking place. The policeman who visited Wills knew that I would be told about his call. It was an indirect warning to me and others that I had approached uncomfortably close to the danger line.

By the use of police threats of arrest and punishment of the kind which resulted in the death of James Cox, Reuters correspondent, who was alleged to have committed suicide by jumping from the third floor of a military prison in 1940, together with an active ring of espionage agents, an efficient system of censorship and a centralized uninformed Board of Information, the Japanese government succeeded in scooping the work of foreign correspondents. We understood, however, that such methods were to be expected in a country intent on deceiving a world which it hoped some day to conquer.

CHAPTER SIX

T H E T R I N I T Y I N T U R M O I L

WHILE the business clans turned out bigger and better guns for the militarists, whose victories in China became smaller and fewer, the Japanese people made longer and deeper bows to their beloved emperor. After almost three years of war in China, their favorite dry white rice had become sticky and soiled by increasing mixtures with alien grains, their charcoal began to sputter and smoke if they were fortunate enough to secure any. But the Japanese were of rugged stock and could endure such hardships as were unknown to most foreigners. Much more difficult to endure were the frequent trips they made to Tokyo Station. There they bowed again, not to their emperor, but to their sons who were leaving for China to answer the call of their emperor. The first, second and then perhaps the last left, when they already had heard for the last time

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from the first two. Their need for heavenly guidance increased as the family grew smaller.

Their need for enlightenment also increased. One of their representatives in the Diet asked the militarists to provide it. On February 2, 1940, when the damp Tokyo winter was at its worst, a little old man mounted the rostrum in the House of Representatives and in a few minutes threw the Diet and the nation into an uproar. What had the Japanese people received for their great sacrifices in the China war? asked Takao Saito, veteran member of the Diet, cross-examining the government on behalf of the Minseito party. Army and navy officials grew tense and then red as the speaker turned on them in the first violent public outburst against militarism since the invasion of China. Under the "cloak" of a holy war, blazed Saito, the army has drawn the nation into a conflict which it cannot conclude. After denouncing Wang Ching-wei as a puppet, Saito demanded that negotiations with Chiang Kai-shek be opened to terminate a futile undertaking.

His was the last voice raised against the militarists, who replied to the nation the next day. "It is a matter of extreme regret that there should be doubt about the objectives of the incident at this time of day," replied the War Minister curtly, as the army's political henchmen in the Diet went into action. Three-fourths of the brazen speech were expunged from the record, the intimidated Minseito disowned its spokesman and forced

his resignation from the party, and a servile Diet voted his expulsion from the chamber, where free speech was guaranteed by the constitution granted by Emperor Meiji. The betrayal of Saito, whose crime was that he sought to apply in his own country some of the principles of democracy he had learned while a student at Yale University, left the aged parliamentarian a broken man. Nervous, frightened and cold in his poorly heated home, he hovered around a small brazier while friends dropped in to express sympathy. When I called on him he was too upset to say anything except that he was an old man and determined to speak his mind for the last time before he died after fighting for freedom and liberalism for thirty years.

While the army and navy were smarting under the cutting rebuke with which a troubled public was in sympathy, members of the Diet, fearing that the wrath of the militarists would spread to them, hastened to soothe their ruffled feelings by organizing a "League of Diet Members for Accomplishing Objectives of the Holy War." The name itself was enough to make clear to the militarists that its members were not to be considered in the same class with rebellious Takao Saito. But to leave no doubt in their minds, about half of the 450 members of the Lower House, representing all political parties, issued a statement which began: "We greet the fourth year of the holy campaign while the gallant actions of our soldiers and the zeal and sincerity of the people on the home front have dealt a

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mortal blow to the Chiang Kai-shek regime and brought about among the Chinese masses pro-Japanese sentiment and desire for peace."

Fearful tribute from a servile Diet which they despised meant little to the militarists, who were disturbed more by the fact that Saito's speech reflected nation-wide uneasiness than by the statesman's audacity in attacking them openly. Interest in the "holy war" was lagging and news of their victories against the Chinese troops was being relegated to inside pages of Tokyo newspapers. The army and navy could extract unlimited budgets from a defeated Diet but they had also extracted almost all the confidence a tired nation had in its militarists. Business clans too recognized the general feeling of frustration which was sweeping the country. The emperor was reported working late at night and rising early in the morning to attend state affairs. He also apparently was uneasy. The bows which were being made more often than before were too long and too low.

The trinity sensed an element of danger which, if permitted to grow, would disturb all of its members. It was clear that Saito's expulsion from the Diet did not answer the big question in the mind of the nation: when was the China war going to end and what was Japan going to get out of it? Four months later there occurred an event that rocked the nation more profoundly than the Saito disturbance. It was the fall of France. To an army hopelessly bogged down in China,

the Nazi victory came like a light from heaven which showed the way to salvation. To a navy which had remained in relative obscurity but still committed to a solution of the China disaster it provided the hope of greater glory. To the business clans, equally involved with their investments and their expanded war industries in the "incident," it brought new possibilities of converting apparent losses into greater gains than ever before.

All were impressed by the sensational success of the "blitzkrieg" and the incredible collapse of the democracies. If the democracies were weak in the West, then they surely were incomparably weaker in the East. And if the Germans were able to gain such striking success in one part of the world, there appeared to be no reason why Japan should not be able to achieve the same success in another. In the fall of the democracies in Europe, the Japanese militarists saw the end of the white race in the Far East and the solution to the question in the minds of their oppressed people.

But before they could accomplish either, they also saw the necessity of preventing another possible Saito incident in the Diet, regaining the confidence of the masses and forcing the nation to accept further sacrifices involved in the total economic regimentation essential for producing the weapons needed for the conquest of all East Asia. The militarists knew better than to undertake the embarrassing job of offering the nation greater victories in exchange for greater sacrifices

when they had failed to provide any satisfactory returns for sacrifices which already had been made for the past three years. No ordinary bureaucrat or statesman was capable of it either. One person was eligible for the distinction: tall, dapper Prince Fumimaro Konoye, fifty-one-year-old scion of a noble family. Through his veins flowed blood almost as rich as that of Hirohito himself, in view of the fact that the Konoye clan was an offshoot of the famous family of Fujiwaras, pre-feudal dictators of Japan who married themselves into the Imperial Family by supplying consorts for successive emperors.

Immediately after the fall of France, army and navy officers suggested that Konoye take over the government. The portly Prince at first chilled at the thought of running the government for the militarists again. Still fresh in his mind were experiences of his first cabinet, which was presented with an unwelcome gift in the form of the Sino-Japanese war one month after it came into office in June, 1937. Konoye was then obliged to sanction the war, tell his people and the world about the terrible Chinese and how they refused to "cooperate" with Japan, making it necessary for the emperor's troops to chastise them into more friendly relations. It was a disagreeable business for a delicate Prince, who preferred to spend his time with more pleasant pastimes.

But the Prince finally gave in and agreed to become premier again, even though the office was more un-

inviting than in 1937. He agreed for several reasons, not the least of which was a sense of guilt, to give up his personal pleasures for the thankless task of trying to hold together a state which was falling apart. The militarists did not hesitate to play on his feeling of personal responsibility for developments following the outbreak of the China war, although he had nothing to do with it directly and knew nothing of the army's plot to precipitate a war against China. The neurotic Prince took almost a perverted pleasure in beating himself publicly in the Diet, where he offered an apology to the emperor and the nation for the billions of yen and the thousands of lives sacrificed in the China war. "It is entirely my own responsibility," cried Konoye in a spirit of self-punishment which deceived no one but brought tears to the eyes of the Navy Minister, who was overcome by Konoye's charity. The long-legged aristocrat, therefore, was impressed by the argument that he was obliged to help finish what he indirectly had helped to start by sanctioning the vicious venture in China.

He was also impressed by the markings on a military map outlining the areas in the Far East and southwestern Pacific which were expected soon to fall easily and quickly into the lap of Japan. Here was an opportunity for him to participate in the totally unexpected conversion of a national disaster into a glorious victory both for himself and the empire. It did not take him long to see the significance for Japan of the startling

collapse of France, the imminent invasion and expected fall of the British Isles, and the dazed, impotent neutrality of the United States.

But there were other reasons why Konoye made his fateful decision to turn his country into an armed camp in preparation for an expected picnic of military conquest of British and Dutch possessions in the Far East and south sea area. One of them was the danger of permitting the militarists to undertake the new venture on their own in complete disregard of the aristocrats, whom he represented, and of the emperor, on whom they all depended for their titles. It was bad enough that the militarists were able to get their own way by intimidating the Diet and the statesmen who surrounded the throne, but it would be worse if the militarists were to liquidate all of them. There was an element of self-preservation in Konoye's reluctant decision to take over the government again. Involved in it was a naïve belief that he would be able to lead rather than be led by the militarists as he was during his first administration. By establishing an entirely new domestic structure, the Prince planned to trap the militarists by forcing them into it, thus achieving what no other statesman had ever succeeded in doing before: making the army and navy responsible elements in government and subject to the will of the Cabinet. He had reason to believe he could do it because the militarists had promised to support him in establishing a new domestic structure in exchange for his consent to

put the nation on a war-time footing for newer and better ventures in richer and more weakly defended fields of conquest.

Before organizing his new government, the ambitious Prince left the oppressing heat of Tokyo for the mountain coolness of Karuizawa, there in his villa to plot his new scheme. To assist him, he called for his "brain trust," the leader of which was Fumio Goto, a boyhood friend who lived with Konoye when they were classmates in the First Higher School in Kyoto. Goto later became the head of the Showa Study Society, an organization which trained young men to become future political leaders of a radical totalitarian Japan. A Japanese reporter compared him in appearance to a "gorilla or the Hunchback of Notre Dame" (as pictured in the American film shown in Japan).

Another member of the brain trust was also a boyhood friend of the political-minded Prince. He was Count Yoriyasu Arima, who became interested in radical experiments as a result of his connections with agricultural cooperatives, the central union of which he directed. During his school days, Arima displayed the same interest in radical literature as did Goto and Konoye, who was not satisfied with reading only Marx but asked his professor at the Kyoto Imperial University to explain the anarchism of Max Stirner, nineteenth-century German philosopher. These three grown-up boys sat down together to figure out a grand scheme

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for a new political Japanese organization incorporating some of their early radical ideas.

Their plan was rather a simple one. On the economic side, it called for a more equal distribution of wealth among the capitalists, workers and farmers by limiting sharply and taxing the profits of businessmen, preventing further increases in the cost of living for workers and peasants and finally easing the burdens of oppressed peasants by forbidding foreclosures by landlords, limiting rents on their land and extending government loans at low rates to make it possible for them to buy their own land. It also provided for greater government control over industry through an organization of cartels which would allot raw materials to different industries and control distribution and prices of finished products. The plan did not envisage nationalization of industry, as it was Konoye's intention to maintain the position of the big business clans as an important check on the militarists. All independent trade unions were to be abolished and labor was to be organized in a government-controlled national union.

The political blueprint specified abolition of all political parties and establishment of a centralized national organization similar to the single-party system of the European dictators. The new party would control elections of members of the Diet as well as the legislature's procedure. Its aim was to eliminate all political opposition to secure unanimous approval of the government's program. It was to differ from single

parties of Nazi Germany or Fascist Italy by the absence of a dictator as its chief. Instead, Konoye proposed a loosely organized executive board of directors to be appointed by the premier.

While Konoye was drawing up his totalitarian economic and political plans, army henchmen in Tokyo were busy dissolving the political parties and trade unions. Fusanosuke Kuhara, who was arrested and later acquitted of charges of having supplied funds to the militarists who rebelled in February, 1936, passed the word around that a new political messiah, Prince Konoye, was coming down from the mountains of Karuizawa to take over. Without a single official word or instruction, almost all the parties collapsed suddenly like Japanese wood and paper houses in a storm. Only the Minseito hesitated, but not for long. The day after a gang of nationalist rowdies broke into and smashed the headquarters of the Minseito as its leaders were discussing the question of dissolution, the party issued a statement saying it no longer was a party. The press was prohibited from mentioning the last use of violence to suppress the last political party of Japan which did not have the foresight to disband "voluntarily" as did the other parties.

The labor unions disappeared as quickly as the parties. They were dissolved by an illegal yet official order by the government supported by threats of army-supported nationalist gangs. Komakichi Matsuoka, chairman of the Japan Labor Federation, leading in-

dependent union of the country, was called to the office of the Welfare Minister one day and politely told that it would be wise for him to dissolve his union so that there could be complete "harmony" between capital, labor and government. He was told that the government had decided to have all workers enlist in the official labor union called Society for Service to the Nation Through Industry, which originally was started as a company union and then was taken over by the government. After the labor chief declined the offer, the press issued warnings, saying the government was "watching the attitude of the federation." The nationalist gangs then called on Matsuoka, and the federation was dissolved shortly after, smaller independent labor unions later collapsing automatically.

In exchange for their right to defend working standards, as low as they were, members of the government-controlled union were given the right to participate in patriotic demonstrations under such banners as "Expansion of Industries," "Labor Service for the Country," "Propagation of the Nippon Spirit." Differences between capital and labor were to be ironed out by representatives of both, but it was observed that the differences grew less and less as the workers became more and more inspired with the spirit of sacrifice to the throne. The government action in dissolving the unions, hailed as a great step forward by the business clans, resulted in application of the feudal relationship of lord and subject to industrialist and worker.

GOODBYE JAPAN

Dissolution of the political parties and labor unions meant liquidation of the last remnants of free institutions introduced into Japan from the West following the industrial revolution in Japan. It was part of the economic and political revolution carried out under the banner of Prince Konoye to pave the way for a totalitarian Japanese state also based on the medieval relationship of lord and subject. The Konoye revolution differed from the Hitler and Mussolini type in that it was not accompanied by fighting or bloodshed, but was carried out almost without a word of opposition from its victims, who submitted meekly to the "advice" of government officials and the threats of army-supported nationalist gangs. The relatively small number of trade unions surrendered not because they lacked courage to fight for their constitutional rights, but because they realized clearly that those rights had been thoroughly undermined by the militarists and nationalists and that the virtual overthrow of the sacrosanct constitution granted by Meiji now was being sanctioned by Prince Konoye, whose word carried something of the authority of Meiji's grandson, the ruling Emperor Hirohito. The political parties fell for the same reasons after they had been hopelessly split into factions as a result of infiltration tactics by militarists and nationalists and after they had been completely abandoned by the capitalist clans, who no longer had any use for them when they failed to hold their own in the Diet.

It is not unlikely that one of the reasons Konoye went up to Karuizawa before organizing his new cabinet was a desire not to be present in Tokyo during these "mopping-up operations," as the militarists refer to the final phases of their work. Being of a rather delicate and sensitive nature, befitting the offspring of his aristocratic family, Konoye abhorred the suggestion of force, physical or otherwise. He also must have found distasteful the thought that he was contributing to the final overthrow of a constitution granted by a famous emperor. Eighty-eight miles away from Tokyo in his villa in Karuizawa, he undoubtedly found it easier to avoid such unpleasant considerations. There he could wait until the army gangs completed their work and descend on Tokyo as a saviour come to save the Japanese from a chaotic situation with the creation of which he ostensibly had nothing to do.

If there was anything that emerged from his frenzied activities following his return to Tokyo to organize his historical second cabinet in July, 1940, it was further evidence that the handsome Prince possessed a confused and weak intellect, as innocent of any convictions as it was of much clarity; an inability to judge the character of bureaucrats and militarists, whom he had had rare opportunities to study since school days; a rare talent for permitting them to confuse him and completely cripple his weak will, as a result of which he would be sent reeling with genuinely mental and even physical illness to the covers of his bed; and

finally a capacity for betraying his closest friends and their mutual ideas.

When he was ready to begin the work of organizing a new government, the army overthrew the Yonai Cabinet by the simple device of having its War Minister resign. The army then provided Konoye with a triumvirate to assist in carrying out the new totalitarian program at home and the new expansionist policy abroad. It consisted of three high-powered generators who had proved themselves in the militarist-socialist puppet state of Manchukuo: hard, cruel-looking General Hideki Tojo, who had been one of the chiefs of the Kwantung army, empire-builder of Manchukuo and points north; arrogant little Yosuke Matsuoka, who slapped the world in the face when he walked Japan out of the League of Nations following the outbreak of the Manchurian war and then fell in with the radical empire-builders and served them as president of the South Manchuria Railway when it was still an industrial octopus in China; and the sluggish, sullen Naoki Hoshino, the army's designer of totalitarian rule in Manchukuo. These three builders of Manchukuo, the successful conquest of which, the Japanese boast, encouraged Hitler to follow Japan's example in the use of violence, were enlisted to help Japan catch up with the pupil who had outdistanced his teacher. Tojo became War Minister of the new Konoye Cabinet; Matsuoka, Foreign Minister; and Hoshino, chief of the Cabinet Planning Board, which

was to establish the new economic structure of Japan.

As representative of big business in the new dictatorial government, Ichizo Kobayashi, chairman of the board of the Tokyo Electric Light Company, was made Commerce and Industry Minister, while Shozo Murata, head of the Osaka Shosen Kaisha, which is controlled by the Sumitomo clan, became Communications Minister. Both supported the new totalitarian political and economic program of Konoye, reflecting the fundamental change which had taken place in the views of the dominant business clans. As a result of two violent body blows administered to the business clans by the assassinations and military uprising of 1932 and 1936 and the two invasions of China with which they almost coincided, the capitalist groups recognized their choice of surrendering to the demands of the militarists or being driven out of the trinity entirely. They preferred the former and bowed to the necessity of joining the militarists in new ventures of conquest on the Asiatic continent. They consequently shifted from light to heavy war industries to turn out the guns, tanks, planes and ships which the militarists needed for destroying a free China and which they subsequently secured in greater quantities for the conquest of all Asia. Murata and Kobayashi, a warm admirer of Hitler, whom he praised highly in newspaper interviews following a visit to Germany, were symbols of capitalist support of the militarist program of conquering Asia and, like Konoye, participated in the new

cabinet not to check the militarists in their foreign policy of aggression, but to prevent their seizing complete control of the domestic totalitarian structure essential for prosecuting such a foreign policy.

The old struggle between the militarist and business clans now was transferred from the Diet to the new totalitarian headquarters, which was given the meaningless title of Imperial Rule Assistance Association. At the very first session of the commission which had been set up to organize the new totalitarian system the struggle between the two members of the trinity became apparent. Nationalist members of the commission, like Colonel Kingoro Hashimoto, leader of the violent Young Men's Federation as well as of the forces which fired on survivors of the American and British gunboats *Panay* and *Ladybird* in China waters, declared war immediately on the capitalist groups and their political associates in the Diet. They advocated a single dictatorial party for politics and a socialistic basis for the economic system. Both were to be controlled by a combination of the militarists and nationalists who would become the Japanese equivalents of the Nazi party leaders.

This was exactly what the business clans in combination with Konoye, who represented the emperor and the aristocracy, sought to prevent and were given to understand the militarists would not demand. Mitsui, Mitsubishi and the other business clans were quite willing to serve as the Krupps and Thyssens of a totali-

tarian Japan which would supply the militarists with all the armaments they could squeeze out of available raw materials and labor, but they were bitterly opposed to the movement for a militarist-socialist state. They had no serious objection to dissolution of the political parties and might even have consented to the elimination of the Diet if permitted to control the new totalitarian economic structure just as they had the old capitalist one. The business clans were interested in the political parties only as instruments which would enable them to maintain their hold on the nation's economic structure. If the militarists would guarantee this hold, they were willing to abandon both parties and the Diet and assist in the program of foreign conquest. The militarists, however, were at first unwilling to provide such a guarantee because of the strong socialist sentiment among many extremist officers as well as the rank and file of the Japanese army, which is drawn largely from families of impoverished peasants and workers.

Konoye was very much in sympathy with these soldiers and officers, partly because of his own poverty during his youth and his early interest in socialism. But the poor Prince was an aristocrat first and a socialist second. The two did not mix very well as a rule, because the principles of socialism, if carried out, would lead to the elimination of the feudal class of aristocrats, of whom Konoye was the representative. While Konoye was ready to sell out his socialist friends he

was less ready to do so in the case of his aristocratic ones.

Hirohito himself, as can easily be understood, was reported to be extremely hostile to the proposal of the extremists to establish a militarist-socialist state. Under such a form of government the emperor would once more be reduced to the status of his ancestors as a patent puppet and prisoner of a military shogunate, which would differ from the old one only in that it would be composed of an army-navy combination operating a socialist instead of a feudal state. Although the emperor at present is a puppet and prisoner of the militarists, he is able to maintain the fiction of independence by being surrounded by a group of statesmen and aristocrats who are not all militarists. His subjects are under the illusion that the emperor is free to appoint anyone he pleases as the head of the government and simply "consults" a group of "advisers" near the throne.

For many years these advisers to the throne, known as elder statesmen or *genro*, were militarists, who ruled directly by appointing themselves premiers. When they died out, the militarists no longer retained this convenient arrangement, and the only remaining *genro* was moderate-minded Prince Kimmochi Saionji, who was related to Sumitomo, one of the four big business clans. When Saionji became too old to continue selecting premiers for the emperor shortly before his death

in 1940, there was established a new organization of *genro* composed of men who formerly had been premiers, including Konoye, Baron Hiranuma, Admiral Yonai and General Abe. The militarists maintained an indirect dictatorship by forcing both the old and new statesmen to appoint premiers who would organize governments willing to serve the wishes of the militarists. If any government displeased them, they could overthrow it by having their War or Navy Minister withdraw from the cabinet, which would then automatically collapse. They could refuse to appoint a new minister unless the succeeding cabinet was prepared to meet their demands. But the statesmen and the aristocracy remained around the throne as "advisers," and behind them the emperor concealed the fact that he was a powerless puppet and prisoner who served the militarists by vesting with power the premiers who would meet the demands of the army and the navy.

Establishment of a militarist-socialist state would result either in the abolition of this imperial facade or a revision of its composition by packing it with militarist material, so that the public could see through it without any difficulty. This would cause loss of face to the emperor, the last thing which has been left to him by the militarists, and his open reduction in the eyes of his subjects to the status of a shogunate's puppet. Strangely enough, it was just this danger of the emperor's real position being disclosed to the public

that has saved Hirohito this humiliation up to the present time and has helped check establishment of a militarist-socialist state in Japan.

If the emperor were disclosed to his seventy-two million bewitched subjects as nothing more than a puppet in the hands of the militarists, the magic spell which holds the empire of Japan together might be broken, the imperial myth of gods, ghosts and Shinto spirits might be destroyed and the unity of the Japanese people as a nation, which they rightfully claim is unequalled in any other country, would be endangered. Once the divine myth were shattered, the Japanese people might stop making their National Bow, symbol of subservience to their supposed ruler. They would recognize the fact that the militarists are dictators who control the emperor as well as themselves and that they were surrendering their sons, their wealth and their labor for prosecution of foreign wars not in accordance with the instructions of the emperor, who in turn is supposed to be fulfilling the command of his divine ancestors to spread imperial rule throughout the world, but in accordance with the wishes of a band of ruthless militarists with an insatiable desire for conquest and power.

Aware of this danger of their exposure and of possible damage to national unity, the militarists themselves are divided on the issue of re-establishing a military shogunate, which the people were called upon less than eighty years ago to overthrow and which they

associate with oppression. The rightist group is in favor of continuing the system of a concealed military dictatorship and permitting the emperor to hide his impotence behind his group of aristocrats and statesmen, one of whom is a militarist himself, General Senjuro Hayashi, a former premier. The leftist group, led by radical-minded officers such as Colonel Hashimoto, is willing to run the risks involved in establishing a shogunate, which it believes can be made popular with the masses of Japanese because of its socialist economic principles.

Prince Konoye and Baron Hiranuma, former premier and prominent nationalist, both supported the foreign policy of aggression, on which both militarist groups are in accord, but they sided with the rightist group on the domestic issue of the military shogunate. They attempted to fortify their position by maintaining and even strengthening the leading capitalist clans as an economic weapon against both militarist groups. Konoye, however, with his sentimental and academic interest in some of the theories of the leftist group, attempted to strike a compromise between the views of all the different factions by establishing a dictatorship of businessmen, militarists and aristocrats, who would extend a number of social benefits to the mass of the people. It was undertaken in the totalitarian blueprint which Konoye drew up with Goto, who was connected with the military leftists, and with Arima, who was associated with the peasants.

As in the case of his first cabinet, Konoye was duped by the militarists from the very start. In violation of his understanding of their pledge to support the new structure, the army and the navy later announced that they could not participate officially. This was a blow which killed the Premier's interest in the entire totalitarian program. Essential to his plan of eliminating the danger of a new shogunate and curbing reckless expansion abroad was participation of the militarists in the new totalitarian hierarchy, by whose decisions they would have to abide. The army and navy recognized Konoye's intention to bind their hands by involving them in a new dictatorship with businessmen and aristocrats and declined the invitation to join. They explained that by agreeing to "support" the new structure they meant support from the "outside" not the "inside." The difference was between controlling Konoye and being controlled by him. The militarists preferred the former and therefore remained officially on the "outside."

Instead of tricking the militarists into assuming responsibility, Konoye was tricked by them into becoming premier for a second time and committing himself to a program of liquidating all opposition to their foreign policy of aggression and regimenting the nation for total war. He was the most suitable man for the job, as he already had proved himself capable of ramming dictatorial wartime legislation through an unwilling Diet during his first administration. What the

militarists wanted Konoye to do during his second administration, when they already had decided to conquer "Greater East Asia," was to invoke with a minimum of friction the provisions of this legislation, which was called the National General Mobilization Law.

Once set in motion, Konoye was like a ball which continues rolling under its own momentum. He did not have enough courage to resign in September, 1940, when the militarists went back on their pledge made to him in July. He had been in office only two months, and the loss of face involved in quitting so soon would have been more than he could bear. As the political parties already had been liquidated and the new totalitarian system organized, the danger from the extremists and the shogunate group was greater than ever. Having placed the emperor, the aristocracy and the business groups in greater peril than ever, Konoye could not let them down and was obliged to control as best he could the dangerous machine he had organized. On the other hand, his friends Goto and Arima, who were more interested in their socialist theories than in curbing the militarists at home, were anxious to try out their new invention. They consoled Konoye on his misfortune but urged him to renew his interest in their great social experiment.

Konoye's troubles, however, were just beginning. No sooner had he turned in disgust and disappointment from his totalitarian experiment than he found

himself facing the big guns of the army and the navy, which announced that the time had arrived for a military alliance with Germany and Italy. About a year before, the then Premier Hiranuma had been faced with the same demands from the army, and he had turned them down. Hiranuma, while supporting the army's policy of aggression against China, was unwilling to court war with the United States and Great Britain through an alliance with the Nazis. He was prepared to convert the anti-comintern pact with the Axis into an alliance against the Soviet Union but not against the democracies. The Germans, during the summer of 1939, made it clear that they were not interested in such an alliance and intimated to the Japanese Ambassador in Berlin that they might conclude a pact with the Soviet Union if Japan was unwilling to join the Axis against the democracies. Supported by the navy, which was then unwilling to face an undivided American fleet in the Pacific, Hiranuma was not intimidated by the German threat and held his ground, which fell out from under him at the end of August, when the Nazis made good by signing a treaty in Moscow.

During the year which elapsed between the fall of Hiranuma and the reappearance of Konoye, the entire international situation was changed by the outbreak of the European war and the defeat of France. The attitude of the Japanese navy also changed, and it was now ready to join the army in a demand for an alli-

ance with the Axis. No premier in Japan could stop a joint army-navy demand, and especially not a premier with a will like Konoye's. Negotiations for the pact had been going on for some time, and Konoye was quite aware of the possibility that it might have to be concluded. When he came into office in July immediately after the collapse of France, however, Konoye was given to understand by the militarists that the invasion of England was imminent and that the expansion into "Greater East Asia," which at that time meant Indo-China, Thailand, Hongkong, Singapore, Malaya, Burma and the Dutch East Indies, would be practically a "peaceful" one. When the invasion of England did not materialize, the army and the navy as well as Konoye became a bit worried. The Nazis, both in Berlin and Tokyo, assured them that there was no need for concern, that England would soon be defeated. The German Ambassador in Tokyo, General Eugen Ott, pointed out, however, that it was not in accordance with the Japanese spirit of "bushido" for the Germans to be doing all the work against the "common enemy" and urged the Japanese to conclude an alliance which, if nothing more, would facilitate the German invasion of England by diverting American assistance to the Pacific.

Konoye fussed and fretted and worked himself up into a nervous stew during the month of September when the militarists forced a showdown on the issue of the tripartite pact. He reminded the hot-headed gen-

erals and the cool-thinking admirals that he had agreed to take over the government immediately after the fall of France with the understanding that the democracies were on the point of complete defeat, that England was about to surrender or be invaded, that America was dazed and powerless, and that the Japanese would carry out their "Greater East Asia" program unhampered except for insignificant "local" opposition. Now, only two months later, he was being asked to conclude a pact against the United States, one of the strongest powers of the world.

From Hirohito, whose respect for England now was transferred to the United States, down to the smallest merchant who had ever done business with Americans, there was opposition to courting war with the last great democracy. Big business and members of the aristocracy, who were well acquainted with the industrial strength of the United States, were willing enough to join the militarists in picking up the remnants of the British Empire in the Far East and the Dutch East Indies, but going to war against the United States was quite another matter. Konoye reflected their views in arguing against the tripartite pact.

The army and navy officers insisted that the pact did not mean war with the United States and was not intended to result in war with the United States. It was simply part of a new type of "blitzkrieg" diplomacy essential for victory. Foreign Minister Matsuoka, considered an authority on the United States because of

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the fact that he was educated there, visited the official residence of the Premier time and again to explain blitz diplomacy, in which Konoye apparently was not well versed. He argued that the primary purpose of the pact was not to *make* war but to *prevent* it as far as Japan was concerned by threatening to involve the United States in war in the Far East at a time when she was concentrating all her strength on saving England. This threat, which Matsuoka referred to privately on a number of occasions to Japanese friends, would be sufficient to secure either the acquiescence of the United States in Japan's "Greater East Asia" program or the defeat of Britain as a result of diversion of American supplies from England to the Far East in order to challenge Japan's claims. In the latter case, the challenge would not be a serious one, as the United States would then be locked between a victorious Germany and an undefeated Japan. Konoye expressed fear about American retaliation against Japan as a result of the pact, but Matsuoka, with his colorful and convincing oratory and his reputation among Japanese as an expert on the United States, assured him that the "decadent" Americans would be stunned, confused and completely divided by the announcement of the alliance and would not dare do more than lodge the usual protests.

As a result of these arguments, the objections of Konoye and Hirohito finally were overcome, but it was an unhappy prince and an equally unhappy emperor

who gave in to the demands of the militarists and sanctioned the tripartite pact. The nervousness, excitement, worry and fear which wracked his mind during the weeks of intense debate leading up to the signing of the alliance combined to make Konoye mentally and physically ill, so that he could not stomach the thought of attending the champagne celebration of Japanese militarists and Axis ambassadors. Instead he went home on the night after the pact was signed, tossed restlessly in his bed and wept with anguish. It was unlikely that Hirohito had an easier time on his hard pillow that night.

After browbeating Konoye into accepting the tripartite pact and inveigling him into having the emperor issue an imperial rescript which sanctified the alliance, thereby making it virtually a crime for any Japanese to criticize it, the militarists turned with fresh vigor to the problem of harnessing the economic structure for total war. Naoki Hoshino, the army henchman who had been given the job of drawing up the real blueprint for economic regimentation in contrast to the one Konoye and his friends had made, completed a secret draft which was to be sprung by surprise and railroaded through the Diet. Commerce and Industry Minister Kobayashi, representing the big business clans, managed to get hold of a copy of it, however, before the Diet convened. During a visit in Osaka, industrial center of western Japan, he disclosed it to his business friends. A loud cry went up from

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leading business clans all over the country. They accused Hoshino of attempting to force socialism upon the country with a plan which called for state control of industry through a system of government cartels. The business clans already had established cartels of their own through which they adjusted their differences and achieved what was called voluntary self-regimentation. The military socialists now were attempting to take over these cartels and through them seize control of industry.

The business clans did not content themselves with bitter protests to Konoye, who was still sick about the tripartite pact and who they realized already had played into the hands of the militarists by failing to bring them into the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. They carried their fight directly to the people by launching a nation-wide whispering campaign accusing the extremists of being socialists or communists in the disguise of patriotic Japanese nationalists. Supported by members of the Diet, who were also bitter enemies of the extremists because of their attempt to seize control of the legislature by packing it with members of their own choosing, the business groups decided to embarrass the government by undermining the new totalitarian program. The threat of chaos in the Diet and of sabotage in industry by the big-business groups was great enough to convince General Tojo and other members of the military hierarchy that it would be unwise to permit the leftists to press their

socialist program. Consequently they called off the leftist hounds, who were used by the rightist controlling group of the army to intimidate business and the Diet into acquiescing in the fundamental policy which supersedes all political and factional differences among militarists: the foreign policy of expansion and conquest. Instead of foreign conquest on a leftist basis at home they agreed to continue the orthodox policy of expansion on a rightist basis.

Hoshino was thrown out of the government and his economic program abandoned. The Justice Minister, Akira Kazami, who was appointed because he was a member of Goto's extremist clique, also was forced out. The Cabinet was reconstructed with Baron Hiranuma, rightist nationalist supported by big business, taking the portfolio of Home Minister and Lieutenant-General Heisuke Yanagawa, who belonged to Hiranuma's group, becoming the new Justice Minister. In control of the police and the courts through their offices, they rounded up several hundred extremists and leftists, one report placing the number at six hundred. Among those arrested were former communists who subsequently joined the national socialists and secured important positions in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association. This liquidation of the extremists reached to the very top of the totalitarian association, and the axe finally fell on Arima, Goto and forty other chief executives. They were all replaced by reactionary nationalists of the Hiranuma type. The socialist move-

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ment was thoroughly crushed while the army hierarchy looked aside, and Konoye took to his bed again to brood about his betrayal of his boyhood friends and their beautiful totalitarian blueprint, which had been trampled underfoot in the struggle between the capitalist and militarist clans.

Having purged their economic differences, the two leading members of the trinity emerged from the crisis better friends than before and in a spirit of "mutual understanding" settled down to the task of regimenting the country for war against the democracies. The instrument of this regimentation was the National General Mobilization Law, which gave the government power to control the entire economic structure. The power, however, was left largely in the hands of big business, whose representatives in the offices of Finance Ministry and Commerce and Industry Ministry applied the law in such a way that the big-business clans grew stronger, a large part of the middle class was liquidated, and workers and peasants were able to buy less goods with their money than ever before. The business clans were permitted to continue their "voluntary regimentation," through their independent industrial cartels.

They not only were given bigger orders than before by the militarists but also a guarantee of seven per cent profit on their iron and steel output as well as subsidies to encourage production. The government announcement of subsidies for big business was made by

the president of the Iron and Steel Control Association, who was privately connected with Mitsui, Mitsubishi and other leading business clans. To guarantee the militarists' good intentions in their new partnership with big business for armed aggression abroad, Masatsune Ogura, head of the Sumitomo interests, was made Finance Minister, and Admiral Teijiro Toyoda, linked to Mitsui, was appointed Commerce and Industry Minister. Sumitomo's Ogura promised Sumitomo and other economic dictators in an official statement after taking office: "I will endeavor to prevent mere theory from running away with affairs." That made it clear that the militarists no longer intended to oust them from the trinity. After Toyoda was made Foreign Minister, his successor as Commerce and Industry Minister, Lieutenant-General Seizo Sakonji, repeated this assurance even more clearly by saying: "Although I hear voices somewhere in favor of government management of industry, I do not think such a system will achieve highest efficiency, and I do not agree to government operation of industry."

The new union thus was blessed by no one less than an army officer. Following the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the invasion of the south sea area there were not only blessings but praise by the militarists for the good work of Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Yasuda and other leading business clans. Domei, the official news agency, rejoicing in the successful attacks on the United States, Britain and the Netherlands East In-

dies, broadcast a report that the new Vice-Minister of War, Lieutenant-General Hyotaro Yamada, had praised the business clans for producing arms "superior to the world level both in quality and quantity." Mitsui, Mitsubishi and the others learned quickly and well from the "white barbarians." The economic dictators had justly won the praise of their superior military dictators.

Prince Fumimaro Konoye, that distinguished political blunderer and weakling, must be given credit for the happy reunion between the two leading members of the unholy trinity and for helping launch the new war by sanctioning the tripartite pact. Although he had a confused, bewildered and sickly mind, it crowned the frame of an aristocrat, through whose mediation the conflict between the modern money men and the militarists was solved, so that once more, with the blessings of the divine emperor to whom Konoye is so closely related, they could advance together to fulfill the imperial mission of foreign conquest.

CHAPTER SEVEN

R I C E , R I C K E T S A N D R A C K E T S

THE foreigner who arrives in the capital of the Japanese Empire after a fast ride on a modern train from one of the outlying ports is met by a red-cap porter, led through an outmoded yet Western-style railway station and then deposited with his luggage on the street. After waiting around for a taxi, he discovers that they no longer are in fashion. If he breaks his leg or is on the point of death, special arrangements might be made with the police to have a car take him to the hospital; but if he is only going to a hotel, then his problem is more difficult. It can be tackled in several ways. To pass time he might buy a copy of the semi-official *Japan Times and Advertiser*, which is still being published in the English language despite the war on the English-speaking peoples, and continue waiting in hope that a charcoal-driven Ford might

stray past the station before he finishes reading his newspaper. If he were lucky enough to see a taxi, his luck would seldom last long enough to enable him to get anywhere near it, for the car would be surrounded by a swarm of Japanese. A young boy in a black student uniform, always eager to help a troubled foreigner and practice his peculiar English on him, might suggest a ricksha. But these are almost as difficult to find as taxis in view of the increasing demand for the limited number of rickshas, which in the past were used only by geisha. It finally dawns on the visitor that he might walk to the Imperial Hotel, which is only about fifteen minutes on foot from the station. If the student is not in a hurry, he usually is glad to show the foreigner the way and even lend a hand with the bags.

After reaching the low-lying, rambling brick hotel which the Japanese had designed by an American architect, Frank Lloyd Wright, as an impressive residence for foreign visitors, the new guest may be so unlucky as to have arrived at a time when the hot water is not on. If he waits for the ration period, however, he may have a bath before going into the dining room. Official prices for meals have been fixed so that he is not permitted to spend more than forty cents for lunch or a dollar and a quarter for dinner. The food is quite good and enough for the average appetite, although the black liquid marked coffee on the menu cannot be associated with any blend hitherto encountered. More

palatable is the freshly brewed beer, which goes on sale every afternoon after 5 o'clock. Each person is allowed to buy one bottle, but he must get to it before the supply is exhausted at about 8 o'clock in the evening. The visitor then begins to observe conditions quickly, especially if he arrived in Japan during 1941, when the government abandoned its policy of inviting Americans for officially conducted visits. There were no cotton shirts, woolen suits or coats, leather shoes, silk stockings or any imported goods which once were available. Foreign residents complained of the difficulty of securing bread, sugar, flour, butter, milk, eggs, meat, vegetables, coal and a hundred-and-one other necessities to which they had become accustomed.

Some foreign visitors, therefore, returned to their own country with extremely pessimistic reports about living conditions in Japan. They failed to observe, however, that all residents of Japan were not foreigners, that all Japanese did not live in hotels, did not wear silk stockings or leather shoes and did not ride in taxis. The implication that life for the Japanese was approaching the breaking point because conditions were intolerable for some foreign residents was not quite correct. It was comparatively recently that Japanese began wearing foreign clothes and taking a fancy to steaks, chops, bread, butter, American jazz and motion pictures. All were importations from abroad, products of foreign countries which were superimposed on

a native, feudal culture, just as were the concrete buildings of Tokyo. The foreign structures, railroads, street-cars and industrial machines for producing modern weapons of war were retained, but foreign food, clothing, habits and thought passed away almost overnight, like the fantastic dream of a samurai. The Japanese returned to the feudal life of their ancestors before they were disturbed by Commodore Perry and other foreign visitors.

Not very many really left the way of life of their ancestors. Fedoras became popular, but they were worn by Japanese usually dressed in native silk kimonos and wooden clogs or straw sandals. Even when they do wear leather shoes, most Japanese do not unlace them, but slide into them like clogs. That is the reason why they break the backs of their shoes and often support them with metal braces. At best such shoes feel uncomfortable to the Japanese, who are relieved at the opportunity to remove them to air their feet. The Japanese with his foreign necktie, shirt and sack coat strips these imported coverings for his more comfortable kimono before sitting down on his straw-matted floor for a dinner of clear fish soup, rice, raw or boiled fish, seaweed, pickled radish, a few vegetables and then an apple or a tangerine. He may not have a foreign breakfast of eggs, bacon, coffee and toast, but the average Japanese is more happy with a bowl of rice, another bowl of bean-paste soup and a few pickles. For lunch he has more boiled rice, lentils

and some dried fish. If this becomes tiresome, he may order a bowl of macaroni made of wheat flour, vermicelli or buckwheat noodles dipped in soy sauce. After a few cups of tea, the Japanese is as satisfied with his ten-cent meal as any American with his roasts and steaks. There may be shortages of milk, bread, butter and meat, but these are not essential for his diet.

In the large "foreign" cities of Japan, many imported ways of life were received together with white visitors and the machines they brought with them. Before the outbreak of the China war, there were a large number of automobiles on the streets of Tokyo, where cab drivers in Fords and Chevrolets would hound pedestrians for fares. After 1937, however, restrictions on gasoline increased steadily. At first the use of automobiles was discouraged on patriotic grounds. Police were stationed outside theaters and geisha houses to glower and insult those who drew up in cars. They prohibited the use of automobiles for reaching race courses, golf links or other places not considered essential for the "national effort." Taxis were forbidden to cruise on the streets or to carry passengers after midnight. An announcement said that drunkards would not be permitted to hire cars to carry them home after ten o'clock at night. Finally in September, 1941, sober persons also were affected, as the government completely suspended supplies of the precious fuel which was needed for the war machine. A number of automobiles were converted so that they could operate by

burning charcoal. Their engines would balk on hills, sputter, and finally die. Most of the civilian automobiles in Japan were turned over to the army, and those which were choked with charcoal gas soon were ruined. Persons who had used taxis, including government officials, took to riding street cars and trains, as most of the subjects of Japan had been doing all along. The ricksha pullers found themselves as busy as their ancestors ever were in feudal days. More advanced thinkers attached bicycles to their rickshas for special rush service at seven cents per trip.

While curtailment of gasoline and oil was not very serious for most Japanese—with the exception of fishermen, who were told to go out in their motorboats only when large schools of fish were reported—the shortage of rice was. The government was reluctant to admit that the rice situation was ever very bad but there were several stories in the newspapers which indicated that it was not very good. One said: "The number of sparrows in Kanazawa, Ishikawa Prefecture, has greatly decreased because of the scarcity of rice left-overs among local households which have become careful in handling rice." Another indicated difficulties for others as well: "Villagers at Kaminogo, Osaka Prefecture, decided at their regular meeting that persons going to the homes of bereaved families to assist them with funerals should bring their own lunches so as not to cause the sorrowing households further trouble over rice."

The shortages in this basic staple of the Japanese diet were caused by decreases in production and the drain on supplies by the army for operations in China. Whereas 500,000,000 bushels of rice were available before the outbreak of the China war, the supply shrank to slightly more than 300,000,000 in 1940, when the need had increased. Shortages of labor, fertilizer and other agricultural materials as well as the government's policy of price fixing were responsible to a large extent for the decline in the rice output, with unfavorable weather making the general situation worse. An attempt was made to alleviate the shortage of rice by mixing it with rice imported from Indo-China and Thailand as well as with barley and mottled kidney beans. If the Japanese, however, is guilty of any fault, it is his extreme fondness for his native white rice untarnished by mixtures with anything else. Nevertheless, he had to make the best of supplies which contained less than fifty per cent native rice. Even then the distribution of rice was not satisfactory and the government finally had to resort to rationing. While this alleviated the shortage to some extent, larger rations were requested by the public for students who were required to submit to compulsory labor and physical exercises, the latter intended to toughen them for military service.

The general dislocation of the nation's economy as a result of the double burden of waging a war in China and preparing for a bigger one in the Pacific

RICE, RICKETS AND RACKETS

led to rationing of other daily necessities. Two small bales of charcoal weighing about sixty-six pounds were made available during the winter of 1940 to each household in Tokyo, where about one-fourth of the population is without gas for cooking or heating. The monthly allotment of wheat was a half pound for a single person without a family, with decreasing amounts per person for families up to twenty members and over, who received a total of three pounds. Sugar was rationed monthly at the rate of six-tenths of a pound per person, while one small and one large box of matches were also distributed to each household for the same period.

The dearth of fresh vegetables and fish sent prices up by as much as four hundred per cent in one year. The price of an eight-pound watermelon which once sold for sixteen cents rose to about sixty cents, while the cost of a small cantaloupe or honeydew increased from four to ten dollars, equivalent to roughly forty yen, the month's wage of a Japanese worker. The government attempted to check prices by pegging them, but farmers reacted by withholding supplies or selling them elsewhere than to the cities. An inspection of one Tokyo store revealed only fifteen cucumbers and eggplants on hand supported by one lonely tomato. But while vegetables and fruits were scarce, there suddenly appeared an abundance of chickens on the market, bringing the complaint that the egg shortage was caused by the fact that the people were eating all the

hens. When this situation was investigated, it was learned that the farmers were selling their chickens because they were unable to secure enough feed for them. The blame was laid by one newspaper at the door of the Netherlands East Indies for making imports of corn impossible following the freezing of Japanese assets shortly before the Japanese attacked to get more than simply chicken feed. The public was assured, however, that it need not worry about what was referred to as "hen fruit" because large supplies of frozen eggs which were previously shipped to the United States from occupied China were to be sent to Japan instead in retaliation for the American freezing of Japanese assets.

The shortages and rationing resulted in long queues in front of Tokyo shops, especially those dealing in cakes and bread, of which urban residents became very fond in addition to rice. Instead of rice, each person could have a ration of about a half loaf of bread per day, but rice eaters were free to stand in line in the hope of being able to buy bread without a ticket after those entitled to rations had been supplied. Tokyo residents also were entitled to about twenty-five cents worth of sweets per month, while those in western Japan were allotted only fifteen cents worth. Shortly before the outbreak of war in the Pacific, the government undertook control of sweet white rice wine called *sake*, the national liquor of Japan. Because of the shortage of rice, the supply of this wine was sharply cur-

tailed, and it became difficult for workers to buy it. Officials therefore decided to ration the wine for the benefit of miners and factory workers "to alleviate their day's fatigue" and "to enable them to recover their strength for the morrow's work." The increasing strain on the working class as a result of longer hours and less satisfactory living conditions had something to do with the government's decision to assure them a stimulant.

Reports in the press indicated official concern about the health standard of the nation as a result of protracted wartime conditions. The government labor union conducted a physical examination of 6,000,000 workers, while the Tuberculosis Prevention Society sent five hundred medical students to all factories of the country to discover the extent of tuberculosis, which admittedly was making steady inroads among young workers in factories. In addition to waging war, for which billions of yen have been spent at the sacrifice of better living and health at home, Japan can boast of the highest tubercular death-rate in the world, more than twice that of England and more than three times that of the United States. Over a period of two years following the outbreak of the war in China, the number of victims of tuberculosis in Japan increased by more than fifty per cent, the majority being youths ranging in age from fifteen to twenty-three, according to official Japanese figures. The number who succumbed to the disease in 1938 was 148,872. Japan had only

about ten thousand beds available for an estimated 1,500,000 tuberculars in 1938. Since that time the number of victims undoubtedly has increased sharply, while the number of beds for civilians could not be much greater because of the increasing demands by the militarists. Japanese officials therefore simply go on making investigations to see how bad the situation is becoming but are rather powerless to do much about it. A nation which is seriously short-handed can hardly permit many of its workers to take sufficient time off to get the air and sunshine necessary for curing tuberculosis. One Japanese doctor said nothing broke his heart more than to see some of his patients ordered back to their poorly lighted and unsanitary factories when they were on the point of being cured.

Not only workers suffered as a result of the shortage of consumers' goods. Nurses employed in hospitals reported a serious increase in the number of cases of rickets among children. This disease, which leaves the bones soft by checking normal calcification and results in bow legs and depression of the chest, had been curbed to some extent following the introduction of butter and milk into the Japanese diet. When dairy products became so scarce that it was difficult to secure any milk at all, while margarine had long ago been substituted for butter, rickets returned to plague the young.

The shortage of doctors in Japan because of the drain by the army did not help the general situation. Inexperienced medical students were pressed into serv-

ice. These students would be sent out into industrial and agricultural areas, where they could work from six o'clock in the morning until early in the evening, when they would then turn to entertaining villagers with motion pictures. In the course of their work, medical students discovered that about seventy-five per cent of the students in one village were suffering from parasites and fifty per cent from trachoma. A government survey disclosed that the declining standard of health and the strain caused by compulsory labor resulted in a sharp increase in the number of students suffering from myopia. Thirty per cent of the students in primary schools, fifty in secondary schools and seventy in higher institutions were found to be victims.

The boom caused by rising wages in the war industries, combined with the network of economic restrictions and rationing resulting from shortages, made almost every subject of the empire a criminal and an "economic violator." The rampancy of illegal transactions caused a general disregard for law by a people which in the past were known for their strict observance of it. The Japanese civilian was once considered one of the most law-abiding citizens of the world. As a result of pressure on his standard of living, he has lost that distinction.

Browbeating policemen, the judge and jury of the Japanese civilian population, were kept on the run from early morning until the city was put to bed at midnight, attempting to keep up with rackets and

racketeers, who multiplied faster than the government was able to increase the army of "economic policemen" required to hunt them down. Cowboys organized a ring not only for rounding up cows but also for relieving them of their milk, which was diluted with water and sold at fanciful prices to thirsty restaurants and hotels. Farmers jammed the aisles of trains with large crates filled with vegetables, chickens, eggs and rice, which they distributed directly to Tokyo housewives, who met them with fistfuls of yen, rather than to government-controlled dealers, who offered a few official coins. Hiking became a more popular sport than ever before. Instead of starting out with a full knapsack and returning with an empty one as in the past, week-end hikers reversed the order by leaving Tokyo with large deflated bags and bringing them back filled to the bursting point with precious unadulterated white rice, which was worth almost its weight in yen if the hiker preferred to sell rather than eat it himself. Shops which were lucky enough to receive a trickle of vegetables and fruits through legal channels often sold them to customers under a secret arrangement whereby the latter paid more than the official price. One policeman reported that he found piles of cucumbers, tomatoes and eggplants under empty boxes in one store in front of which was displayed the "all sold out" sign. The store had enough only for its "regular" customers.

When the price of a cup of coffee was reduced by official order from four cents to two and a half, the

stomachs of many addicts shrank proportionately. Coffee shops doubled their profits by mixing one pound of coffee with larger quantities of soya beans to produce 130 cups of bitter brew, whereas only fifty cups were turned out with the same amount of coffee in the four-cents-per-cup days. Those who were not virile enough to withstand the soya bean brew sought relief in the numerous bars of Tokyo, where glasses were marked to make it possible for the customer to see that he received the full quantity of liquor to which he was entitled at the official price. The quantity seldom was short but the quality almost always was. Water flavored with whiskey was passed off as a highball. Flavored with syrup it became a cocktail. Up to the summer of 1941, however, it was still possible to buy bootlegged foreign whiskey for prices ranging between twelve and fifteen dollars for four-fifths of a quart. More annoying to Japanese than the diluting of their whiskey was the watering of their rice wine, which some thoughtful dealers attempted to keep from going flat by preserving it with formaldehyde.

Illegal prices for most unrationed commodities were the rule, and legal prices the exception. Clothing made of wool and cotton, leather goods, typewriters, cameras and various other goods of foreign origin brought prices from five to ten times more than official rates. Illegal transactions in these commodities continued until they finally disappeared from the black market in 1941.

With gradual economic and political isolation from the rest of the world, the Japanese withdrew to their former feudal life, but the taste for many of the imported novelties continued to linger. In attempting to produce substitutes, the Japanese were ingenious even though often unsuccessful. The same talent which they showed in extending the range of their bombers by having them carry streamlined cans of gasoline was applied in producing homespun cloth from horsehair and cloth fiber from sea slugs. Staple fiber was the usual substitute for cotton and wool in clothing. It was not always loyal to the possessor, however, as I discovered after sending a staple-fiber shirt to the laundry. The Japanese laundryman never brought it back and finally admitted that it had dissolved in the water. Apparently others had the same experience as the search for something better led to the production of a national uniform made entirely of paper, which was said to be cheaper and better than staple fiber. If produced cheaply enough on a mass-production basis, the suit could be tossed away like a napkin after it had been soiled.

In the line of Western food, the sweet potato was shriveled, roasted and finally packaged as coffee, which was guaranteed not to smell like potatoes, while lily bulbs, which once were exported to the United States, were similarly treated to produce a beverage "just as tasty and more nourishing than genuine coffee." Radish leaves were dried and pounded into a fine powder,

which became the substitute for flour in making bread. A nation-wide campaign was launched by the government to collect used tea leaves, which were found suitable as fodder for horses, while an experimentally minded farmer announced that good results could be achieved by using the droppings of bats as a substitute fertilizer. The Tokyo agricultural experimental station pronounced the substitute an excellent one. To conserve the supply of wood, matches tipped with phosphorus at both ends were offered for sale. Eighty of these two-headed matches were sold for less than one cent.

Long before many Americans became aware of the possibility of a rubber shortage in the United States, the Japanese had developed a wooden automobile tire which required no iron or rubber, yet assured the purchaser a smooth ride. Unfortunately for the inventor, insufficient substitute gasoline and oil were produced from shale and sardines to make it possible for many automobile drivers to use his invention. After experimenting for a year, an idle chauffeur claimed to have found the solution to his unemployment as well as to the gasoline shortage. He developed an automobile which was driven by air pressure. In the Hokkaido, northernmost of the main islands, the government decided to replace iron railroad tracks with wooden ones. Over them could roll trains pulled by an engine burning soot collected from the smoking stacks of regular coal-burning locomotives.

But even if these experiments failed, most Japanese would not be affected too seriously. If they did not like the new coffee, they could go on drinking tea as they had in the past, and if the Western-style suits and shoes made of substitutes were not satisfactory, they could wear their native silk kimono and wooden clogs. The chief problem of the government was to provide them with rice, fish, seaweed and pickles, the principal items of the national diet. After a great deal of confusion, the rationing system was worked out quite satisfactorily and the public was officially assured of a "minimum standard of living." It is a medieval standard which the masses of Japanese never abandoned to any great extent. Although they have to do without taxis, bread and American films, many remember the time when these did not exist for them. On the whole they abandoned without much complaining the few foreign luxuries which they had acquired only recently. Most of the grumbling about shortages came from foreigners, not Japanese.

The Japanese are as self-sufficient in their native, traditional diet as are the Americans. They cannot be starved out by blockade as England or Germany might be. They are better off with respect to food than any other factor essential for prosecution of warfare. As a result of their conquest of Indo-China and Thailand, their supply of rice may be greater than ever before. More serious than food has been the problem of labor and raw materials, both of which may be secured in

freshly occupied areas. The fall in the living standard to the subsistence level, deterioration of the nation's health and protracted warfare in China combined to create dissatisfaction which led to the outburst in 1940 by Takao Saito. By providing their subjects with new uniforms and a new nationalism, however, the militarists taught the Japanese how to forget their grievances by undertaking greater sacrifices and recalling that they were children of a rising sun empire entrusted with a divine mission.

CHAPTER EIGHT

A L L F O R O N E

IF THE Japanese had less food for his stomach and less freedom for his mind, he was compensated for both with more liberal doses of samurai spirit. While the standard of living fell back to feudal days, the level of thinking retreated with it, providing the basis for a new nationalism which was as crude as it was powerful. It can hardly be matched even by Hitler's brand. The Japanese were not always a nationalistic people, nor were they always conscious of the fact that they were ruled by a descendant of heaven. But after the revolution of 1867, when the feudal fiefs were consolidated into a centralized country, a new nation was born. Into it the militarists blew the fire of Hachiman, their god of war. Although democratic influence for a while acted as a damper which stifled the flame, the militarists nursed it until it burst into a bigger blaze

than ever before, sending foreign elements into a singed and injured retreat.

Although the war lords succeeded in stirring nationalism to a high pitch during the Russo-Japanese war and to a lesser extent during the Manchurian invasion, they were not very successful in securing spirited support for their last venture in China. The Japanese public already had discovered an important fact. It was that wars were expensive and led to further expense by creating further wars. Returns from the Manchurian conquest were not as great as had been expected, and the new "state" became a burden instead of a help because the militarists who ruled it drew from Japan large quantities of money and materials in order to establish an arsenal for the conquest of the Asiatic continent. When the militarists finally undertook their next step, which was the conquest of North China, they found that their people back home were more than one step behind them. Nevertheless, a maxim of the Japanese army is never to retreat. It therefore advanced in a circle for several years while Japanese mothers and fathers became as dizzy as their soldier sons in trying to follow the course of their movements. They also became a bit dizzy in trying to figure out how they were going to make ends meet. They became so involved in their own problems at home that they almost forgot that a war was being fought in China. These individual problems combined into a big national problem which the militarists could

hardly ignore. Morale was cracking and there was a general loss of confidence in the khaki-clad conquerors.

What the Japanese army considered most unfortunate was that morale at home was lowest at a time when opportunities were greatest. Following the fall of France and the decision of the militarists to seize all Asia, there was need for decisive and drastic action at home as well as abroad. The army, being of the land and therefore closer to the people than the navy, which was of the sea, was in a position to repair the disordered lines of the home front. It was not enough to dissolve the political parties and labor unions, to reduce the Diet to a slavish institution for cheering when militarists demanded bigger budgets, to ration the people at subsistence levels and to tie them to a regimented war economy. These measures liquidated opposition and channeled all the nation's materials and manpower into a war machine but did not eliminate uneasiness and unrest, suspicion and distrust of the dictators. Neither did they secure a united nation prepared to toss in its fate with that of the militarists in a reckless gamble to win all or lose all. For this it was necessary to drug the Japanese with a large dose of medieval spirits, which kindled in their minds fresh dreams of divinity and conquest. Like intoxicants which lift the imbiber out of the realm of painful reality, these spiritual stimulants made it possible for the Japanese national mind to rouse itself from its exhaustion after three years of the China war and to fling itself about

to stare contemptuously across the Pacific at the monster which it feared above all others: the United States of America.

The formula of the drug which the war dictators brewed for the national mind was not a new one. It was hundreds of years old and had been used on numerous occasions by other Japanese warriors, notably at the time of the Meiji "restoration." It was composed of the following principal elements: a myth about the divine founding of the Japanese state by a god whose great-grandfather descended from heaven at the command of the Sun Goddess; a religion called Shinto, which sanctified the myth, brought it to life with spirits of lifeless gods and ancestors and had as its chief priest a man who sat on a throne and was called an emperor, directly descended from the divine founder of the empire; a code of medieval life in which there were no free citizens of a free state but imperial subjects of a god state who were born to serve and to obey.

This drug had been in the system of the subject Japanese from their earliest history, but over periods of time it lost its strength, making it necessary for the war lords, who are the armed guardians of the Shinto religion and of its chief priest, to administer new doses at various intervals. In July, 1940, following the fall of France, the time arrived for a new dose. The program of conquering "Greater East Asia" was ready, but a people who had already lost hope and confidence in the army were not. The spokesman of the militarists,

Prince Konoye, therefore reminded the imperial subjects of "the lofty spirit of the country's founding" and the sacred command of Emperor Jimmu to bring the "eight corners of the world under one roof." For the achievement of this heavenly mission he advised the subjects to abandon "selfish and materialistic thoughts."

To refuse to surrender any more of their sons for bigger wars than those in China was "selfish." To object to further sacrifices in labor and money was "materialistic." It was more than that. The sacred command to which Konoye referred was an order to be obeyed by the subjects, not discussed. Those who failed to do so would be guilty of a sin not only against their ancestors and their religion, but also against a bearded man with a rod and a golden hawk who climbed upon a primitive chair 2,602 years ago and announced that he was Jimmu, the first divine emperor of Japan. They also would be guilty of violating the will of Jimmu's direct descendant, Hirohito, who commanded his subjects in 1940 to "work in harmony and cooperation . . . and make manifest the national dignity so that the Heavenly Spirits of Our Ancestors may be answered." The duty of loyal subjects was clear. It was to abandon all resistance to the demands of the war lords for greater military adventures and to "work in harmony" with them for the greater glory of the throne.

The Way of the Subjects, the bible of the modern

samurai issued in Tokyo a few months before the attack on Pearl Harbor, provided the Japanese with a handy manual which explained their duties. It informed them that their lives had meaning only when they were surrendered to their great father, the emperor and the head of the national family. "Our lives will become sincere and true when they are offered to the emperor and the state," the weary Japanese were told in the summer of 1941, when the interminable war in China entered its fifth year. "All must be unified under the emperor," and all must serve the state willingly just as did their revered forefathers.

By reviving the primitive principles of clan loyalty, obedience and subservience, the militarists succeeded in restoring the minds of the subjects to the feudal world of their ancestors, crushing all opposition to their aims and harnessing a united nation to their war chariot under the slogan of service to the state and the divine emperor. In their greatest need, the spiritual member of the Japanese trinity was of greatest assistance. Without bloodshed or revolution, heavenly Hirohito came to the rescue of his warriors by uniting a nation which had been in great disorder and distress. The dictatorship of the militarists under the emperor became stronger than ever before and more solidly entrenched than that of Hitler and Mussolini.

In returning to their world of gods and ghosts, however, the Japanese were required to perform the Shinto rites of purification. Their souls had been polluted by

relations with foreign ideas and ways of living. They had learned something of freedom of thought and religion and were so sacrilegious as to engage in it. They began to question and embarrass the government. They even discussed such ideas as democracy and equality. They learned to enjoy foreign food, clothes, sports and entertainment, which some Japanese began to prefer to their traditional kind. Japanese girls took a fancy to foreign men, crowded the piers to gaze at them in frank admiration and besieged them with requests for autographs as they debarked from ships. Girls of all ages, especially prostitutes eager to escape for a few moments into a world which they could never have, pored over American magazines, admired the richly dressed women in luxurious cars which they saw there, realized that American women had freedom and rights just as men did. Mothers learned about birth control and practiced it.

The samurai frowned. They saw the world of their feudal ancestors disappearing and the birth rate falling as Japanese men and women, in Western suits and dresses, turned to "selfish and materialistic thoughts." The warriors decided to purge the country of the evil ways which their bible said had injured the "virtuous habits and customs bequeathed by our ancestors." These had been contracted largely from the "decadent democracies," and the militarists turned upon Americans and Britishers as if they were so many witches attempting to mislead innocent children.

Just as the militarists fired upon the ships of the democracies in the nineteenth century to provoke retaliation which would inflame Japanese nationalism, so again in the twentieth century they fired on the gunboats *Panay* and *Ladybird*, undressed Britishers at Tientsin and then arrested others in Tokyo. And just as the shoguns arrested and expelled Christian missionaries in feudal Japan, so their descendants repeated the performance in modern Japan. Missionaries who had secured thousands of dollars from Americans for the improvement of health and education in Japan, suddenly were branded spies disguised under the cloak of religion. They were driven from their positions in various religious institutions as the militarists tore another article from the holy constitution providing for freedom of religion. A government-controlled Japan Christian Association was established to secure "autonomy" for Japanese Christians and to relieve them from "dependency" on Great Britain and the United States. Churches were forbidden to continue accepting financial assistance from the democracies, and missionaries were advised discreetly to leave the country as their services were no longer required. Various denominations in Manchukuo, occupied China and the south sea area were "unified" into one. Even then there remained doubt as to the extent Christianity could be "Japanised spiritually." The samurai disliked the pacifist teachings of Christ, which they felt interfered with their divine mission to conquer foreign

countries. The Salvation Army similarly was liquidated after its Japanese leader had been arrested and accused of being an agent of a British espionage ring operating through the headquarters of the Salvation Army in England. He also was charged with *lèse-majesté* for preaching that Christ was superior to the emperor, thereby damaging the China war effort.

Having crushed the religion of the democracies, Japanese nationalists, acting in close collaboration with the war lords, launched a drive to popularize the primitive cult of their ancestors. Chikao Fujisawa, a member of the Diet, proposed that Shinto again be made a state religion as it once was in the past, the intention of the militarists being to force all Japanese to observe the Shinto cult officially rather than voluntarily. He suggested that Christianity, Buddhism and Moham-medanism be classified as "people's religions" which those so inclined could practice as a side-line to Shinto. To have pressed the issue would have resulted in an open violation of Meiji's constitution. The nationalists therefore limited themselves to undermining foreign religions and "Japanising" them to conform to the samurai bible.

Primitive Shinto rites were revived, however, to teach the Japanese the religious practices of their ancestral gods. Lieutenant-General Heisuke Yanagawa, leader of the Imperial Rule Assistance Association, and General Kuniaki Koiso, arch-nationalist and former Overseas Minister, led a party of fifty loyal subjects

into the mountains of Hakone for purification exercises in the icy waters of the Sukumo River. Rising at 4:30 o'clock in the morning, they worshipped their ancestral gods; and then, clad only in loin cloth, the spirit lovers jumped into the stream. Standing knee-deep in water, they chanted the ancient rites of lustration. "Ay-oh! Ay-oh!" echoed and re-echoed in the mountains as they thrust their hands skyward in the performance of the preliminary rite of Misogi," the press reported. Watching solemnly from the banks of the rivers as the scantily clad figures dipped themselves in the icy waters, just as did the gods of Japan thousands of years ago, were two living members of the divine imperial family, Prince Kanin and his consort. Following a thorough soaking, which came from above as well as below when the heavens answered the ritualists with a torrential downpour, General Koiso told one reporter, "Misogi aims to lead the people to a stage where nothingness prevails, but I don't think I have reached that point yet." Another enthusiast said the river rites had the "wonderful power of making people forget every daily worry, and the minds of the people are made as crystal clear as the waters of the stream." For five days they practiced rites which helped reduce their minds to nothingness, making their headquarters at the Japanese Spirit Training House.

An ardent supporter of the back-to-nothingness movement was Yanagawa's political patron, Baron Hiranuma, who organized a Shinto Rites Inquiry

Council to dig up some of the outstanding primitive practices of the early Japanese gods. Said Hiranuma, "We should study the rites in detail and consider their application in general administrative affairs and the nation's daily life."

Applied to daily life, the Shinto cult called for the sacrifice of all forms of physical pleasure and entertainment. The nationalists turned to the task of eliminating foreign vices, such as American films, jazz singers, bands and records, leg shows and ballroom dancing. Importation of Hollywood films, which won thousands of fans in Japan, was virtually stopped by the government. Instead, newsreels of Japanese soldiers in the holy China war as well as the Nazi film *Victory in the West* became part of the new diet for movie lovers. Propaganda films, announced one official, were "as important as steel-capped bullets." Stage shows were banned and ballrooms closed. Hostesses looked for new jobs either in houses of prostitution or in cafes. Baseball, to which young Japanese took as readily as their generals and admirals to the latest types of American bombers, was denounced as a foreign sport. Athletes were urged to return to the traditional Japanese form of *sumo* wrestling, in which the man with the biggest belly has the advantage in preventing his opponent from throwing him to the ground.

Everything foreign became taboo, including the ap-

pearance of English words over shops and on public signs. In the days of "liberalism," when foreigners helped the Japanese build their railroads, equivalents in the English language of Japanese names of stations had been posted. These were now torn down or concealed. The word Yokohama at the railway station of that principal port of intercourse between Japan and the United States was pasted over by a long strip of white paper. The Japan Tourist Bureau, a government agency which had helped so many Americans learn to praise Japan after they returned to their country, abandoned its English name for a Japanese one meaning "East Asia Travel Corporation," indicating the new direction of the nation's itinerary. Feeling against the use of the English language became such that a group of nationalists petitioned the government spokesman, Koh Ishii, to abandon the use of English at his press conferences with foreign correspondents. Ishii made a diplomatic concession by opening one conference in the Japanese language and having it photographed by sound-recording cameras and then reproduced on the screen to cool the ardor of these nationalists. The use of the English language in public by Japanese marked them as suspicious characters and possible spies in the employ of foreigners. Conversing in English with friends while riding on a train to her summer home, Mrs. Renzo Sawada, wife of the former ambassador to France, was stopped by a plain-

clothes policeman and cross-examined at great length regarding her speech and the purpose of her trip on the train.

The nationalistic movement was not without its humorous side. Before it reached the point where English words were removed from signs, a cranky member of the Diet persuaded the government to adopt its own system of romanization of Japanese words, being opposed to the current one apparently for no better reason than the fact that it was devised by an American, J. C. Hepburn, who contributed a great deal to Japan both as a doctor and a missionary. The N. Y. K. Line therefore was obliged to change the spelling of one of its best ships, the *Chichibu Maru*, to *Titibu Maru*, as under the new official system the sound "chi" was represented by the letters "ti." The new spelling resulted not only in Americans failing to make sailings because they did not recognize the name of the ship when her departure to or from America was announced in the press, but also in arousing a good deal of amusement. Prince Chichibu, brother of the emperor after whom the ship was named, had a good understanding of the English language and was very annoyed by the new spelling. He is understood to have insisted that it be changed. The steamship company squeezed out of a tight situation by renaming the ship *Kamakura Maru*, which was spelled the same way in both the old American and the new nationalistic system.

To alienate Japanese further from foreigners and

their ways, the army launched an anti-espionage campaign. It resulted in the arrest of a large number of Britishers throughout Japan and culminated in the death of the Reuters correspondent. Japanese were exhorted to break their relations with foreigners, while cafe girls and geisha were warned to mind their words in the presence of white clients. Train passengers were told to refrain from speaking to strangers as "there is a possibility of important information entering into the ears of undesirable persons." A Railway Ministry announcement informed passengers that they were forbidden to mention the kinds of minerals and products produced in mines and factories. They also were advised not to measure the length of tunnels and bridges by counting the number of minutes required for trains to pass through or over them.

Having relieved them of their few pleasures and foreign friends, and refilled their minds with pagan rituals of their primitive ancestors, the war lords dressed the Japanese in khaki-colored uniforms and regimented them into a civilian army for work on the home front. While the Imperial Rule Assistance Association failed completely in its attempt to control the nation's economy, which was left in the hands of the business clans after a deal with the militarists, and was no more successful in the political field, which was left in a state of liquidation to the present day, it did provide the war lords and their nationalist supporters with a convenient instrument for beating the war drums

and regimenting men, women and children for the war program. It launched a nation-wide movement for "a new design in life through collectivism" under a new slogan called "Realization of Justice in Life." All participants in the new life were expected to reform themselves by abandoning their illegal dealings on the black market for rice, milk, vegetables and other necessities which they were unable to secure in sufficient quantities and to learn how to get along on a new "national minimum budget." Rather than spend their money for living, they were shown how they could convert it into savings to be used by the militarists for other purposes.

The first day of each month was set aside and called "New Asia Day," an uncheerful holiday when the entire nation was expected to contemplate its serious duties and obligations in assisting the government to achieve the mission of conquering neighboring Asiatic races. To relieve the minds of the people of any anxiety while they were performing their services to the state, police instructed fortune tellers to stop selling pessimistic tales to their clients and to substitute cheerful ones for them. Mothers and fathers had been flocking to the fortune tellers to inquire whether they would see their sons again. Without taking any serious risk of being wrong, the diviners often had said no. Following police advice, however, the answers were yes.

Workers were mobilized into labor service on farms and in war industries to relieve the serious shortage

caused by the sharp increase in the number of men pressed into the army for the attack on Greater East Asia. Officials were stationed at strategic points in Tokyo to coax workers into contributing their spare time to munitions plants, including their three regular holidays each month. A labor service corps consisting of girls who worked in bars and cafes was organized in Yokohama, while Osaka police launched a drive to induce the 100,000 girls working in cafes there to abandon their "irregular and unhealthy lives" and return to the farming districts from where they came to the more healthy amusement of wallowing in the paddy fields.

Students, whose minds already had been regimented in government schools, were organized into compulsory labor and defense corps to serve their war lords at home before being graduated into the army for service on the battlefields abroad. Following their daily military exercises under the direction of army officers, who instructed them in the operation of planes, gliders, big guns, tanks and armored cars as well as the lowly rifle, they were turned out into the streets for air raid drills. As the fashion of studying English declined, the time spent on the study of war increased. During recess periods I frequently saw boys, who could not have been more than twelve years old, being taught by army officers how most effectively to bayonet straw dummies set up on the playground of a primary school between the Imperial Hotel and the Domei Building.

In October, when time for the attack on the democracies drew near, universities and colleges were instructed to graduate their seniors immediately so that the army could have them for more important assignments. The school term for all other students was reduced by three months to make them available for the war machine at home.

There was a place for women as well as for their sons, husbands and brothers in the army machine at home. They too were instructed to abandon foreign ways for the more serious task of preparing for war, in which permanent waves and curls were considered out of place. An American-born Japanese girl who visited her hairdresser for her usual number of five curls in front of her head and fifteen in back was advised one day that the number had been officially fixed. The maximum number permissible was three curls and she was offered one in front and two in back. Girls dressed in expensive-looking clothes or whose lipstick and rouge were too prominent were stopped on the streets of Tokyo by patriotic matrons who handed them printed leaflets chiding them for their lack of patriotism and their failure to be more serious-minded during the emergency.

Samurai fathers thought that the place for the nation's daughters was in the home, where they were urgently needed for producing more babies for the future generation of conquerors and rulers of the great

empire which they were carving. The drain on the nation's manpower for the battlefields had created a shortage not only of labor but of babies as well. While the death rate increased, the birth rate fell from thirteen per thousand population to less than ten. Members of the Diet pointed nervously to the increasing birth rate of China and the Soviet Union. They were equally nervous about the fact that not only was the birth rate decreasing but the number of mentally insane was increasing together with the death rate. While there were only sixty thousand deranged persons in 1926, their ranks had been increased to ninety thousand by 1938. The legislators therefore adopted a National Eugenics Law for compulsory sterilization of the insane but at the same time outlawed birth control. Women no longer will be permitted to engage in "sexual delinquency," it was announced. Thus the Diet furnished not only money for the guns but helped to provide enough future samurai to fire them.

The Japanese government, which had succeeded in touching the tender hearts of numerous Americans at the time of the Manchurian invasion with its sad tales of overpopulation, making it necessary for the crowded Japanese to "expand somewhere or explode," next launched a ten-year program to increase the nation's population to a new explosion point of 100,000,000. This expansion plan, which was almost as ambitious as that of the militarists in conquering the eight corners, would make it necessary for Japanese mothers to turn

out annually about three million baby samurai, or roughly six times their current rate of production. As no female could be spared in this prodigious and patriotic program, all women who were qualified were pressed into service.

"Having babies is fun," announced Mrs. Katsuko Tojo, wife of General Hideki Tojo, one of the three big army dictators of Japan and well experienced in handling babies after they grew up. She and the general, the press was told, raised seven children of their own and influenced the production of two grandchildren. It was true that she scarcely had enough rice to care properly for her big family, but like a true soldier's wife, Mrs. Tojo said she learned to "suffer in silence." And like a true soldier's wife, she had no time for trifling. "During the past twenty years I have not once gone shopping at night stalls or attended a theatrical performance," boasted the mate of the man who took over the reins of the government for the attack on the democracies. She was busy at home tending the baby boys who would be inspired to launch bigger and better attacks than their great father.

Assisted by Mrs. Tojo's press promotion, the government launched a drive to encourage young girls to marry and multiply. Various inducements were offered to lead young women into the bonds of matrimony, and numerous rewards were offered for plentiful procreation. Official agencies were established throughout the country to bring healthy couples together. In one

town trousseaus for the bride and formal dress for the groom were loaned free of charge to those who were kept apart because they could not purchase their own. The government instructed private companies to reward employees who had distinguished themselves in the baby production field by granting special bonuses for each new-born subject of the state. Free higher education was promised for children whose parents had produced at least ten.

But some women did not like the bait which was being extended to their daughters. Unlike the soldier-trained wife of the general, they foresaw greater poverty accompanying greater families, with less for each member as they grew still greater under the official encouragement to step up the baby output six times. After a struggle, some Japanese women had succeeded in breaking away from the oppression of their feudal homes, in which their principal function was to provide their autocratic lords with offspring either for war or for the rice field. They now feared that a warrior-controlled government had undertaken to return them to their medieval homes. There was good reason for fear in a country which was being taken back hundreds of years into the dark days when their ancestral gods jumped into icy streams and shouted Ay-oh! Ay-oh!

CHAPTER NINE

N A T I O N A L G U E S T S

OF ALL the strange things about Japan, one of the most curious is the fact that many foreign residents who learned to love the country also lived to dislike her with varying degrees of bitterness. Many who were enchanted by the land of the cherry blossoms left disenchanted. The longer they lingered, the deeper was their disillusionment. Some Americans, like the enthusiastic writer, Lafcadio Hearn, and the equally warm admirers, Mr. and Mrs. Gorham, grew so attached to Japan that they changed their nationality and became subjects of the emperor. But the former, whose salary as a school teacher was reduced to the pittance of other Japanese after he had abandoned his foreign status, is said to have died deeply disappointed in his adopted country while the latter, who are now cut off from their sons in the United States, lived to see their new

country locked in a death struggle with their old only a few months after they had received their citizenship papers. One who was spared this pain was Frank Hedges, veteran American news correspondent of long service in Japan, who passed away in Tokyo in 1940 with sinking hope for the future of the two countries to which he was so devoted.

Still more curious is the fact that some of the reasons for the foreigners' attraction to the Japanese were the same reasons which later caused their ardor to cool, although foreigners themselves were not often aware of it. Almost everyone who has lived in the lovely land of the Japanese has been struck by their courtesy and respect. But the same courtesy and respect which they showed to the foreigner they displayed to a much greater degree to their rulers, so much so that when the time came for them to be discourteous and disrespectful, the foreigner was even more impressed than before. The same holds true for their admirable qualities of gentleness and docility, which are found especially in Japanese women. But had the Japanese been less gentle and less docile they would not have been led so easily into a situation in which their cruelty and stubbornness were displayed so prominently. And had they been less obedient to their foreign employers they might also have been less willing to lay down their lives for their emperor in a future war against these same foreigners. It is not inconceivable that the young Japanese who was so obedient to the foreigner in Tokyo

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in 1941 might meet him on the field of battle in no-man's-land in 1942 because he was even more obedient to his war lords. In themselves these various qualities may be admirable, but in the Japanese they can become deadly as they are unsupported in most cases by an intelligence capable of applying them discriminately. They are based on a feudal mind and a feudal culture, which were some of the chief reasons why foreigners were able to live so comfortably and cheaply in Japan, like so many lords, and why they later lived to be disillusioned.

Among other qualities of the Japanese, for which perhaps they have not been given sufficient credit, are their unmatched industriousness, their keen powers of observation, their precocity and their great capacity for appreciating and absorbing foreign ideas, especially of a practical and materialistic nature—Prince Konoye's attack on "materialism" notwithstanding. While the foreigner justly admired the courtesy, good manners, kindness, cleanliness and hospitality of many Japanese, the latter were busy relieving him of all his Western secrets. Basil Hall Chamberlain, one of the most brilliant students of Japan, observed that the Japanese employed numerous foreigners immediately after the revolution of 1867 to teach them their wonderful discoveries in science. Good salaries were offered, and numerous foreigners seized the opportunity to visit the strange and romantic land of Japan—to the great misfortune of their sons and grandsons later.

The Japanese often have been criticized cynically for their "imitation" of foreigners, but it was a tribute to their keen foresight, as it was to a lack of it on the part of the foreigner, that the Japanese sought and were granted the scientific knowledge of the West, which it would have taken them years to develop by themselves, if they ever succeeded at all. When Japan was reopened to the world following Commodore Perry's visit, she was a feudal country in organization and technique as well as in spirit. Could any foreigner suggest a speedier way of bridging more than two centuries of progress between the East and the West than to have the foreigner himself deliver the products of this progress and teach the Japanese how to use them?

Lieutenant A. G. Hawes, an Englishman, transformed the Japanese junks into a modern navy, records Chamberlain. The French created the Yokosuka dockyard, one of the principal bases of the fleet which later cowed the French into surrendering Indo-China. The French were the first to teach the Japanese how to organize a modern army, for which the former can hardly be thankful today. Later, when the Japanese had learned to judge the relative merits of foreign armies, they replaced their French instructors with German ones, which was not altogether an unwise decision in the light of subsequent military events in France.

The French also introduced civilized law into Japan, which she later learned to ignore when it suited her

purposes. It was the French, again, who insisted that the Japanese abandon their methods of torturing Japanese, and here again the Japanese reasserted their originality by torturing not only Frenchmen but also Britishers and Americans, whose predecessors introduced into a samurai country a modern educational system, post offices, telegraph, railways, water-works, harbor works and numerous modern industrial methods, all at the request of the Japanese government. Later, after Americans had invented and developed the airplane, they came to Japan to teach the new art. Up to as late as the summer of 1940, the Douglas and Lockheed aircraft companies had their representatives in Tokyo teaching the Japanese how to build modern planes. In the first months of 1940, five Americans were sent to Japan with a giant Douglas experimental plane which cost thousands of dollars to develop and which was sold to Japan for a small fraction of the amount. Oil, industrial and other companies similarly supplied the Japanese with products and agents.

Japanese strength, whatever it may be, does not lie hidden in some darkly concealed mystery or even in "state secrets" but in Japan's capacity to appreciate and develop blueprints, models and materials supplied to a large extent by the democracies, whose blindness and stupidity in turning them over to a country which they had no logical reason to trust was matched only by their generosity in doing so. To refuse to recognize this fact, which is as important for the future as it has

been for the past, is to continue to be blind to it. I could recite here the well-known figures of Japan's industrial development as well as those which are not so well known because they are Japanese "state secrets," such as the highly reliable estimate that Japan's iron and steel production in 1941 was roughly 7,500,000 tons while her aircraft industries were tooled up to a production of about 10,000 planes annually, but their significance fades to a shadow in comparison with the bristling fact that the West had supplied the Japanese with the art and the machines required for turning them out.

In her general industrial and cultural relations with foreign countries as well as in her diplomacy, perhaps no nation has given so little and taken so much as Japan. And perhaps no other country has shown a greater capacity for ingratitude as well as kindness to those who not only offered their services but competed with each other in supplying them.

The beautiful, pine-covered little islands of feudal Japan first became known to the world in the middle of the sixteenth century, when Portuguese adventurers discovered them. St. Francis Xavier visited Japan for twenty-six months and his work in converting her to Christianity was continued by numerous other missionaries. The Japanese then closed their country in the first part of the seventeenth century after expelling or exterminating the foreigners, including their Christian converters. In the long period of isolation

which followed, the Japanese digested the new ideas and tools which the Portuguese and later the Spanish had brought to them. They continued to import and to study foreign materials and methods, however, through a colony of Dutch traders who were established and isolated on the island of Deshima, which is part of Nagasaki, at the western tip of Japan.

Following the arrival of Perry in the nineteenth century, Japan once more was opened to the outside world, and foreigners bringing new ideas and inventions were welcomed with open arms. During this period, in which Anglo-Saxon influence was dominant, the Japanese won numerous American and British friends, who became so attached to the little islands and their little people that they unhappily were incapable of taking them very seriously. The reactions of Pierre Loti, who wrote of the Japanese in a steady flow of diminutives colored by adjectives suggesting the exotic and the grotesque, were inherited and retained down to the present day not only by foreign visitors but by numerous foreign officials and news correspondents whose work in Japan can hardly stand to their credit today.

The great Basil Hall Chamberlain, an ailing English scholar, whose writings no one can read understandingly without a deep sense of appreciation and thankfulness, arrived in Japan in 1873, almost immediately after the Meiji revolution, to witness the amazing drama of the sowing and flowering of West-

ern culture and science in a still feudal Japan. But before Chamberlain left Japan in 1905, to die subsequently in Geneva in 1935 with apprehensions about the country which he loved so much, he observed a change in Japan which later led to deceit and violence in the most brutal forms of which the Japanese are capable. For the first few years, he wrote in his classical book called *Things Japanese*, "foreign" and "good" were synonymous terms in Japan. He then relates a development which is worth quoting in full because it sounds almost exactly as if it had been written about events which occurred in 1940 and 1941 :

"This state of things passed away suddenly in 1887. The feeling now is, 'Japan for the Japanese, and let it be a Japanese Japan.' Foreign employees have been dismissed and replaced by natives. In the Diet—it was in the Upper House, too—the metrical system of weights and measures was opposed on the ground that the introduction of a foreign standard would be a blot on the national escutcheon. The Tokyo Chamber of Commerce, too, resolved that the Roman nomenclature theretofore used on the silver and copper pieces should be dropped from the new coinage. Not only has the national costume come back again to a considerable extent, and interest in the native pastimes and the national antiquities been revived:—the peculiar feature of the present situation is that Japanese are determined to beat us on our own ground and with our own weapons. Japan is to engross the trade of the Pacific and to

be the leader of Asia in modern warfare and diplomacy."

He then goes on to tell how the Japanese, having learned a little, thought they knew so much that they set about teaching their teachers how to improve on their new knowledge. Some Japanese set for themselves the task of remodeling philosophy. Others explained Japan's special fitness for originating new views on international law (how special and new they were our generation has seen). Foreign missionaries were abandoned as old-fashioned and their fresh converts set about developing a "superior theology" of their own. "Furthermore," continues the writer, "it has been discovered that courage, patriotism, and loyalty are specifically Japanese virtues, or that—at the least—Japanese courage, Japanese loyalty and Japanese patriotism glow with an incomparably brighter radiance than the qualities called by those same names in inferior countries—England, for instance, France, Germany, or America."

The venerable Chamberlain concluded with an apology evoked possibly as much by a sense of nervousness about the future as by his great affection for the Japanese: "Japan is a young nation,—at least a rejuvenated nation,—and youth will be self-confident. The greybeards must not wish it otherwise." Still later, as he grew more feeble with age, he wrote of the early twentieth century: "If it is true that the last thirty years have witnessed a cooling towards Europeanism,

this has been a matter of sentiment only, a return from cosmopolitanism to nationalism in matters of minor importance, and has affected nothing practical by so much as a hair's breadth. Inquisitive persons from home, who remember the Stuarts and the French Legitimists and Don Carlos, sometimes ask whether there may not be a Japanese reaction in favour of feudalism. No! never,—not till the sun stops shining and the water begins to flow uphill." Chamberlain's genius and his scholarship entitled him to be spared the pain of living to see these things come true. Having given so much and lived so close to Japan, it was only natural that his defense of her should have increased in vigor together with questions he may have had in his mind as to its soundness.

But many of us in Japan did see the sun stop shining in 1941. It had been in eclipse at frequent intervals before. Foreigners were arrested and assaulted not only in prisons but on the streets. Rocks were thrown at the British Embassy in Tokyo while clothes were removed from British subjects at Tientsin. Dung was smeared over the white walls around the American Embassy on at least two occasions, and police finally strengthened their force there. Americans and Britishers were hunted and haunted by Japanese as well as foreign spies. There is more than kindness and courtesy in the Japanese character. There is also cruelty and violence and unbridled nationalism.

Immediately after the fall of France, when Konoye

announced a "new order" at home, sixteen Britishers in principal cities of Japan were arrested by military police. Mention already has been made of the death of the Reuters correspondent which followed. There are numerous precedents to lend support to the charge that Japanese police had returned to their methods of torturing prisoners after they had promised the Frenchman who codified their modern laws in 1875 that they would abandon them. In 1934, a New Zealander named Bickerton, who was teaching in a Tokyo school, was arrested, held incommunicado for ten days and in a foul, overcrowded prison cell, filled with some of Tokyo's numerous insane, was cross-examined and tortured for twenty-four days. After he finally was permitted to leave the country, Bickerton published an account of his experience in the *Manchester Guardian*. He told how he was beaten with a baseball bat, kicked and punched by semi-crazed policemen, who finally banged his head repeatedly against a cupboard. It is not impossible that similarly courteous and kind treatment at the hands of police led James Cox, the Reuters man, to prefer death by jumping from a window of his cell in 1940.

The use of violence against foreigners was by no means the exclusive right of police. Japanese nationalists felt they also were entitled to participate in the pleasures of patriotism. In February, 1941, when agitation for the attack in the south continued to mount, Count de Tascher, commercial attaché of the French

Embassy in Tokyo, was thrown to the ground by the driver of a taxi in which he had been riding and beaten until he was almost unconscious. Not desiring to monopolize all the fun, the driver called a group of fellow patriots who were standing nearby, and while he hammered at de Tascher's body with an iron tool from the taxi, his friends kicked the wounded diplomat in his stomach and face, leaving him bleeding and senseless on the concrete pavement of the pier at Kobe, where the Frenchman had just arrived from Shanghai on the American liner *President Coolidge*.

The entire foreign diplomatic corps, and especially its dean, American Ambassador Joseph C. Grew, was outraged by the brutality of the attack on a colleague who was entitled to diplomatic immunity. On behalf of all foreign diplomats with the exception of the German, Ambassador Grew lodged a protest denouncing not only the attack itself but the negligence of Japanese officials in taking proper action after they had been informed of it. The note, handed to Foreign Minister Matsuoka as he was preparing to leave for Europe, pointed out that after the cab driver carried the diplomat to the Kobe customs station, Japanese officials, in their typically slow-witted and methodical manner, left him groaning for help while they went into a long-winded discussion with the driver about what had happened. After that, the Frenchman was taken to a police station, where the driver repeated his cooked-up story of how the foreigner had insulted the

Japanese. Roughly an hour was consumed in this form of cruelty before de Tascher was taken to a hospital, and even there Japanese at first refused to call the French consul in Kobe to assist his wounded countryman and to secure the kind of medical care he needed. Following the protest delivered by Grew, Japanese officials made a pretense at punishing the patriots, but like their fellow patriots who murdered moderate-minded Japanese statesmen, they were hailed as heroes and let loose for further deeds. The reason for the Italian Ambassador's readiness to support the diplomatic protest while his Nazi colleague refused was that the wife of an Italian diplomat had been soundly slapped and abused on a railway train by another patriot, the Japanese unfortunately being unable to distinguish white allies from white enemies.

Other instances of Japanese hospitality were of a less violent nature, not without their humorous side. Another Britisher, one of the leading foreign businessmen of the country, who contributed not a little to the present industrial strength of Japan, was repaid for his enterprise by being arrested in Kobe. According to a story circulated in Tokyo, police found a sheet of paper in the desk of his office on which were written a number of suspicious-looking notations. They were something to the following effect: K. 1, Y. O., slip 1, K. 1, P. S. S. O., P. 1, K. 1. When confronted with them for an explanation, the Britisher was at a complete loss. He claimed that he had never seen the paper

before. This only served to confirm police suspicion of a secret code. A request that he be permitted to communicate with his wife, who might know something about it, was denied. Finally, after long and exasperating questioning and cross-questioning, of which the Japanese police never tire, they agreed to summon the businessman's wife. She explained that the notations represented a new knitting stitch which her daughter had copied and inadvertently left in her father's desk. The code above means: knit one, yarn over, slip one stitch, knit one, pass slip stitch over, purl one, knit one.

Good-natured Joe Dynan, assistant to his equally good-natured chief of the Associated Press bureau, Max Hill, failed to return to Tokyo from a visit to Yokohama one night. He turned up the next morning, unshaven and bleary-eyed, late for breakfast, which we usually had in my rooms of the apartment house in which we both lived. Then Joe told his story, which I suggested that he wire to New York but which he with good reason thought was better left unwired in view of the increasingly vulnerable position in which American correspondents found themselves as the end of a chapter in Japanese history drew to a close. Catching the last train out of Yokohama, he discovered when he reached Shinagawa Station, about half-way to Tokyo, that the train ran no farther, and that there were no others. Joe therefore left the station to look for an inn or a hotel, observing at the same time that some of the tracks were filled with troop trains. This

was during the summer of 1941 after the Japanese had started full-scale mobilization for the attack in the south. He had not been looking around very long in the dark streets near the station in search of a place to spend the night before he ran into a policeman. For Japanese, it was a perfect case of espionage, for which they had an insatiable appetite at that time. Here was a foreigner, about one o'clock in the morning, prowling around a railroad station in an obscure suburban area at a time when the army was moving troops. Joe was marched promptly off to the police station, where he was questioned for hours. He spent a rather miserable night trying to understand the Japanese questions of the policemen and then replying in a language which they understood no better. Finally, after they had gone over his credentials time and again and had been satisfied that he had only been with friends in Yokohama and got off at Shinagawa simply because he could ride no farther, they released him.

Other stories of the heavy atmosphere of suspicion in which foreigners moved apprehensively during the last few months of peace between Japan and America are too numerous to relate, but a few typical ones might be mentioned. The maid of one American housewife came crying to her one day that she was afraid she would be taken to prison because she had lost an important notebook. Further questioning disclosed that the notebook contained a daily record of activities of her foreign employers, which she was obliged to turn

over to the police at regular periods during the week. The day had arrived for her to deliver her report and she could not find the book. It finally was traced to the laundry, where it was found in the pocket of her apron. The maid thanked her mistress gratefully for her assistance, dried the wet leaves of the notebook and went out to make her report, leaving everyone in the household with peace of mind after the brief turmoil. Not long afterward, however, this same housewife, whose husband was an agent of the American President Lines, considered by Japanese an official American organization and therefore worthy of close inspection, returned home to find a man on his hands and knees in the living room looking for something under her furniture. He blushed deeply on being discovered, said he was in a great hurry and politely bowed himself out of the house. The maid explained that he was the gas man. By this time foreigners had learned enough about Japanese manners and diplomacy not to point out such embarrassing and trifling matters as the fact that there was no gas outlet in the living room.

Almost every American and Britisher who held positions which the Japanese considered important had visits from the secret police. An engineer of Lockheed aircraft reported that his room in the Imperial Hotel was searched almost daily and the lock of one of his leather bags broken. He too once took a detective by surprise when he walked into his room at a time when he was not expected. Again there was the usual blush-

ing and apologies as the officer explained he had mistakenly entered the wrong room. Other airplane engineers said that letters received from their offices in California had been opened, although they contained only instructions to be turned over to the Japanese. In my own case, the police and I engaged in the innocent sport of spying on each other. There seemed to be one folder in which they were particularly interested. It contained clippings of editorials I wrote for the *Japan Advertiser* and notes of personal observations. In the morning I would place the folder in one position on my desk and tie the string around it with a double knot. In the evening it would be in another position and tied with a bow. This went on regularly with all possible variations of positions and knots.

Hal Schlieder, another American who lingered almost until the end, had an early call from the police one morning at the Tokyo Station Hotel, where he lived with his wife. They wanted to know what he was doing every morning at about seven o'clock with an instrument in front of his window facing toward the Imperial Palace. Schlieder was rather dumbfounded for a moment and then remembered. He plugged in his electric razor and demonstrated how he shaved each morning in front of a mirror near the window. The explanation satisfied the police, who apparently had suspected him of aiming a long-range camera or gun toward the emperor's residence.

The great exodus from Japan of Americans and

Britishers began in October, 1940, when the State Department in Washington issued its first warning advising Americans to leave the Far East. During a period of almost exactly one year from that time until October, 1941, when the Japanese government sent its last three evacuation ships to the United States to repatriate its nationals, there was enacted the final scene of the chapter in Japanese history which began with the arrival of Commodore Perry in 1853. It marked the final withdrawal of Anglo-American influence which had been dominant in Japan for eighty-eight years. Those of us who were in Japan at the time witnessed the end of a dramatic period which Chamberlain saw begin. It was a human drama of tragedy on a scale greater than any which had ever taken place before in the Far East, which is as full of sorrow as it is of splendor. Like most great human tragedies, it ended in death.

Following the State Department warning, members of the American community, which, with the exception of the Chinese, was the largest foreign one in Japan, numbering roughly 2,500, withdrew in an ever-increasing stream, finally leaving a small shrunken group of about three hundred to hold their ground to the very end, isolated among hostile natives on the beautiful islands of Japan and cut off from the rest of the world.

Symbolically enough, it was during that same month of October, 1940, that the only American newspaper

in Japan was extinguished. I had worked continuously on the *Japan Advertiser* for almost three years, and together with a handful of other Americans I was with it to the very end, when it was taken over by the Japanese conquerors. The death of a newspaper anywhere is, for its staff, almost like the death of a member of one's family. But the end of the *Japan Advertiser* was of greater significance than that of most newspapers because it marked the end of an age and the end of a long period of peace in the Pacific. It was therefore with more than the usual strain on the sentiments of newspapermen that we saw the Japanese enter our office to take over after we had put our last newspaper to bed. I remember Don Brown, of Philadelphia, our extremely capable news editor, behind his big desk in the middle of our heavily littered and abused news room on the third floor of the *Advertiser* building, which was near the Imperial Hotel and faced elevated railroad tracks. His desk was usually piled high with newspapers like a barricade, but on this last day it had been stripped clean, as it sometimes was on special occasions. To him perhaps the loss of the *Advertiser* was a heavier blow than to the rest of us in the news room, for he had devoted so many uninterrupted years and so many long hours to the paper, which, according to others, was one of the best, if not the best English-language newspaper in the Far East, having friends throughout the world.

Directly in front of Brown sat Newton Edgars, of

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Seattle, who also spent many years with the *Advertiser* and the best part of his life in Japan. Across from him was Richard Fujii, an American-born Japanese of Honolulu. Al Downs, a rolling, rollicking Montanan faced Fujii, next to whom was Dick Tenelly, of Washington, D.C. I sat behind Tenelly, and Jim Tew, of Florida, was at my side. Behind us, partly obscured by our hanging newspaper file, was Thelma Hecht, of Hollywood, our society editor. Together with Ray Cromley, who handled the business page from another room, and Wilfrid Fleisher, our managing editor who wrote editorials, these were the members of the small group which turned out the *Japan Advertiser* during its last days. We could not have done so, however, without the help of a loyal (because of Japanese pressure against them to desert us) group of about five Japanese translators and two American-born Japanese proof-readers, one of whom was Roy Saiki, a kind-hearted and true American. Both the translators and proof-readers worked in the main news room with us. On the ground floor were the printers and linotype operators, who performed the unusual feat of setting type without a knowledge of the English language.

As the *Advertiser* was a morning paper, we usually finished our work between midnight and one o'clock, but on the last day we put the paper away early in the evening. As the Japanese moved in, we collected a few private papers and books, took a last glance at the dreary dilapidated news room, and then, with a hard

lump in the throat and a good deal of forced wise-cracking, walked out of the room, down two rickety flights of stairs, and out of our building forever. Painted on the sliding, Japanese-style glass windows of the printing room facing the street were the familiar Japanese characters which spelled the name of our paper: ah-du-va-ti-zah.

If the death of the paper was a deep personal loss to every member of its staff, including Clarence Davies and Al Pinder of the advertising department, it was an incomparably greater one to B. W. Fleisher, that grand old man who spent half a century and most of his life building up the *Advertiser* to what it was from nothing more than a small four-page sheet which he purchased soon after he arrived in Japan. To his wife, the late Mrs. Fleisher, and to their son, Wilfrid, it also was a great blow. To the foreign community of Japan, which the *Advertiser* served for almost fifty years, it meant the end of free journalism and free thinking in that country.

After the virtual seizure of the *Advertiser* by the Japanese, whose use of censorship and threats made its continued publication as an independent American newspaper impossible, the American community in Japan disintegrated quickly. Most of the foreign members of the *Advertiser* staff returned to the United States the following month, leaving Tenelly, who became Tokyo correspondent of the National Broadcasting Company and Reuters; Downs, who worked for

International News Service; Cromley, who remained as representative of the *Wall Street Journal*; while I succeeded Fleisher as *Herald Tribune* correspondent. I went down to Yokohama to see the first and largest group off on the *Yawata Maru*, whose departure marked the beginning of a series of unhappy sailings which evacuated the American community from Japan. A large number of foreigners and Japanese boarded the ship to pay a last farewell and tribute to the publisher of the last free newspaper of Japan. There was an air of tension in the cabin in which B.W., as he was known, sat in his wheel-chair, a cripple by the loss of one of his legs. The white-haired but rugged old man, who is more than seventy, was as cheerful and unperturbed as if he were only leaving for one of his annual trips to America. Less cheerful were his Japanese friends and associates, who bowed low and deeply again and again and again, knowing it was for the last time. And then, when the last gong sounded, they broke away in a final series of bows, only to break into muffled sobs as they hurried through the corridors to leave the ship.

The sailing of the *Yawata*, besides its symbolic international significance of which everyone at the pier was keenly if silently aware, involved a deep personal loss for me. She took with her my friend, Jim Tew. I had a painful foreboding when I left him that I would never see him again. I knew he was going to join the Royal Air Force. Shortly before I began writing this

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chapter and after the one describing our trip to China had been sent to the printers, I read the press report that Jim had been killed in action over Malta. Jim could not wait for the United States to awaken from her lethargy and become fully aware of the menace confronting her from both the East and the West. He felt that time was short for free people and that he had better do what he could as a flier before it was too late. His is the stuff of which a new America may be built to win the victories to bury the old one, which we both agreed was too stupid to retain its own.

It was with a heavy heart that Dick Tenelly and I left the N.Y.K. pier in Yokohama to return to a cheerless Tokyo to witness the final outcome of the implications involved in the departure of Americans from Japan on the *Yawata Maru*.

CHAPTER TEN

T H E B A L L S T A R T S R O L L I N G

THE departure of Americans made the Japanese government as well as the people uneasy. For the first time in almost ten years since the Japanese launched their program of conquering Asia in earnest in 1931, the American government did something which made it appear that perhaps it was not bluffing altogether about the Far East. Hitherto it had limited itself to official expressions of indignation and to protests against attacks on American property and nationals in China. These were respectfully noted and filed by the Japanese Foreign Office with hundreds of others. As long as the American government went on talking and protesting about violations of the nine-power pact and similar "legalistic" documents, the Japanese felt that everything was going smoothly, and the army could go on bombing American property and slapping Ameri-

can nationals in China at its convenience. It was to be expected that the "emotional" Americans would be a bit upset, but it was thought that after a time they would learn to adjust themselves to their upset situation in the Far East.

Denunciation by the United States of its trade treaty with Japan in the summer of 1939 was carrying things a bit far, but even this, the Japanese felt, was largely a matter of "sentiment" rather than determination. This view was confirmed by the failure of the United States to do anything after the treaty formally expired in January, 1940, and the Foreign Minister assured the Diet that everything was very much the same as before. The Americans had the satisfaction of feeling they had done something by terminating their trade treaty, and the Japanese had the satisfaction of knowing that they could go on buying more war materials from the United States than before. During the first month in which the trade treaty expired and the nine months which followed, the value of all American exports to Japan increased by twelve million dollars over that for the same period in 1939. The value of shipments of steel products rose by the same amount, amply compensating the Japanese for the ten million dollar decrease in scrap purchases. Their imports of petroleum, machine tools and copper all increased. On the whole the Japanese were satisfied with the good behavior of the American government following expiration of the trade treaty and thought it wise to con-

ceal their pleasure behind a barrage of complaints about "economic pressure." This fitted in nicely with the general policy of Japanese official spokesmen to support the isolationists and their confused friends in Washington by warning them of the danger of provoking Japan, thereby fortifying obstruction to the one American they really feared, President Roosevelt.

But when the State Department, instead of talking only to the Japanese government, began talking to American nationals as well and advising them to leave the Far East, then for the first time did the business clans and the militarists really become uneasy about Washington's good intentions. It looked very much as if the United States were clearing the decks for possible economic action, which would disrupt the Cabinet Planning Board's war production program. The Foreign Office, therefore, had to do something more than simply continue filing American protests. There were two ways to attack American "truculence." One was to break it down by sending a fire-eating ambassador to Washington who would make the hair of isolationists stand on end with threats of applying the freshly concluded tripartite pact and of joining the Axis in the war against the democracies. That was the first intention of Foreign Minister Matsuoka, who together with Premier Konoye, already had issued statements to the press warning the United States that Japan meant business and would go to war if Washington did not behave.

The alternative to this was to select a "moderate" ambassador who had the respect of the American government and who would attempt to check its hostility by undertaking negotiations for a settlement of the Far Eastern crisis. This was the choice of the business groups, which had a better appreciation of American psychology than did Matsuoka, despite his long residence in the United States. They realized that the appointment of a pro-Axis firebrand like Toshio Shiratori, Matsuoka's chief adviser in the Foreign Office, would only provoke the United States to stronger action against Japan. Working through their friends in the army, a number of businessmen, including Amherst-educated Count Kabayama, who genuinely hoped for some kind of an understanding with the United States, persuaded the militarists to have a "moderate" diplomat sent to Washington. Mild-mannered, pleasant Admiral Kichisaburo Nomura was suggested.

It is unfortunate that the word "moderate" applied to Japanese diplomats was not accompanied by the word "meaningless" when published in the United States. It is true that there were still many of the old-school "moderates" left in Japan during the last decade, but their political influence was liquidated, even if they themselves were not, together with that of numerous other "moderates" who had been assassinated by the nationalists and militarists. Many of those who were left could be seen almost every day at the Tokyo Club, an impressive monument to the British domi-

nance which had disappeared in Japan. The respectability of the club, of which I was a member, fell into disrepute with the police, who considered it one of Tokyo's innumerable spy centers because it was there that many foreign diplomats and old-time Japanese "liberals" would meet for a beer or a round of snooker, an English game of billiards played on a table so large that it gives the American an impression of a football field. Nevertheless, men like Hachiro Arita and Admiral Nomura, both former foreign ministers, Renzo Sawada, former ambassador to France, Count Kabayama, member of the House of Peers and known as a "friend of America," Juji Kasai, member of the House of Representatives and also considered "pro-American," visited the club regularly. Their influence in the new military state of Japan, however, was negligible. They were ghosts of an old Japan which no longer existed, and it did not take me long to realize that the views which they expressed about the Japan of 1941 were sometimes more misleading than enlightening.

Therefore it was not without significance that the army agreed to the selection of another "Tokyo Club man" as ambassador to the United States to succeed Kensuke Horinouchi. If officials of the American government could find comfort in the appointment of a man whose views were similar to those of the "ghosts" or "has-beens," as they were commonly referred to, the militarists were perfectly willing to provide him. Both the businessmen who selected the new ambassa-

dor and the "moderates" with whom he associated were frequently used by the militarists to camouflage or apologize for their aggression. Nomura understood that very well, having had a taste of army deceit while he was foreign minister, when he was authorized to promise Ambassador Grew that the lower regions of the Yangtze River would be reopened to foreign trade, only to be let down later when an immediate reciprocal display of "goodwill" by the United States toward the army's aggression in China failed to materialize. Nomura therefore declined the offer to become ambassador to Washington. Prodded by the army, Matsuoka pressed Nomura a second time to take the job, but the sturdy Admiral held his ground. A third attempt failed also. Finally, as a result of constant appeals by his business friends and other members of the Tokyo Club, Nomura agreed on condition that both the army and navy provide him with adequate assurances that they would support his efforts to reach an understanding with the United States.

The basis of the proposed understanding, inspired largely by the business groups, was that Japan would invite the United States to share in the exploitation of China under a new version of the principle of the "open door," through which the United States would pass to the banquet table as the guest of Japan. Great Britain and France, both of whom were now considered defeated powers and therefore held in equal contempt by the Japanese militarists, would be largely ex-

cluded. The United States was to provide the capital for the reconstruction of a China which had been destroyed by the Japanese warlords, and Japan was to provide a guarantee for profitable returns besides the brain power required to secure them. Except that it was on a much grander scale, covering as it did all of China, the plan was not unlike one advanced earlier by Yoshisuke Aikawa, the army-sponsored industrial tycoon of Manchukuo, who frequently attempted to secure American capital for development of that puppet state's resources.

Joint collaboration between Japanese and American businessmen in the exploitation of China was not without precedent. The late Elbert Gary, head of the United States Steel Corporation, which is connected with the House of Morgan, was quoted as having said, on his return to the United States following a trip to Japan during the first world war, that it would be much safer to lend money directly to the Japanese rather than to the Chinese for the development of China's resources. This view was neatly turned by Marquis Okuma, former Premier of Japan and noted for his successful browbeating of the Chinese, who said that what China needed was American money and Japanese brains, according to A. Morgan Young, former editor of the *Japan Chronicle*, whose observations on modern Japan were so keen that the Japanese refused to permit him to re-enter the country after a visit to England. After the world war was over, Thomas

W. Lamont, a close associate of J. P. Morgan and also connected with the United States Steel Corporation as well as with the Guaranty Trust Company, visited Tokyo to organize a China Consortium, which was to monopolize loans to China and see that the money was not wasted on Chinese warlords or new civil wars. Another visitor at that time was the late Frank A. Vanderbilt, head of the National City Bank of New York. The aim of the Consortium was to finance the revival of China. Although it did not succeed because it was boycotted by the Chinese, the Japanese nevertheless gained a closer association with American businessmen.

It was on the basis of these relationships, especially those arising from connections of the Japan Iron Manufacturing Company, the leading iron and steel producer of Japan, and of other steel producers, with the House of Morgan, United States Steel, Bethlehem Steel and Republic Steel, to name only a few, that Japanese businessmen hoped to establish a new financial arrangement for China which would facilitate an agreement between the governments of Japan and the United States. An attempt to lay the groundwork for an understanding between Japanese and American businessmen had been going on for some time. It is to the credit of Thomas Lamont's foresight that he refused to have anything to do with it. In a letter which he sent to Japan in reply to one sounding out his views, Lamont condemned the program of conquest on which

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the Japanese militarists had embarked in 1937. The Japanese did not give up hope, however, and in 1939 Count Kabayama, who was indirectly connected with the government-controlled Japan Iron Manufacturing Company, arrived in the United States on a goodwill mission to establish in Rockefeller Center the Japan Institute, a branch of the Society for International Cultural Relations, of which Kabayama was the head. The most important part of his mission, however, was to sound out American businessmen again about the program of joint American-Japanese development of China. An arrangement was made for him to see Lamont, but the latter was no more interested than before. Kabayama returned to Tokyo after his mission had failed.

The work of securing the interest of American business, however, was continued by Fuji Fujisawa (or Huzi Huzisawa, according to the new nationalistic spelling which he used), who was sent in 1938 to New York, where he established an office in the Trinity Building as the central purchasing agent for all scrap iron imported by Japan from the United States. Instead of competing against each other and thereby sending up the price of scrap iron on the American market, the various iron and steel importers of Japan, including Mitsui and Mitsubishi, very sensibly decided to appoint a single purchaser of their scrap who would let American sellers compete against each other and thereby keep the price of scrap at its lowest level.

Fujisawa, a very likeable Japanese businessman whom I saw after his return to Japan in 1940 because of the illness of his wife, was given the job of negotiating financial agreements with American steel companies as well as purchasing scrap, which was a relatively simple matter and left largely in the hands of a young Japanese assistant who had studied at Columbia University. His biggest undertaking was a large loan with a New York bank for the purchase of supplies from the Bethlehem Steel Corporation. Negotiations with the bank had been making such satisfactory progress in the winter of 1939 that the Tokyo businessmen whom Fujisawa was representing were almost certain that they would be concluded. At the last moment, however, it was understood that Bethlehem Steel refused to go through with the deal, and the Japanese suspected interference by the American government, which already had denounced its trade treaty with Japan. At about the time the trade treaty expired in January, 1940, Fujisawa succeeded, however, in concluding a deal with another leading American steel company, which agreed to sell one million dollars' worth of steel to Japan, half for cash and the other half on credit.

Encouraged by the interest still shown by some American businessmen, the Japanese decided to try still again. And that is where Admiral Nomura comes in. While stationed in Washington as a young naval officer, Nomura had met President Roosevelt and was

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even described in the press as a "friend" of his. Being a navy man, Nomura also made a number of friends among American naval officers, who in the course of time had risen to high positions in the American navy just as Nomura did in the Japanese navy. The Japanese felt that if they could secure the sympathetic understanding of the President and of the navy, which they considered responsible to a large extent for the stiffening attitude of the American government toward Japan, it might become possible to reach an agreement on the basis of a new business arrangement over China. Nomura was considered the ideal man for dealing with the President and the American navy because of his previous relations with them. Furthermore he was assured as friendly a reception by the American public as any Japanese could secure at the time because of his reputation as a "moderate" and because of his affable and good-natured personality. Count Kabayama was to join him later in Washington to continue his work of securing the support of American businessmen.

If an agreement could be reached on China, the rest was considered easy sailing. The United States would offer its good offices for a general settlement of the Sino-Japanese war, and both China and the United States would recognize the puppet state of Manchukuo as well as a certain "special position" for Japan in China. In exchange, the Japanese government would provide assurances against the use of force in the south or anywhere else, thereby abandoning the tripartite

pact in spirit if not in form and giving the United States a free hand to assist Britain in overthrowing Japan's European allies.

It was realized that the American government would not be interested in any discussion with the Japanese government unless adequate assurances could be secured which would guarantee observance of any possible agreement by the Japanese militarists. Nomura was very skeptical about being able to secure them and therefore at first declined to go to Washington for reasons already mentioned. The army and navy, which were in a difficult position at the end of 1940, being caught between the tripartite pact and Germany's failure to invade England, and which had a new scheme up their sleeves, promised Nomura that they would support his mission faithfully. The warlords were always prepared to provide assurances. These cost nothing and almost always brought valuable returns. Just as they had assured Konoye that they would support his idealistic program of establishing a totalitarian state if he would agree to become premier, so they now promised Nomura that they would back his efforts to reach an understanding with the United States if he would go to Washington. Nomura was not as worried about the navy as he was about the army. Therefore in December, 1940, before leaving for Washington, he visited China to secure assurances directly from Japanese generals in the field. To prove its sincerity further, the army appointed a special representative

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to support Nomura in Washington. He was Colonel Hideo Iwakuro, a member of the army general staff and known as one of the leaders of the young extremist officers primarily responsible for recent Japanese aggression.

I had several talks with Nomura before he sailed for the United States. We had a long discussion about the American-Japanese situation at the Tokyo Club shortly before he was formally appointed ambassador in November, 1940. I already knew the purpose of his appointment and was interested principally in knowing the nature of the assurances he had secured from the army and navy. These he refused to disclose. The general impression I gathered from his remarks was that he was not very optimistic about his chances of succeeding in Washington. He referred to his task as an "unpleasant" one, which I know he was strongly opposed to undertaking and did so only because of such pressure as would have made him appear unpatriotic had he continued to refuse. By criticizing Washington's denunciation of the American-Japanese trade treaty, as a result of which he said Japan was forced to look to the south sea area for raw materials, Nomura indicated the cause of his own unhappiness in being forced to go to Washington. It was a general fear among the Japanese, especially the militarists, that America would begin to embargo exports of war materials to Japan after evacuating her nationals from the Far East.

As we walked down the stone steps to leave the Tokyo Club, Nomura made the most striking remark of all. As I remember his words, the sense of which I could never forget, they were to the following effect: "Everything is now out of our hands. The outcome will be decided in heaven." That struck me as an unusually fatalistic remark by a diplomat on the eve of his appointment to Washington, even if he was Japanese. It was even more significant coming from a man like Nomura, who is cheerful by temperament.

After I had written my story for the *Herald Tribune*, Nomura phoned me at the office and asked if I would bring it to the Navy Club, so that he could read it before I telephoned New York the following morning. Many of his navy friends had assembled at the club to congratulate him on his appointment and wish him well. After he broke away from them, we sat down at a small table in a corner of the room to discuss the story. As he had lost the sight of one eye as a result of an attack on him in Shanghai in 1932, when he was commander of the fleet which participated in the assault on the Chinese at that time, it took him quite a while to finish reading. Although he wore horn-rimmed glasses he preferred to raise them to his forehead and read without them. Finally he said everything was as he had stated earlier but asked me to eliminate the lead of the story. This contained his fatalistic remarks. He thought they were much too pessimistic for publication and suggested that I write in-

stead that he was going to Washington because he was convinced of the "possibility" of an agreement between the United States and Japan. He wrote out his meaning in English on the back of a typewritten page of the story I had shown him.

I sent the story as he requested, because it was clear that he was convinced of the "possibility" of an agreement, as slight as it was. But I never forgot what he had told me, and this affected my subsequent stories to the *Herald Tribune* not a little. I concluded the report which I telephoned to New York the following morning by saying that Nomura "will return either a great hero or a tragic failure." There was not much risk in making a remark like that as late as November 27, 1940, when "heaven" already knew that Japan and America were to have scarcely more than one more year of peace.

If any further indications of the poor prospects of Nomura's mission were needed, they were provided the next month at a farewell luncheon given for the new ambassador at the Imperial Hotel by the America-Japan Society. As the main speaker on that occasion, Foreign Minister Matsuoka spoiled whatever goodwill the society had hoped to create by bringing Americans and Japanese together. Although he inherited a glib tongue, which he did not spare in displaying his oratorical ability and his bitter, vindictive nature, Matsuoka was blessed with little tact, which was one of the principal causes of his eventual downfall. On this occa-

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sion, after making a rather specious gesture of goodwill toward Americans, he attacked the United States for interfering with Japan's "moral crusade" in China and demanded that Japan be left alone so that she could carry on her work unhindered. The little Foreign Minister, who cropped his hair close in true nationalistic style, repeated Japan's loyalty to the Axis and said that his foreign policy would continue to revolve around the tripartite pact. He could not have sabotaged more effectively the purpose of the luncheon. But if there is anything that can be said on behalf of this ambitious diplomat, it is that he reflected the views of his army masters so well that he was unable to conceal them at a time when the militarists might have preferred that he play their game of diplomatic guile more skillfully.

Just before Admiral Nomura sailed and after the German Embassy had unsuccessfully attempted to prevent his departure for the United States by bringing to bear whatever pressure they could against the Foreign Office, the emperor called him to the palace for a special audience. According to information from court circles, the emperor asked Nomura to do everything possible to bring about an agreement between Japan and the United States. Nomura replied by promising to do his very best. The censor refused to permit me to send the story. There is good reason to believe it was true because Hirohito, having been brought up in something of a "liberal" tradition, could have had no

desire to risk his throne as well as the fate of his people in a war with the democracies. Both he and Nomura, however, must have been aware of how powerless they were to prevent war if the militarists decided in favor of it. Nomura unquestionably had a strong fear that he might be used as a blind for the militarists in Washington, which is a role he did not want to play, but he was courageous enough to take a last chance on fortune, which had let him down hard on several occasions in the past.

After Nomura had arrived in Washington, his army assistant, Colonel Iwakuro, was ready to set out in March to join him. Count Kabayama, who originally intended to leave with him but then decided to await further developments, arranged an interview for me at the War Office. Speaking with the authorization of the Vice-Minister of War, Iwakuro said the army was prepared to conclude "a truce in the present undeclared economic war between Japan and the United States." When I pointed out that Nomura, in an interview with Washington correspondents, was unable to state definitely that Japan would not resort to force in her southward expansion program, Iwakuro said he was in a position to announce that "there will absolutely be no resort to force." Japan urgently needed raw materials from the south sea area, he continued, but would use only peaceful means in her attempt to secure them. He even expressed optimism about reaching a settlement with the United States over the China issue.

The sudden goodwill displayed by this member of the extremist faction of the army was not a little suspicious. I already had learned that something more serious than Nomura's mission to Washington was under way, and it began to look very much as if both the new ambassador and Iwakuro were being used by the the army and navy to conceal nothing less than their preparations for an attack in the south sea area. On February 18, 1941, I sent a cable to the *Herald Tribune*, worded as vaguely as possible, disclosing Matsouka's intentions of leaving the following month for Berlin and Moscow, where the Foreign Minister expected to conclude a non-aggression pact. On the following morning, I telephoned New York to learn whether my cable had gone through and to clarify it in a special message following the reading of a regularly censored report. As soon as I began to read my message, Maruyama, the censor, cut the line. He called back later to inquire what I had attempted to say, and I explained. He asked me to read the previous night's message and then announced that I would not be permitted to say anything about Matsouka's trip to Europe. After promising not to mention it, I was permitted to speak to New York again and was informed that my cable had been cut in half by the Japanese censors and therefore was unintelligible. That same day I wrote a personal letter about the incident which arrived in California a week before the censors permitted the news to be sent abroad. Had I known

that the announcement of the Foreign Minister's trip would be delayed so long, I could have sent the story to New York by ship across the Pacific and still have had it published there before it could be wired from Tokyo.

On the day that I left my cable at the telegraph office, the Japanese worked one of the most clever tricks that they had ever put over on the American and British press. It was all the work of Matsuoka, who should be given full credit for it. At the press conference with foreign correspondents, the spokesman, Koh Ishii, read a prepared statement, which he seldom had done before, saying that Japan was willing to mediate in any conflict anywhere in the world. The story naturally was filed in full to the United States and England. There it was played up under large headlines asserting that Japan was ready to mediate in the war between Britain and Germany. In view of the information about Matsuoka's imminent trip to Moscow and Berlin, which had been disclosed to the other correspondents, the statement read by Ishii was preposterous, and I decided to ignore it entirely. Instead, I attempted to send the news about the Foreign Minister's trip to Europe, which, if it had escaped the censor, would have disclosed the ruse for what it was.

The purpose of the trick was twofold: first, to disperse the first big Pacific war scare which had been created as a result of countless rumors of Japanese troop and naval movements in the Indo-China area

and numerous statements made in Australia, the United States and England warning of an imminent crisis in the Far East; and second, to confuse the democracies regarding Matsuoka's approaching trip to Moscow and Berlin. The trick was eminently successful because of the wide publicity given to the story, which was offered as proof of Japan's "peaceful intentions," thereby contradicting the rumors of a Japanese attack in the south. It was given still further publicity as a result of an announcement in the House of Commons disclosing that Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden had received a message from Matsuoka similar to that issued by Ishii.

I visited Ishii privately later in the week, and he admitted that the statement which he read had been prepared by Matsuoka, that he had not intended to emphasize the "mediation" part of it and that it was not to be taken "too literally." He also agreed with my understanding of the story as having been intended to "calm" American and British sentiment, which had been aroused by the war scare in the Far East. The spokesman thereby virtually admitted that it was a publicity stunt, but he could not be held responsible for it as he had acted under his superior's instructions. Ishii personally disliked Matsuoka bitterly.

I have never known Ishii to lie intentionally or even unintentionally on his own responsibility when not confused by his group of advisers or the American agent of the Foreign Office who attended our press

conferences. What he admitted next confirmed my impression of him as an honest Japanese official, which is more than can be said for some of his superiors. I asked him about Matsuoka's trip to Berlin and Moscow. Ishii confessed that the report was true and that Matsuoka already had received his visa to pass through the Soviet Union. He also admitted that Matsuoka was going to Berlin as a result of persistent personal requests by Hitler. Finally, before I left, he confirmed the report I had heard that the German Ambassador had protested to Matsuoka against both the mediation statement which had been read to the press and the message Matsuoka had sent to Eden. It was the most profitable discussion that I or perhaps any other correspondent had ever had with an official Japanese spokesman.

In attempting to mislead the democracies, Matsuoka had overplayed his stunt. The German government was greatly incensed over the announcement that Japan was willing to mediate in the war, because the British cleverly had disclosed Matsuoka's message to Eden, thereby supporting the impression given by Ishii's statement that the Germans had asked their ally, Japan, to mediate in the European war. This was made to look like a sign of German weakness, when the unhappy Nazis beforehand had not known a thing about Matsuoka's message to Eden or Ishii's statement. The German Ambassador, Eugen Ott, rushed to the Foreign Office and demanded that Matsuoka issue a

retraction. The Foreign Minister therefore held two special press conferences in which he denied having made any specific proposals to the British for mediating in the European war and at the same time issued a warning to the democracies against exciting the Japanese by their military preparations in the Pacific intended to counter a possible attack by the Japanese, thus himself disclosing one of the purposes of the statement which the foreign press had publicized for him.

Baron Hiranuma, Matsuoka's most bitter foe, who had recently joined the Cabinet to crush the leftist movement in the Imperial Rule Assistance Association and to bring about the new partnership between the business clans and the militarists, attempted to weaken the Foreign Minister's position as a result of his blunder. Matsuoka, however, was strongly supported by the warlords, who were sending him on an extremely important mission to Europe the following month, and the attempt to expel him from the Cabinet at that time failed. When I first mentioned Matsuoka's trip to Moscow and Berlin, Ambassador Grew was quite skeptical about it, apparently because it did not fit in with the recent departure of Nomura for Washington and the army's professed desire for an understanding with the United States. Before I met Iwakuro, he had already had a long talk at the American Embassy with Eugene Dooman, the counselor of the Embassy and Ambassador Grew's chief adviser. Embassy officials seemed to have attached more importance to Iwakuro's

statements than subsequent events proved they deserved. It is clearer now than it was at the time that Iwakuro had gone to the Embassy in a deliberate attempt to mislead our officials there, just as Matsuoka had attempted to mislead the American and British press. Being of a more suspicious nature, perhaps, than American diplomats, news correspondents were better capable of believing that the Japanese might be engaging in a form of deceit and treachery greater than any that had ever been undertaken before. While the militarists had assumed the mantle of peace by speaking encouragingly to American officials in Tokyo and sending Admiral Nomura to Washington, they also were plotting war against the democracies, with which Matsuoka's trip to Europe was directly connected.

Before the Foreign Minister could leave Tokyo, however, it was necessary for him to clear up the negotiations which he had undertaken between Indo-China and Thailand for a settlement of their border dispute. The reason the Japanese forced Indo-China and Thailand to accept their mediation in the border conflict was to soften both territories for eventual Japanese occupation. In the course of the negotiations, the Japanese further humiliated the French diplomats by browbeating and disclosing them as being at the mercy of the Japanese. On the other hand, they attempted to induce the Thai delegation to accept the principle of a "Greater East Asia," in which Thailand would participate as an ally of Japan. Their principal efforts

were centered on Prince Varavarn, head of the Thai delegation, whom they hoped to make one of their puppets. The Japanese wine and dined him night after night, with geisha provided in abundance. They gave him the best suite in the Imperial Hotel and embarrassed him by refusing to let him pay for it. After the negotiations had been completed, the Japanese launched an all-out campaign to win him over. They induced him to extend his visit in Japan for several weeks and arranged for his wife and young daughter to be flown in a Japanese plane from Bangkok to Tokyo so that together they could marvel at the beautiful Japanese scenery and various places of interest to the tourist.

Varavarn, however, was an astute diplomat and more brilliant than Matsuoka. He was not the usual material of which good puppets were made. Tall, well-built and youthful in appearance, Varavarn was a striking personality in his formal dress, which he seemed to wear almost every day of his several months' stay in Tokyo. He was educated in England, like many other members of the Thai royal family. His diction and command of the English language made me conscious of my own shortcomings when I spoke with him. He had a mind and ideas of his own. He was willing to be quoted as saying that he did not understand Japan's "new order" and that Thailand did not want to participate in it if it meant Japanese control of East Asia. He made it clear that his country wanted to be

free and could only continue to be free by dealing equally with the democracies as well as Japan.

If he permitted himself to be pampered by the Japanese and if he flattered his hosts in exchange, I believe it was because of a desire to be on as good terms as possible with the Japanese and give them no cause to invade Thailand in the event they decided to attack in the south. Although he was reluctant to admit the danger, I gathered from what he said that he felt that neither Thailand nor Britain would be able to stop the Japanese if they attacked, and the position of the United States at the time was still uncertain. He saw no point in having his small country antagonize a bigger power when Thailand could not count on effective and immediate assistance from the United States. He was syrupy in his praise and flattery of the Japanese not because he wanted to serve them as a puppet but because he hoped he could thus avert a Japanese invasion of Thailand. If this failed, nothing else would succeed because it was apparent to everyone that Thailand could not hope to resist effectively by herself, and there were no prospects of substantial assistance from the democracies.

After the negotiations had been completed and he had more free time, I sat up with Varavarn one night in his room at the Imperial Hotel until the early hours of the morning to discuss what I thought was a serious blunder on the part of his country in agreeing to participate in Japanese "mediation." Varavarn insisted on

blaming Indo-China and Vichy for the mediation. He said his government repeatedly had asked French officials in Indo-China to negotiate a settlement directly, but the French refused every time. The Thai government, he continued, had opposed Japanese mediation from the start and preferred to continue fighting if the French refused to negotiate directly. It was to be expected that he would voice the belief that the Thai forces eventually would have been able to break all French resistance, but after speaking with French officers from Indo-China who had come to Tokyo to attend the negotiations, I was inclined to believe that Varavarn was right. The French officers disclosed that they had but five decrepit planes in their entire air force, while the Indo-China army and its equipment were something which had better be left without further mention.

Had the French not been so narrow-minded and stingy, Varavarn said heatedly, the border dispute could have been settled long before hostilities reached the point where the Japanese had an excuse to intervene. Only after the French had first agreed to Japanese intervention did Thailand accept it, he said. To have refused would have placed the responsibility for continuing the war on the Bangkok government and also would have been interpreted by Japan as a hostile act. The likelihood of Nazi pressure to force Vichy to accept Japanese mediation might have been the reason for the French action, he continued, but that did not

relieve Vichy of the responsibility for Japanese intervention. The fact that Thailand officially announced acceptance of Japanese mediation the day before Vichy does not prove anything. Once having been convinced that the French preferred to have the Japanese mediate rather than make any concessions directly to Thailand, the latter turned promptly around and gave full-hearted support to the Japanese demand for mediation. I asked Baron Fain, counselor of the French Embassy, about Varavarn's accusation that Vichy had first accepted the Japanese proposal to mediate. He appeared to be embarrassed and refused to comment. He would not deny its truth. It was obvious that both Vichy and Indo-China, squeezed between Germany in Europe and the Japanese in the Far East, were in a hopeless situation.

Matsuoka, however, played another one of his tricks on the French. To induce the French to accept the offer of Japanese mediation, he apparently promised the French Ambassador, Charles Arsene-Henry, that the negotiations would be conducted satisfactorily for the French, and it is believed that the Japanese Foreign Office went so far as to indicate the maximum territory which they would permit Thailand to receive. It was so little that the French at first were quite satisfied and thought they would get out of their difficulty rather easily. Varavarn, however, was not interested in the promises which the Japanese had made to the French and demanded that most of the territory which

had been seized originally from Thailand by the French be returned. This the French refused to do, and there was a great deal of haggling back and forth before the Japanese forced the French to concede much more than they had at first indicated. Varavarn's comment after the negotiations were over was: "The French thought they would put me on toast, but I think I succeeded in putting them on toast."

The Japanese now have them both on toast, but the border warfare between Indo-China and Thailand and the subsequent mediation by Japan actually did not affect very much the developments which followed. The Japanese could have marched into Indo-China immediately had they so desired, while the occupation of Thailand was not essential for them until they were prepared to launch their full attack in the Pacific. Varavarn seemed to share the same view, although he refused to admit he had any real fears of a Japanese attack in the south. But regardless of whether or not the Japanese would attack, the Thailanders felt they had little to lose by attempting to regain some of their territory. Varavarn had little sympathy with the suggestion by Washington that Thailand's claims against Indo-China be deferred and discussed later at the peace conference following the end of the European war, expressing the belief that it would be impossible to get anything back from the French through negotiation. It was another case of force being invoked to rectify the wrongs of force.

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The Prince admitted frankly that his country had been receiving large quantities of war materials from Japan and asked me where Thailand was expected to buy them when Britain and the United States refused to sell to her because they either did not want to or were unable to as a result of their inability to meet their own needs. He insisted that all purchases from Japan were paid for either with goods or with gold and that there had been no gifts of Japanese war materials. Japanese officers in Thailand very likely encouraged the latter to attack the French, but the Thailanders did not need any encouragement to do so. Thailand's long-standing grievances against the French were well known, and her desire to regain her lost territories as soon as the opportunity presented itself and before the Japanese had seized all of Indo-China was not difficult to understand.

Although the Japanese have occupied Thailand and set up a puppet government there which apparently succeeded in turning Thai troops against the democracies, the remarks made by Varavarn indicate that the free people of Thailand have no desire to support the Japanese program of a "Greater East Asia," that they attacked Indo-China not because the Japanese wanted them to but because of long-standing grievances, that they resisted Japanese efforts to "mediate" the conflict until after the French were first forced and tricked into accepting intervention, and finally that the Thailanders probably would turn against the

Japanese at the first real prospect of ridding themselves of the invaders.

Having bathed quickly but loudly in the glory which he claimed both for himself and the emperor as a result of his successful mediation between Indo-China and Thailand, Japan's up-and-coming diplomat, Yosuke Matsuoka, was ready to undertake more serious business—with no one less than Joseph Stalin and Adolf Hitler. No Japanese had ever been entrusted with a more important mission, and no Japanese mission had created more confusion abroad. The pugnacious little Foreign Minister seems to have had singular success in confusing the democracies about Japan's policies but equal misfortune in carrying them out. The Japanese government had intended to keep his trip a dark secret up to the moment of his departure, but like many Japanese "state secrets" the rest of the world knew about it long before the Japanese people were informed by an official announcement. The purpose of his trip, however, was a much better kept secret, and it was several weeks before the full significance of it was realized. The official announcement about Matsuoka's trip disclosed that he was going to Europe simply to make a few social calls on the leaders of Japan's allies and to have a look-see at the European situation. In all the time I had been in Japan, never had the Japanese government issued an announcement which told so little about a trip which meant so much, because in the course of his social calls Matsuoka was

expected to secure personally from Hitler assurances which would make possible a joint attack against the democracies and was to conclude a pact with the Soviet Union which would guarantee the northern frontiers of Japan while she launched her long-awaited drive in the south.

In January, two months before Matsuoka left for Europe, the German Embassy launched a fresh campaign urging the Japanese to join the war against the democracies. There was no particular secrecy about the diplomatic drive, because all Nazi agents in Tokyo had been mustered to participate in it on all fronts at which they had been stationed in Tokyo. Some Nazis worked on the Japanese army and navy, others on the Foreign Office, and still others on business and newspaper circles. I learned the details of the Nazi propaganda from a Japanese newspaperman who had just been given a full injection of it by one of the correspondents of D. N. B., the official German news agency. According to the latter's story, the German government was prepared to assure Japan that two thousand large transport planes were massed near the English Channel in preparation for the landing of waves of forty thousand armed troops in England on each trip across the Channel. At the same time, the Germans claimed that they already had massed more than one million troops on the Soviet border which would guarantee the immobility of Soviet forces and thereby eliminate any Russian threat against the northern

frontiers of Japan. The Germans explained that they were ready to launch the invasion of the British Isles if Japan would support them by attacking Singapore and other British possessions in the Far East, thus delivering such a shock to the British Empire at both ends that it would collapse, and at the same time freezing the United States into a terror of neutrality.

As early as the beginning of 1941, therefore, the Japanese were given to understand that the Nazis could not alone fulfill the unwritten promises, given to the Japanese at the time of the signing of the tripartite pact four months earlier, that they would invade England. The Nazis had succeeded in tricking the Japanese militarists, the latter had succeeded in tricking Konoye and the Prince had succeeded in tricking the Emperor into believing that if they only signed the tripartite alliance, the Germans would invade England, and Japan would then be able to carry out her Greater East Asia program unmolested. The Nazis were now singing a different tune. The tripartite pact was a valuable instrument only if it were applied by all the signatories. If the Japanese wanted to see action in England, then they would have to participate in the war *before* and not *after* the fall of the British Isles.

For at least two months the Japanese militarists debated with themselves and with other members of the Cabinet the advisability of joining the Nazis in a spring attack, not because the Nazis wanted them to but because they were becoming desperate. The cau-

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tious group, represented by Konoye and Hiranuma, were in favor of doing nothing but continuing to wait for the collapse of England, which the Premier had expected in the summer of 1940. Having been let down several times by the Nazis, Konoye and Hiranuma were quite content to let bad enough alone. The militarists, however, could hardly afford to do nothing. They had hoped that the American fleet would be divided more equally in the Atlantic and the Pacific as a result of the tripartite pact, but the main body of the fleet remained at Pearl Harbor. Furthermore, the United States began strengthening her defenses in the Far East in earnest together with Britain and the Netherlands Indies. At the same time, she had recalled her nationals from the Orient, and Japan therefore had to be prepared for economic pressure. Both the army and the navy were in favor of moving south at the earliest possible moment. Therefore in March, after securing the consent of the entire Cabinet, they sent Matsuoka to learn from Hitler when that moment might be expected. By "earliest possible moment" the Japanese meant the capture of the Suez Canal or the invasion of the British Isles. If Hitler could convince Matsuoka that his forces would make an attempt to invade England in the spring or that they could seize the Suez Canal, then the Japanese would attack in the south.

That was the momentous nature of Matsuoka's trip to Europe, in the course of which he was to sign a pact

with the Soviet Union. It was momentous because it was the result of a decision by the Japanese Cabinet to attack British and Dutch possessions in the Far East in the spring if certain conditions were fulfilled by its Axis partners in Europe. For the first time since the first world war, the Japanese government in March, 1941, reached an agreement to engage a first-rate power in war. The decision was based on the assumption that the United States would not act in the Far East.

The strategy of the attack for the spring of 1941, as learned from Japanese sources which had proved correct in the past and which had no sympathy with the Japanese military dictatorship, was not to creep south in gradual stages by first occupying all of Indo-China and then Thailand, but to launch a frontal assault on Singapore and the Dutch Indies directly from bases at Formosa, Hainan Island and the China coast. The Philippines were not to be attacked, as the United States was expected not to intervene. As one informant said before the Foreign Minister's return from Europe, "All Matsuoka has to do is to press a button, and the operations will begin."

In April, after Matsuoka had left Berlin to return to Moscow on his way home, I learned the full story of the Cabinet decision and of Matsuoka's trip. At first I refused to take it very seriously. Then the evidence began to mount and to come in from various sources. Finally I had no choice but to accept it. That was the

first and only time I had ever been seriously upset in Tokyo, which is one of the dullest and seemingly uneventful places in the world. I asked a Japanese friend whether he thought it would be wise for me to leave the country. He said he was unable to give any advice, because no one yet knew what answer Matsuoka was bringing from Hitler. When I discussed the crisis with diplomatic officials, I found the same division of opinion as in the past. The younger men were inclined to believe the story, while others treated it rather skeptically, just as I did myself at first. Strangely enough, what I believed was the first real war scare in the Pacific passed almost entirely unobserved abroad, where the first scare of February already had passed away together with the editions of the newspapers which created it. News correspondents in Tokyo could do nothing more than hint at the crisis. To have attempted to disclose the Cabinet decision would have meant imprisonment.

Several days later, Matsuoka signed his neutrality pact in Moscow, and the story of an imminent attack by Japan against Singapore began to be taken much more seriously in diplomatic quarters. Warnings of danger were sent to the capitals of all the democracies and we all waited with bated breath for Matsuoka's return. Premier Konoye at that time contributed to the general nervousness by suddenly issuing two statements saying that Japan was determined to collaborate more closely with the Axis. He said that his govern-

ment intended to strengthen relations with Germany and Italy in "actual practice" and confirmed the information I had received earlier by saying that "all things will have to be talked over after Matsuoka's return."

When Matsuoka did return finally during the latter part of April, he had nothing to say to the press. Foreign correspondents waited for a long time to see him, but he dismissed them after five minutes by saying that he had to hurry to the palace to report to the Emperor. He was extremely pale and tired after his long trip twice across the continents of Asia and Europe in little more than one month. He also appeared to be no more cheerful than when we saw him off at Tokyo station at the time of his departure. Later we learned that his weariness and nervousness were caused by more than simply extensive traveling.

The story of Matsuoka's trip to Berlin and Moscow was learned through members of the party who accompanied him and other Japanese officials who were informed of it. No sooner had Matsuoka digested the feast which had been served to him during the impressive banquet held in his honor than he was led into a room for a performance of Hitlerian drama which the Nazi dictator had staged on numerous other occasions for other diplomatic victims who came to visit him before the outbreak of the European war. Matsuoka asked the questions which he had been sent to put to the Fuehrer. Instead of answering them definitely,

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Hitler worked himself into a frenzy of bitterness against Britain and the United States, pounding on the table under Matsuoka's little nose and shouting that the democracies had to be crushed and that Japan had to join Germany in the tremendous task which would change the face of the world. In the words of Colonel Yatsuji Nagai, a member of Matsuoka's party who described the scene after his return to Tokyo, Hitler "became heated in his conversation, and finally was so carried away that it seemed he did not know to whom he was talking."

Matsuoka attempted to do a bit of feeble pounding back at Hitler, agreeing with him that the decadent democracies had to be smashed by the two great powers, Japan and Germany. He explained, however, that his government was interested in knowing when it might expect Hitler to launch the long-awaited invasion of the British Isles and when he expected to capture the Suez Canal. These, Hitler assured him, would come in time, but the important thing at the moment was immediate Japanese participation in the attack against the British Empire before the United States was able to bring her power to bear in the struggle. Matsuoka made it clear that he had not been empowered to make any commitments, and this aroused the Fuehrer's fury all the more.

When the question of Germany's attitude toward the Soviet Union came up, Hitler again was evasive. He admitted that there was tension between Germany

and the Soviet but he did not give Matsuoka the impression that there would definitely be war. As Hitler later disclosed himself in his announcement on the outbreak of the Soviet-German war, he asked Matsuoka to leave a warning with Stalin on his way back through Moscow to be more careful in his actions. In view of the tension between Germany and the Soviet Union at the time, it was understood that Hitler was not very enthusiastic about Matsuoka's announcement that he intended to sign a pact with the Soviet Union in Moscow.

The results of the meeting between the big dictator and the little man who aspired to be like him were described as rather unsatisfactory. Matsuoka was said to have left Berlin with his head reeling with all kinds of ideas but no clear ones. He had not been convinced that the Germans were going to invade England or attack the Suez or fight the Soviet Union. To Matsuoka, Hitler made no sense at all, while his wild ranting served more to frighten Matsuoka than to impress him. Although there were numerous meetings in Berlin among high German and Japanese army, navy and diplomatic officials, no definite decisions were reached.

Although Matsuoka's trip to Berlin was a failure, his visit to Moscow was highly successful. Before leaving Tokyo, Matsuoka had been authorized by the Cabinet to conclude a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union. On his way to Berlin, the Japanese Foreign Minister stopped off at Moscow to sound out Molotov

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and Stalin, who encouraged him to continue their talks on his way back from Berlin. When Matsuoka returned to Moscow and disclosed that he still wanted his pact, he was welcomed by the Soviet leaders with open arms. The warning which Matsuoka carried from Hitler only served to confirm the impression in Moscow that Hitler might attack the Soviet Union. It was natural that the Soviet leaders should have agreed to conclude the pact in the brief period of ten minutes, according to Matsuoka's own count. Stalin personally went to the station in Moscow to see the Japanese Foreign Minister off, an unheard of tribute by the leader of the Soviet Union. His satisfaction over the pact with Japan could well be understood.

When Matsuoka returned to Tokyo with his head full of confusion about Hitler, the militarists immediately realized that something had gone wrong in Europe. They suspected the worst, a German-Soviet war, but refused to believe that it would take place. Matsuoka had been able to learn little from the Soviets about the possibility of a war. Information, both official and unofficial, kept coming into Tokyo during the subsequent weeks indicating increasing tension between Germany and the Soviet Union. During the early part of May, I already had gathered enough material for an impressive story about a possible war. I hesitated to send it immediately to the *Herald Tribune*, however, because the possibility of a clash was minimized both by diplomatic officials and newspapermen

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who were much better acquainted with Germany and the Soviet Union than I was, never having visited either country. Walter Duranty, who had just arrived from the Soviet Union, Otto Tolischus, of the *New York Times*, who had been stationed in Berlin for many years, and Chip Bohlen, one of the secretaries of the American Embassy who also had arrived recently from Moscow and was well versed in Soviet affairs, were all dubious about a Soviet-German clash. By the end of May, however, more information had been received by the Foreign Office, and Japanese officials were becoming more worried than ever. I decided not to hold the story any longer and therefore telephoned it to New York on May 31. It said that a German attack, if it were to come at all, would be made before the end of June, as the Nazis planned to attack after the wheat had been sown in the Ukraine and hoped to complete their campaign before the crops were harvested and before winter set in. According to figures received by the Japanese, Germany and the Soviet each had concentrated about two million troops along their frontier, and the latter had massed about 4,500 planes in the Ukraine.

It was a strange coincidence that my copy of the *New York Herald Tribune* in which the story appeared arrived from the United States on the day Germany attacked the Soviet Union, June 22. The declaration made by Hitler on the outbreak of the war confirmed the principal reason given in the story to explain why

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the Nazis were expected to attack the Soviet. It was to remove the threat of the only huge land army on the European Continent before the Nazis could be in a position to assault the British Isles. Hitler did not mention, however, other important reasons for his attack, such as a desire to make possible the demobilization of several million idle German soldiers who had to be maintained in the East as protection against the Soviet Union when they were needed badly in industry, to secure the Ukraine's wheat without paying the prices demanded and to secure the labor power of the Ukraine for renewed efforts necessary in the west.

News of the outbreak of the Soviet-German war swept Japanese officialdom off its feet. The last thing the Japanese wanted to see was a war which would cut them off from their allies in Europe and leave them completely isolated in the Far East. Resentment against the Germans mounted in all quarters. Matsuoka, especially, was bitter. He realized that he not only had not been trusted by Hitler but that the German dictator had once again double-crossed the Japanese, making Matsuoka himself look rather ridiculous for having signed a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union only two months before. If Matsuoka had believed that the Germans would attack the Soviet, he obviously would not have signed a pact in Moscow. Under the terms of the tripartite pact, the Japanese were not obliged to help Germany against the Soviet Union, as the latter was specifically excluded from its application. On the

other hand, the Japanese-Soviet pact tied Japan's hands in the north, where a guarantee of good behavior by the Soviet Union in the event of possible action in the south no longer was necessary, as the Soviets were completely engaged in the struggle against the Nazis. From all possible points of view, therefore, the pact was a diplomatic blunder of the first magnitude, in the opinion of the Japanese.

While Matsuoka was still greatly upset by the news, the German ambassador called on him to explain what had happened. He assured Matsuoka that the war would be over in about two months, after which communications between Germany and Japan would be better than they had been under the Soviet. Matsuoka also was told that Germany did not expect Japan to take any action against the Soviet in violation of her recently concluded neutrality pact. The German ambassador's remarks hardly comforted Matsuoka. The day after the war broke out, a message was received from the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, General Hiroshi Oshima, a strong supporter of the Nazis, asserting that he had been informed by the Germans that they expected to break the back of Soviet resistance in two weeks and that they intended to be in Moscow within two months.

For days the militarists and members of the Cabinet were at a loss as to what they should do. During the first week following the outbreak of the new war, conferences were held by all important branches of

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the government, especially by the War and Navy Ministries, from early morning until late into the night. The old anti-Comintern group again raised its voice and demanded that Japan seize the "heaven-sent opportunity" of eliminating the menace of Communism once and for all. The dominating faction, however, insisted on continuing the southward expansion program and warned against the dangers of becoming involved in another Siberian expedition such as that in which the Japanese engaged following the first world war.

In one week's time, that is by the end of June, the Japanese militarists reached a decision following a number of emergency conferences between the government and the high command. It was unquestionably the most important decision ever made in Japanese history and the most treacherous one. It was the most important because it made a war between Japan and the United States almost inevitable. It was treacherous because it called for an attack on the Soviet Union in violation of a freshly concluded pledge to respect her territory. The Japanese decided to attack both in the north and the south. What took place at the Imperial conference on July 2, called to sanction the decision of the militarists, was an incredible re-enactment of the scene in Tokyo following the Sino-Japanese war of 1895, when the army insisted on driving north and the navy south. At that time, it will be recalled, Emperor Meiji gave his blessings to expansion

both to the north and to the south. On July 2, 1941, his grandson, Emperor Hirohito, did the same thing.

To report the decision was both dangerous and difficult. It was supposed to be the deepest of all the deep secrets of state, although a number of us learned about it the day it was reached. In order not to disclose too exact a knowledge of the decision, I thought it would be best at first to send only the most important part of it, which was to continue the southward expansion movement despite the outbreak of the German-Soviet war. On July 1, the day before the Imperial conference was held and before the censors had received any instructions to prevent transmission of information about the decision, I was lucky enough to get through to New York over the telephone with a report saying: "fresh efforts are planned to realize the so-called Greater East Asia co-prosperity sphere, which would include French Indo-China, Thailand, the Philippines and the Netherlands East Indies." Together with the story about the German-Soviet war, it was the most important piece of news I had ever succeeded in sending from Tokyo. The following morning, when I attempted to send another report on the decision, censor Maruyama refused to pass the story, explaining that nothing more could be said about it. By that time he had received his instructions. Shortly afterward, however, I found an article which referred to the historical policy of Japan to expand both to the north and to the south in accordance with the decision reached at the

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Imperial conference of the Emperor Meiji. I telephoned the article in full to New York and was charged over one hundred dollars for the call, more than twice what the charge should have been. It was the beginning of the eventually successful attempt to force me to abandon the regular use of the international telephone by charging exorbitant rates.

The decision reached at the Imperial conference was to occupy all of Indo-China and develop bases there for the eventual launching of a general attack in the south sea area, while at the same time mobilizing troops in the north to await the defeat of the Soviet Union by Germany. The Japanese attack on the Soviet Union was to begin as soon as the German troops reached the Volga River, east of Moscow. Following the collapse of the Soviet, it was believed that the democracies, especially the United States, would be too worried about an imminent invasion of England to become involved in the Far East, and the Japanese expected to seize the territories in the south sea area without much resistance. Almost immediately following the Imperial conference, therefore, the army issued a secret order for general mobilization and the government later invoked all provisions of the National General Mobilization Law to place the country on a full wartime basis. Military reinforcements were sent both to the Manchurian border facing the Soviet Union as well as to Indo-China, which was fully occupied toward the end of July.

Hiranuma made capital out of the diplomatic mess caused by the neutrality pact with the Soviet by placing blame for it on Matsuoka, who was asked to resign from the Cabinet. Matsuoka, with some degree of justice, refused to resign, pointing out that the Cabinet had authorized the conclusion of the pact and therefore should assume responsibility for it. Konoye therefore caused the downfall of his own cabinet by resigning and then organized a new cabinet which was almost the same as the old one, leaving Matsuoka out. The reason the militarists and Konoye agreed to drop Matsuoka was not so much the belief that his presence would embarrass the government when the attack was made against the Soviet Union (Matsuoka already had participated in the Imperial conference which sanctioned the move) but the fact that he was strongly disliked by Ambassador Grew and other officials of the American government. Following the invasion of Indo-China, the Japanese realized that relations with the United States would approach the breaking point, which they wanted to avoid until after they had completed their campaign against the Soviet Union and then turned south again to resume where they had left off at Indo-China. Therefore, it was considered a wise move to make a "conciliatory" gesture to the United States by substituting a "moderate" Foreign Minister, for which Americans had such an unfortunate weakness, for an antagonizing one. Admiral Tei-jiro Toyoda, closely associated with the business clans,

was considered a suitable successor to Matsuoka. The principal difference between them was that Toyoda spoke softly without giving any warning while the militarists struck, while Matsuoka spoke loudly and gave so many warnings no one believed him.

Toyoda's job was to prevent a complete economic embargo by the United States following the invasion of Indo-China. This he failed to do because of the fact that the American government was shrewd enough not to be taken in by new expressions of goodwill by a "moderate" Foreign Minister. The freezing of Japanese assets by the democracies immediately following the invasion of Indo-China virtually amounted to an ultimatum to Japan, which had the choice of abandoning the decision of the Imperial conference together with her general program of conquest or launching an attack. The question was where to attack. The original plan called for the collapse of Russia at the hands of Germany almost immediately after the Japanese had completed occupation of Indo-China, following which they would turn on Russia's rear. But the Soviet refused to collapse and the Konoye Cabinet found itself in a greater dilemma than ever before.

Konoye refused to undertake an attack against the democracies in the south sea area before the Soviet Union was conquered, when American pressure in the Far East could be expected to ease. The militarists also were troubled for a solution. They decided to wait a few weeks more for the Russian collapse. It never

came, and by the end of August, the Japanese were desperate. In an attempt to gain more time, Konoye therefore sent an eleventh-hour appeal to President Roosevelt which led to the final negotiations between Nomura and American officials in Washington. While it was hoped that the "moderate" ambassador whom they had victimized would succeed in checking rapidly increasing American defenses in the Far East and possibly secure some short-term economic concessions, the militarists prepared their final dispositions for the Battle of the Pacific.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

T O W A R D T H E N E W O R D E R

W H I L E I was leaving Tokyo for Yokohama on the afternoon of October 15, 1941, to board the *Tatsuta Maru*, one of the three N. Y. K. ships requisitioned by the Japanese government to evacuate Japanese nationals from the United States, Premier Konoye left his official residence for the Palace to announce his final decision to resign. We had known about the imminent collapse of the Cabinet for several days, and on the morning of my departure, when I sent my last telephone report to the *Herald Tribune*, I attempted to hint at what was about to take place, the censor refusing to permit me to say that the Cabinet was to fall. It was clear that Konoye resigned because of his failure to reach an understanding with the United States, but the nature of the new Cabinet and what its policies would be were not yet known. There were all kinds of

rumors circulating in Tokyo, one being that the new Cabinet would be organized by the navy to make further concessions to the United States in an effort to reach a temporary agreement and to secure relaxation of the American economic embargo. Another rumor was to the effect that the army would organize the new Cabinet for the same purpose, it being believed that only the army was in a position to keep the extremists and nationalists in check while Japan lost "face" in making further concessions to the United States. I was inclined to believe that the latter might be the case, thinking that the militarists would not launch an attack in the south at a time when the Nazis had bogged down so disastrously in the Soviet Union, but I had no chance to learn what was taking place from any informed Japanese, as I had to spend almost all of my last two days in a last-minute rush to make the *Tatsuta Maru*. Furthermore, my contacts with these Japanese had to be made most discreetly and less frequently than in the past in view of the fact that I was being watched closely by the police and warned by friends on more than one occasion to be more careful.

Up to ten o'clock of the night before the *Tatsuta Maru* was to sail, the police had not yet decided whether to permit me to leave the country. For two days they had been discussing my application to leave for a month's vacation in Honolulu. The *Herald Tribune* had granted me a leave of absence to meet my wife, who had left Japan one year earlier at the time the

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State Department issued its warning to Americans to evacuate the Orient. I explained that I was not leaving the country for good and that my intention was to return to Japan in about a month by the *Taiyo Maru*, another one of the evacuation ships, which was scheduled to leave Honolulu November 4, thereby giving me about twelve days there. The police still were reluctant to issue the necessary permit to depart. Finally, after a number of strong appeals by loyal friends in the Foreign Office, the Board of Information and Domei, the official news agency, I was allowed to leave.

I carried with me only two suitcases of clothing necessary for the trip, leaving everything else behind, as I did not believe that the Japanese would launch their attack before spring. Before the ship sailed, officials of the Finance Ministry relieved me of 140 yen (about thirty-five dollars) which I carried with me for tips and other expenses during the trip, explaining that an official permit was necessary for taking the money out of Japan. They returned ten yen (less than three dollars), which they said would be enough for my needs. Following the freezing of American assets in retaliation for similar action by the United States, the Japanese government announced officially that it would deal with America on a reciprocal basis. While the United States allowed Japanese to leave with about two hundred dollars without a permit, Japan permitted Americans to depart with less than three dollars. It was an excellent and last personal example for me of

how the United States and Japan dealt with each other.

The trip to Honolulu was marked by nervousness among the passengers because of uncertainty as to whether the ship would turn back to Yokohama before reaching American waters. A number of American-born Japanese already had had the unhappy experience of leaving Japan on the *Asama Maru*, only to be brought back about three weeks later, when the ship was instructed to return following her departure from Honolulu for the United States, because of the freezing of Japanese assets by the American government in July. One of them said that the *Asama Maru* crossed the international date-line eight times while waiting for definite instructions from Tokyo whether to proceed to San Francisco or return. After sunset, we had no way of knowing the direction in which our ship was traveling, and rumors about our having turned about began circulating at night only to be dispelled in the morning when the sun showed us that we were still heading in an easterly direction. The ship traveled under "semi-wartime" instructions, reflecting the state of relations between Japan and America at the time. The course which the ship followed was kept secret, and wireless messages were not permitted to be sent from the vessel in order not to disclose her position to "semi-enemy" craft which might be in the vicinity. On entering Honolulu, the ship was greeted by a restrained display of American air and naval power, with planes circling the Japanese visitor and torpedo

boats whizzing by. The arrival and departure of the evacuation ship was otherwise uneventful.

In Honolulu I read the news reports about the new Cabinet which had been organized by General Tojo, the War Minister in the Konoye administration, while we were at sea. The statements issued by the new Cabinet Ministers sounded ominous, but they had announced that the negotiations with the United States would be continued, and there was still not sufficient reason to change the original assumption that the new army Cabinet might offer some concessions in an attempt to reach a brief truce. The first indication that the danger might be nearer than previously suspected came in the form of a wire from George Cornish, managing editor of the New York *Herald Tribune*, instructing me not to return to Japan. He had received a report disclosing that a newspaper friend of mine had been arrested and that the police were awaiting my return. I am indebted to my friends for having been spared either imprisonment or internment in Japan following the outbreak of the war in the Pacific.

I had already completed arrangements to return to Japan when I received the wire from New York two days before the *Taiyo Maru* was to leave Honolulu in the first week of November. I had made purchases of clothing and food for my newspaper colleagues as well as for Japanese officials. The Japanese Consul in Honolulu, Kita, had received approval from the Foreign Office in Tokyo for my re-entry into Japan. In my talks with

Kita, who subsequently was accused by the Federal Bureau of Investigation of having transmitted important information of military value by telephone to Tokyo, he did not appear particularly pessimistic about the future although he may have sensed that we were on the verge of war. When I told him that I had been instructed not to return to Japan, he looked troubled, apparently fearing that it might be a straw in the wind. Later he told me that he had sent a wire to Tokyo informing the Foreign Office that I was not returning. What his reason was in doing so is not yet clear to me. It may have been simply a routine report, but after the attack on Honolulu I wondered if it might not have been sent as an indication of increasing suspicion in America regarding future Japanese moves. In the latter case, however, it is difficult to understand why Kita informed me of his action when he had no need to do so.

An extremely pleasant Japanese of the "moderate" group, Kita later arranged an interview for me with Saburo Kurusu, who passed through Honolulu by clipper on his way to Washington, for final "negotiations" with the United States. During my half-hour talk with him at the Royal Hawaiian Hotel, where he spent the night, he denied that Tojo's new Cabinet was a war Cabinet. He said that Tojo was not a "firebrand" and that he was sincerely seeking an understanding with the United States. It is questionable whether Kurusu knew that the militarists had definitely decided to

attack the democracies. The man who signed the tripartite pact in Berlin as the Japanese Ambassador to Germany but still was described as a "moderate" diplomat would better and more sincerely have been able to play the role of a diplomatic decoy to throw the United States off guard for the December 7 attack if he had not been told beforehand of the part he was to perform in the plot of the Japanese militarists. Furthermore, the militarists seldom told non-military officials of the Foreign Office very much about their secret plans. The Foreign Office was used by the militarists as a front behind which they carried out their international crimes. Kurusu may have been just as much of a victim of his military masters as were Nomura, his special assistant Kaname Wakasugi and countless other Japanese officials although all of them, with their strong feeling of fatalism, may have sensed the approaching disaster. It is just as questionable whether the captain of the *Tatsuta Maru*, which left for a "second evacuation trip" to the United States only a few days before the attack on Honolulu and later turned back, knew that his ship was being used as a floating decoy to mislead Americans into believing that there would be no attack at least until she had returned to Japan from the United States, just as there had been no attack during the previous trip which I made on the vessel.

The departure of the *Taiyo Maru* on November 5, one day behind schedule because of the extra time re-

quired by American officials to examine the Japanese in enforcing the freezing order, was rather pathetic. She was the last peace-time Japanese ship to leave American waters to return directly to Japan from Honolulu. Carrying no cargo and not being permitted to receive even packages or mail from Honolulu because of the time required to examine them under the freezing order, she perched rather precariously on top of the water at a pier which looked straight up one of the main streets leading into the heart of the city, to which Japanese warships and bombers returned a month later to attack. She carried with her 456 passengers, only three of whom were Caucasians, Leo Sirota, one of the best foreign pianists of Japan, his wife, and Tom Crichton, a friend whom I had met in Tokyo earlier in the year. I learned later of at least one Hawaiian-born Japanese who had been given a leave of absence from his commanding officer in the United States army so that he could go down to see his parents off on the ship, later to return to train for possible action against the land of his mother and father. The outbreak of war caused no more tragic situation than that of the second-generation Japanese born in the United States. With few exceptions, I personally have found the American-born Japanese to be loyal to the country of their birth. I have heard of several cases, however, in which blind loyalty and obedience as well as other traditions of Japan have been ingrained in the

character of American-born Japanese by their alien parents.

Following the departure of the *Taiyo Maru*, I spent a month in Honolulu waiting to see what the next move of the Japanese would be, meanwhile visiting army and navy bases for a series of articles for the *Herald Tribune*. Navy officers with whom I spoke appeared to be very sensitive to the danger of a Japanese attack in the Pacific, but the possibility of an assault on Pearl Harbor generally was minimized. What struck me most of all was the fact that Pearl Harbor was exposed to public inspection. For a few cents it was possible to ride by the mighty base on a bus from the city of Honolulu and see virtually everything that was in the harbor. An American naval officer admitted the danger of the harbor's being so exposed and pointed out that Japanese even lived or operated gasoline stations on the hill overlooking the harbor. It was not even necessary for the Japanese to violate any laws in observing the movements of the American fleet. They could always know how many and what kinds of warships were in the harbor simply by looking at them in broad daylight from a favorable position. The same situation in Japan was unheard of. No foreigner could get anywhere near a Japanese naval base without being stopped by police and possibly being arrested. When the Japanese were transporting troops from Kobe following the military mobilization order before

I left Tokyo, foreigners arriving from China on Japanese ships were not permitted to land at the regular pier but were taken off in tenders and put ashore at another point some distance away. At Nagasaki, the Japanese concealed the movements of their transports behind strips of cloth fastened to bamboo poles fixed on shore.

On December 5 at 12:30 o'clock in the afternoon my wife and I sailed from Honolulu on the *Lurline* to return to New York. The luxury liner was jammed with vacationers and residents of Honolulu bound for the United States for the Christmas holidays. We were given the usual Aloha send-off of streamers and Hawaiian music. As we drew out of the harbor, army bombers and pursuit planes staged an elaborate demonstration, diving at our vessel and sweeping past with breath-taking speed at excitingly close distances. About ten o'clock Sunday morning, December 7, the steward knocked on our cabin door. He had something to tell me which he thought I might be interested in hearing. "The Japs just bombed Pearl Harbor." At first I thought it was a joke, just as hundreds of other Americans must have thought when they first heard the news. Then the purser confirmed the story, which swept through the ship like a terrifying blaze at sea.

At noon, seamen began blacking out the windows and portholes. At five o'clock the captain called a general assembly of passengers to announce what had happened. He pointed out the danger of our being attacked

by Japanese submarines or warships and instructed everyone either to sleep in his life preserver or keep it handy. He concluded with the ominous remark that he hoped to bring the ship into San Francisco safely. The captain was more aware of our grave danger than the rest of us. Our ship was painted a glistening white, which could betray her easily to the enemy at night. Furthermore, the Japanese knew that we had left Honolulu only a day and a half before and therefore had a fairly good idea of our position. There could be little doubt that the Japanese would have liked to capture the vessel. She was one of the best passenger liners in the Pacific and would have made an excellent prize.

When the lights of the Golden Gate Bridge came into sight at about midnight a few days later, a cry of joy and relief went up from the passengers and the crew. They did not remain lighted very long, however. Soon the whistles of San Francisco began to shriek, and the United States had one of the first real blackouts in her history. We had entered a country at war. The harbor had been mined, and a small navy craft led us through a clear channel. Later I learned why the captain of our ship had been so frightened during the trip. He had received an S O S from the freighter *Cynthia Olsen*, asking for help, as she had just been torpedoed by a Japanese submarine about one hundred miles from our position. It was a stroke of luck that we reached port safely, as the submarine was between us and San Francisco.

In attacking the democracies, the Japanese militarists reversed the order of the expansion program which they intended to follow at the time of the Imperial conference on July 2, when it was reliably learned that they expected to turn against the Soviet Union after occupying Indo-China and then resume the southward expansion drive from newly developed bases in the French colony. This plan was based on the assumption that the Germans would reach the Volga River at least by the end of July. When the Nazis failed to fulfill their schedule, which had been transmitted to Tokyo by the Japanese ambassador in Berlin, the scheme of the militarists broke down. In the meantime, they discovered that they had stirred a hornet's nest by occupying all of Indo-China, as the democracies then began to arm feverishly in the Far East.

The attack on the Soviet Union was expected to be concluded swiftly, the Japanese having no desire to engage in a full-scale war in Siberia. The militarists thought that the Soviet Far Eastern army, after its strength had been sapped by withdrawals to meet the steadily advancing victorious Nazi troops and after it had been demoralized by the defeat of the Stalin government, would fall an easy prey to the Japanese army, which would be accompanied by the White Russian puppets, who would organize a counter-revolutionary movement and establish a new government. The excuse for the attack would have been that the Soviet Union was in chaos as a result of the Nazi invasion and

that it was necessary for Japan to establish "order" in Siberia. The real reason for it, however, would have been to seize the territory before the Nazis could control it through a puppet Russian regime of their own, and to prevent the United States from supporting a refugee Soviet government in the Far East which would be willing to permit American planes to be based at Vladivostok and other points within bombing range of Tokyo. The reason why the Japanese objected so strenuously to the shipment of American war supplies to Vladivostok was that they feared that these might be used not only by Soviet fliers but by American as well.

When the Soviet government and the Red army succeeded in standing up despite the impact of the Nazi drives, the Japanese militarists had to shelve their plan to attack Vladivostok. They turned to the more important part of their expansion program, the southward drive. The reason the militarists modified their original plan of attack in the spring of 1941—which was to launch an assault on Singapore and the Netherlands Indies directly from Formosa, Hainan and bases in China rather than wait for the development of bases in Indo-China—was that they felt it necessary to protect their rear while engaging in the attack against the Soviet Union in the north. Although Indo-China as well as Thailand would have been occupied in the spring of 1941, they were not essential for the attack at that time. By late summer or early fall, when the

Japanese expected to attack the Soviet following the Nazi invasion, however, the democracies had strengthened their military position in the Far East, and the Japanese feared that they might stage a de Gaullist coup if the French colony were not completely occupied by the armed representatives of the emperor. Furthermore, the Japanese realized that by the end of 1941, after they had defeated the Soviet Far Eastern army and were ready to resume the southward drive by the spring of 1942, the position of the democracies in the south sea area would be even stronger than before, requiring different tactics and making newly developed bases in Indo-China extremely valuable.

By October 15, when I left Japan, Konoye must have realized that the Nazis would not reach the Volga River for some time, if at all. The militarists also must have recognized that likelihood, as well as the possibility that the Nazis might not defeat the Soviet Union. As is now apparent from the official notes exchanged by the American and Japanese governments and released by the State Department following the attack on Pearl Harbor, the American government refused to consider the proposals of Nomura for a business arrangement on China if for no other reason than the fact that the Japanese militarists refused to withdraw their troops from China. The final Japanese note also makes clear that what the militarists wanted following the outbreak of the Soviet war was only a pledge by the United States not to strengthen her military posi-

tion in the Far East and an agreement to resume trade. In other words, the Japanese were willing to maintain the military status quo in the south sea area if the United States would agree to continue supplying them with materials with which to expand their production of war supplies to be used later for an attack in the south. The American government obviously knew better than to fall prey to such an ill-concealed plan, and instead continued to increase its military position in the Far East together with the other democracies. It also is clear now that their position was being strengthened at such a rapid pace that the Japanese realized that the balance of power in the south sea area would swing against them if they waited much longer. At the same time, the economic pressure caused by the embargo by the democracies was making the country increasingly weaker. For the militarists to have continued to remain idle apparently would have resulted in their war plants' eventually becoming idle, causing an economic collapse. The militarists therefore had to attack before the democracies became too strong in the south sea area and before the collapse of their war plants, which could only be maintained by securing for them the raw materials of the south seas. Konoye resigned because of the setback of the Nazis in Russia and his failure to conclude an economic truce with the United States which would tide Japan over the period in which it was hoped that the Germans would finally succeed in overwhelming the Soviet Union.

That appears to be a fairly reasonable reconstruction of what took place after the American government refused to accept the proposals for a truce made first by Konoye and then again by Tojo after he became Premier. It does not explain, however, why the Japanese refused to accept the American terms. The explanation for this, however, already has been provided in an earlier part of this book. I do not see how it is possible to understand the final note handed by the Japanese Ambassador, Admiral Nomura, to the American Secretary of State, Mr. Hull, after the Japanese already had bombed Pearl Harbor, without a previous understanding of the concept of "Hakko Ichiu," or "eight corners of the world under one roof." The Japanese note states baldly :

"It is the immutable policy of the Japanese government to insure the stability of East Asia and to promote world peace and thereby to enable all nations to find each its proper place in the world."

This statement was lifted almost bodily from the samurai bible published in Tokyo in the summer of 1941. It is an expression of the ideal or the commandment of the Emperor Jimmu, according to which the militarists believe they have a heavenly mission to conquer the world. To the Japanese, the idea that nations must "find each its proper place in the world" means that they must fit themselves into a world over which

their heaven-descended emperor shall rule, in accordance with the will of their gods. It means that they must join the "co-prosperity sphere" of a Greater East Asia which is not limited to Asia but extends to all the continents of the world and all its eight corners.

That is the reason why the Japanese militarists could not consider such proposals as those advanced by the United States, which called for a multilateral non-aggression pact and the withdrawal of Japanese troops from occupied areas. To accept such proposals the Japanese would have to abandon their divine mission to conquer the world. And more than that: it would also mean that they would have to surrender to the civilian population of Japan, which would be tantamount to a revolution in that country. The refusal of the American government to accept Japan's "economic truce," first suggested in Tokyo by Colonel Iwakuro and published in the New York *Herald Tribune* on February 25, 1941, meant that the Japanese militarists had to choose between surrendering to the civilian population of Japan or destroying the country which refused to grant their demand.

If there was any single blunder made in American diplomacy (not to speak of the British), it was the failure to recognize long ago that the Japanese warlords would never agree to surrender voluntarily. American diplomacy, not only during our generation but during previous ones as well, labored under the unfortunate illusion that there was a "moderate" group

in Japan with which democratic countries could deal peacefully and speak a language understood by all. It is true that at one time in Japan there was the budding of "moderate" or "liberal" opinion and the beginning of something that looked as if it might develop into a democratic form of government. But these were nipped early in the bud by the militarists. Americans, nevertheless, insisted on believing that the small minority described as "moderate" might somehow, as if by magic, manage to overthrow the militarists and gain control of the country.

What is equally unfortunate is that they confused the money clans with the "moderates," believing that the former were all for democracy and peace and all against totalitarianism and war. The recent history of Japan, let alone earlier history, belies such a belief, which could not possibly be entertained seriously by anyone who cared to take the trouble to spend a few moments in reading almost any book dealing with the subject, written either by Japanese or non-Japanese. The fact of the matter is that the "moderate" Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and other business clans of Japan are operating the industrial war machine for the Japanese warlords in the present struggle against the democracies, just as they have in other wars launched by their army and their navy.

The same mistake which Americans made about the business clans they made about the Japanese navy, which also was considered "moderate." The Japanese

navy men, as mentioned earlier, had a much brighter Western veneer than did the Japanese army men, but beneath it beat the same samurai heart which felt the same samurai spirit as inspired their army colleagues. Even Admiral Nomura, as "moderate" as he may be and as much as I was favorably impressed by him because of his friendly and kind nature, unquestionably would support the attack against the democracies if he believed it was undertaken under the most suitable circumstances, promising victory.

Because of their failure to understand the nature of the Japanese navy and the business clans, Americans were led to the mistaken conclusion that there was a fundamental split between them and the army. This was more wishful thinking. The different groups may have had different views about the time and the place for their aggression, but they had been in accord on the fundamental policy of conquest ever since the alliance between the merchants and the militarists which made possible the overthrow of the shogunate in 1867 and the establishment of a new dictatorship in which they had their own part to play.

Wishful thinking again led many to believe that it was only the army which wanted the alliance with the Axis and that the navy was opposed to it. True it is that the navy in 1939 refused to join the Axis, but the reason they refused was not that they were opposed to the alliance in principle but that they saw no good in concluding it at a time when the European war had

not even begun and when the British and American navies possibly would have been able to mass all their strength in the Far East. Following the outbreak of the war and the fall of France, however, the situation changed completely. It was then impossible for the British to send much of their fleet to the Far East, and the American navy had to begin worrying about the dangers in the Atlantic. At such a time, the navy was quite willing to support the alliance, and the tripartite pact consequently was concluded.

In view of what already has been said, the popular belief that the Japanese joined the war and even the Axis because of pressure from the Nazis can be seen to be more than simply naïve. The Japanese were not threatened by the Nazis and were far enough away from them in the Far East that they had no immediate reason to fear them. If the Japanese were at all uneasy about the Nazis, it was because of the possibility that they might defeat the democracies and then challenge them in the Far East. In that case, it would have been more logical for the Japanese to join the democracies in crushing the Nazis than to join the Axis in overthrowing the democracies and thereby strengthening the Nazis. The fact of the matter is that the Japanese, as can be gathered from reading their bible, have no use either for the Nazis or for the democracies or for anyone else. Their mission is to establish a divine order in this world, to which all countries and all creeds must submit willingly or be crushed into submission,

like Korea, Manchukuo, parts of China, Indo-China, Thailand and other occupied areas. The Japanese joined the Axis for a very simple reason: to facilitate their conquest of Asia as a step in the program of conquering other areas until there is only one world co-prosperity sphere. The alliance with the Axis was the most logical one the Japanese could possibly have made in view of their immediate task of defeating Britain and the United States in order to establish their control in the Far East.

Matsuoka did not go to Berlin simply because Hitler had been urging him to come. Hitler wanted him to come to Berlin to urge him to bring Japan into the war against the democracies before the Fuehrer launched his attack against the Soviet Union. With Japan in the war, pressure against the Nazis by the democracies would be relaxed during the period when the Germans would be most vulnerable—that is, while they were fighting the Soviet. The Japanese militarists wanted Matsuoka to go to Berlin to find out when they could expect Hitler to make a move which would bring Japan the best possible opportunity for the attack against the democracies in the south sea area. Although Hitler failed to give Matsuoka a satisfactory answer, he nevertheless said that the invasion of the British Isles and the capture of Suez would be achieved eventually. He also failed to inform Matsuoka that he planned to attack the Soviet. The Japanese Foreign Minister therefore concluded a pact with Stalin on the assumption

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that the Nazi attack against Britain would be made "eventually," in preparation for which he thought it might be useful for the Japanese to have their pact with the Soviet Union.

The fact that the Japanese attacked in the south at a time when things looked darkest for their Nazi allies and when the influence of the Germans in Tokyo was at its lowest point almost disproves in itself the assertions that the Japanese joined the Nazis because they thought the latter would win the war and that they were "forced" into the war by the Nazis. On September 26, 1941, the eve of the first anniversary of the tripartite pact, a banquet was given by the Board of Information for Axis correspondents. I walked out of the Domei Building with the correspondent of Stefani, the official Italian news agency, whose name is Gaetano Aulisio. He was on his way to the banquet. Before leaving me he expressed the pessimistic belief that the Japanese would not attack the democracies because they were afraid and that "next year you [meaning Americans] will be given the banquet." That was the general sentiment of Germans and Italians in Tokyo up to the time I left Japan and probably up to the time of the attack on Pearl Harbor. Not long afterward, this same Aulisio was arrested by police on suspicion of being implicated in the attempted assassination of Baron Hiranuma, one of the leading members of the Cabinet, who originally had been opposed to the Axis

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alliance, not in principle but because he thought that the time was not yet ripe, just as did the navy.

Japanese police had as keen an eye on the movements of the Germans and Italians in Tokyo as they did on the Americans and the Britishers. It is probably safe to say that the Japanese have better control over the nationals of their allies than have the Americans over the nationals of their enemies. The influence of the Nazis in Tokyo also has been greatly exaggerated. Despite the Nazi drive to induce the Japanese to join the war in January, 1941, the Japanese resisted it and did not join the Germans at that time. In fact, they have not even joined them now. The Japanese and Germans are simply carrying out their own programs in the theaters of the world in which they are immediately interested at the moment. The fact that their efforts in these programs happen to be directed against the democracies is an indirect form of assistance to each of them and the only common interest which the Japanese and Nazis have. Both realize that if they emerge victorious, they must face each other for the final battle to decide whose "Hakko Ichiu" is to reign supreme.

In deciding to attack the United States rather than submit peacefully to her as well as to the Japanese people, the militarists undoubtedly counted heavily on the disunity and "decadence" of the American people. For some time the Japanese press disclosed its pleasure over

the various clashes between different sections of the United States. Following the outbreak of the European war, it pointed time and again to the strikes in industry and the feuds in Congress and in the nation as a whole. Lindbergh, Wheeler, and other American isolationists were the heroes of Japanese newspapers, which almost always gave them the front page. The Japanese did whatever they could to encourage differences among the American people through their propaganda literature and agents in the United States as well as through official statements intended to strengthen the isolationist bloc against the President.

Japanese nationalists expressed to me directly their belief that Americans had grown "soft" by saying that we preferred our automobiles, our well-furnished homes, our good food, our motion pictures and other comforts to the rigors of war, to which the Japanese had become accustomed. They assumed that the American mind also had become "soft," as indicated by the short-sighted policies of the United States since the first world war. They may have committed a serious blunder in believing, however, that the American mind had become permanently disabled. They may have overlooked the possibility that a new generation of Americans might not continue to repeat the blunders of the old, that a new America with a greater capacity for intelligence than that displayed by some of the representatives in Congress of the old America might be created from the fire of war started on both

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sides of them by two equally ambitious nations which aspire to rule the world, that there are many other Americans like Jim Tew, who saw the danger confronting their country long before many of their fellow countrymen saw them and who were willing to give their lives long before many others were.

In the process of fighting the greatest war in the history of their country, the Americans who will be called upon to wage it until it is won will possibly become aware of the necessity of understanding something more about the forces which have brought the war upon them. As far as Japan is concerned, it is probably correct to assert that never have Americans undertaken to engage in war another country about whom they know so little. Many Americans apparently still are of the opinion that we are fighting the Japanese simply because they attacked Pearl Harbor. If Americans were disturbed only by Pearl Harbor, it is no great risk to hazard the guess that the Japanese government would be more than willing to repair all the damage done to the base, replace all the ships which have been sunk and pay compensation for all the lives which have been lost there, if the United States government would call off the war and retreat to its base at Pearl Harbor until the Japanese are better prepared to attack it at some later date.

The attack on Pearl Harbor may have started the war, but it did not start the Japanese militarists on their program of conquest. Pearl Harbor is only part

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of it, and the reason it was attacked on December 7, 1941, was that the Japanese felt that we refused to stay there and that we insisted instead on maintaining that other peoples, such as the Chinese, were entitled to American assistance so that they too could be free, and by being free could indirectly help the American people in the security of their country as well as of the base established to protect it against the day when the Japanese, in their program of reaching for the eight corners of the world, might undertake to destroy them both.

And while they are fighting their war, Americans may realize that it again will only be in vain unless they have a better notion than did their forebears of the necessity to eliminate the forces which generated the conflict in the Pacific. It is difficult to see how there ever can be a genuine basis for peace in the Pacific as long as the Japanese are ruled by an unholy trinity of a divine emperor, a fanatical group of militarists and an equally dangerous number of business clans which are prepared to furnish them with the weapons to engage in their divine mission of conquest. It is difficult to see how the Japanese people can ever have or conceive of a system of free democracy, under which most Americans prefer to live, until they first are freed from the prison of their feudal minds, filled with myths and ghosts and the spirits of dead ancestors, which were largely responsible for their becoming patriotic victims of a military dictatorship. And the Japanese will

never be released from this intellectual and spiritual prison until they are first released from the emperor who holds the key to it. There may be nothing wrong with the emperor himself, but there is much that is wrong with the principle of blind and servile obedience to a ruler who has no power but who has succeeded admirably with his three magic and divine symbols to secure the fervent loyalty of a people controlled by the same warlords of whom the emperor himself is a victim.

Once released from the bondage of their crude Shinto religion, which raised one of their kind to the level of a god and made it a crime for anyone to question his divinity, the Japanese may learn to see for the first time that they have been living under a dictatorship of militarism which has led them into their death struggle against the democracies. Once they see the militarists for what they are and once they are free to raise their voices against them without being accused of a crime against their gods and their emperor, it may become possible for them to rule their militarists rather than be ruled by them as they are at the present time.

Having regained their minds as free-thinking human beings, free to think and to act without being struck down by the military guardians of their chief Shinto priest, the Japanese may be able to liberate themselves from the economic dictatorship of a handful of family clans over which they have been able to exercise no control and by which they have been victimized as much as by their divine god and their militarist rulers.

The Americans, therefore, are not fighting strange little creatures whom many of their cartoonists take such self-deceptive delight in picturing as monkeys. They are fighting a race of people capable of great industry and refined feeling, both of which have been distorted and turned to the ends of conquest by their rulers, who constitute the unholy trinity of Japan. Not until this trinity is destroyed will the democracies be able to return safely to the peace which they have been forced to abandon. And not until this trinity is destroyed will the Japanese people be able to lift their heads above their world of feudalism and join other countries in the pursuit of life rather than death.

Joseph Newman here explains the strangest dictatorship in the world; who the leaders are and how they achieve and maintain their power. In his chapter, *School for Puppets*, he describes the Japanese skill not only in making puppets behave like human beings but their success in making human beings behave like puppets. The Japanese have a larger collection of these international dolls than any other people in the world—puppets from China, Mongolia, Russia, Malaya, Burma, Thailand, India, and the Philippines, and other areas in which Japan is directly interested. The Japanese militarists are the puppet-masters, having begun in Korea back in the year 1895.

Mr. Newman exposes, for the first time, just how far Japan will cooperate with the Axis; that Japan was at war with the democracies long before the first bombs fell on Pearl Harbor; how far-reaching her preparations for this war are; the extent of her propaganda in North and South America; the American and British residents' weak and ready acceptance of what Japan would have them think.

Mr. Newman believes that whatever Japan took from the United States in trade and information she used to promote her plans of conquest and domination. Whatever she gave in return she hoped would soften and confuse a future enemy.

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